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While some controversies still remain as to whether global warming is the conse-
quence of past human choices or the simple evidence of entirely natural and recurrent
temperature changes, there is however no doubt that peoples’ and firms’ economic and
environmental choices today, will influence their economic and environmental well-being
tomorrow. The European Union’s ratification of the Kyoto protocol in May 2002, not
only reflected this position, but also lead the debate on environmental protection to be
even further acknowledged on the national and international political arena. By ratify-
ing the Kyoto protocol in 2002, the European Union recognized the urgency in taking
action to limit its emissions today, and therefore contain the environmental damage of
increasing emissions tomorrow. Therefore the European Union, now with others, has
accepted to be subject to new constraints that may jeopardize its economic growth.
Indeed, the existence of a dichotomy between the protection of the environment
and unbounded economic growth can be a major stumbling block for many countries
whose environmental concerns may often, and understandably so, become overridden
by the "political and social pressure" of the pursuit of economic growth. Indeed, the
financial and economic well-being, as well as the demand of electing citizens for a
constantly increasing purchasing power, is the fundamental focus of all democratic
countries, often to the detriment of ideological principles. For this reason, governments
may choose to release themselves from environmental constraints that may seem to
them in contradiction with their initial points of focus. Indeed, it is often supposed
that the introduction of an environmental policy1, the goal of which is the protection
of the environment, will necessarily lead to negative impacts on the overall economy. In
fact, this argument was the fundamental one used by the United States, to support the
Bush Administration’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. In an interview to the Danish
1The goals of an environmental policy can be many. It can range from seaking, on the earth, to
protect biodiversity by preventing the extinguishing of diﬀerent animal species, to working towards
protecting, in the skies, the ozone layer. But while the objectives of environmental policies may be
multitude, the instruments that can be used to serve such goals are few, and well known. Policy makers
for instance may use norms and quotas, taxes, emission permits, subventions or public awareness to
serve their purposes.
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television in June 2005, the United States’ President George W. Bush explained his
refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol by suggesting that adhering to the Kyoto treaty on
climate change would have "wrecked" the U.S. economy. But, he adds :
"And so my hope is [...] to move beyond the Kyoto debate and to col-
laborate on new technologies that will enable the United States and other
countries to diversify away from fossil fuels so that the air will be cleaner
[...]" .
In the context of the apparent dichotomy between this need for environmental
protection and the pursuit of unconstrained economic growth, the International Energy
Agency (IEA (1999)), undertook an international consultation to identify the expected
technologies that could help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A surprisingly long list
was published. Taking note of this work, Maurice Claverie (former president of the
scientific council of the ADEME), among others, reconciles these apparently opposite
trajectories, with the solution of technological change.
"As it is morally inacceptable, and in any case completely unrealistic, to
curb economic development, and specifically in the Third World, the ways
that we may have to control greenhouse gas emissions are those of tech-
nological progress, lifestyle choices, and better organisation of the society."
(see Maurice Claverie (2000))
We place this thesis at the heart of the debate linking emission constraints or gen-
erally environmental policies, economic growth and technological change. The object of
this thesis is to study technological change in the context of an emission constraint, and
to develop a method to incorporate induced technological change in energy-economy
models, in order to improve modeling projections, and to determine how technological
change may alter the impact of the constraint on the economy.
In the first chapter of the thesis we develop the state of art of the diﬀerent main
Introduction 10
methods for modeling technological change in energy-economy models. We first specif-
ically note the uncertainties that are linked to the diﬀusion or the use of new technolo-
gies, due to "lock in" or "crowding out" eﬀects, which may limit the introduction of
technological progress. We then note that technological change can be portrayed either
as an exogenous or as an endogenous process, according to whether the technology
choices are previously exogenously determined or included in the model. We mathe-
matically describe how both the autonomous energy eﬃciency improvement parameter
(AEEI) and backstop technologies can be incorporated in energy-economy models as a
method to model technological change as an exogenous process, and we list the models
that use such formulations. We address the advantages and disadvantages of using such
methods. We then mathematically describe how both the process of learning by doing,
and the stock of knowledge approach can be introduced in energy-economy models as
a method to model endogenous technological change, and we list the models that rely
on such formulations.
In the second chapter, we build a recursive dynamic general equilibrium model
for the French economy, in which we implement the French National Allocation Plan
(NAP), as well as the Kyoto targets. We calibrate our model on data from 1995 for the
French economy, and use the elasticities of substitution of the MIT-EPPA model (Palt-
sev et al. (2005)). We model technological change as an exogenous process through the
autonomous energy eﬃciency parameter, and we suppose that, each year, the eﬃciency
of energy is increased by 0.75 %. We diﬀerentiate between two types of labor qualifica-
tion (skilled and unskilled labor), and model skilled unemployment through the wage
curve specification, and unskilled unemployment through the minimum wage speci-
fication. We therefore take into account these two labor market unbalances, namely
unemployment for both skilled and unskilled workers. In the context of exogenous
technological change, we assess the stringency of the NAP and of the Kyoto targets by
deriving the expected prices of emission permits, and detail the eﬀects of these emis-
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sion constraints on the economy. We give insights as to which sectors will buy emission
permits and which ones will sell them. We conclude on the stringency of the NAP for
France.
Capturing the process of endogenous or induced technological change in energy-
economy models is a complex task2. It is however today quite widely accepted that
an energy-economy model where technological change is not portrayed as inducible
or endogenous, may not manage to replicate some of the major economic interactions
one can expect to see in the reality. We therefore take note of the shortcomings of us-
ing the autonomous energy eﬃciency parameter to model technological change in our
CGE model for France, and seek in the following two chapters to focus our attention
on the process of technological change. Our approach is twofold : through a partial
equilibrium model we seek to determine how an emission constraint can influence tech-
nological change, and then through a general equilibrium model we seek to assess the
eﬀects on the rest of the economy of technological change induced by an emission con-
straint. In chapter 3, we therefore give conclusions on the direction of technological
change in the case of an emission constraint, and show that in a theoretical partial
equilibrium model such a constraint does in fact influence its direction. In chapter 4,
we then propose a method to model induced technological change through the stock
of knowledge approach in a computable general equilibrium model. We implement this
method in the forward looking version of the model we built in chapter 2. Our goal is
to assess how an emission constraint may influence technological change, but also, how
induced technological change may influence the rest of the economy.
Therefore, in the third chapter, we study how the direction of technological change
may be aﬀected by an emission or energy constraint. Indeed, the exogeneity of techno-
2"If the choice of technologies is included within the models and aﬀects energy demand and/or
economic growth, then the model includes endogenous technical change (ETC). With ETC, further
changes can generally be induced by economic policies, hence the term induced technical change
(ITC) ; therefore ITC implies ETC (...)". See Barker et al. (2005)
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logical change constrains a model in its reactivity, while, in the reality, technological
change can be expected to increase the eﬃciency of various inputs to production dif-
ferently, according to the policies that are introduced in an economy. To address this
issue, and to determine how technological change can increase the eﬃciency of inputs
to production in the case of an emission constraint, we place ourselves in Nordhaus’
(1968) frame of work. We work with a small theoretical model representing an economy
on a balanced growth path. We modify Nordhaus’ production function, and add energy
as an additional input to production. In this new production function, physical capital
and energy are bound together through a Cobb Douglas (CD) function. This bundle
is then linked to labor through a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function.
Capital can be accumulated, and labor is a non reproducible input, while energy is
produced each year (just like electricity is).
The goal of our work in this framework is to shed light on the direction of tech-
nological change in the case where the use of energy as an input to production, is
constrained (case of an environmental policy or an emission constraint). We show that,
when emissions are not constrained in the economy, technological change will mainly
increase the eﬃciency of the non reproducible factor, in our case labor. Technological
change will therefore be Harrod-neutral. We then show, that, in the case of an emission
constraint3, the optimal direction of technological change will depend on the share of
capital in the capital-energy bundle. Indeed, we show that the smaller the share of
capital in the capital-energy bundle, the more technological change will tend towards
Hicks-neutrality, and similarly, the greater the share of capital in the capital-energy
bundle the more technological change will tend towards Harrod-neutrality. However,
contrary to the case where energy is an unconstrained input, we show that technological
change may never be Harrod-neutral in the case of an emission constraint if the share
3In our model we constrain the amount of energy per capita e used as a input in the production
function to not be greater than a total fixed amount e¯.
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of capital α belongs to ]0; 1[ 4. These results lead us to conclude that technological
change will tend to increase the eﬃciency of the inputs constrained by the limitations,
whether these limitations are non reproducibility (such as the inherent limitations in
labor) or simply environmental constraints. Finally, we note that the direction of tech-
nological change is entirely independent of the intensity of the emission constraint.
This chapter allows us to support the thesis whereby, modeling technological change
as an exogenous and therefore independent process, is a suboptimal method to model
technological change, as the direction of technological change will not stay unaﬀected
by various economic constraints.
In the last chapter of this thesis, we take note of the conclusions of our first chapter
listing the diﬀerent modeling methods to account for technological change in energy-
economy models, and of the inherent limitations of modeling technological change as
an exogenous process, as it was modeled in the second chapter. We moreover take note
of the conclusions of our theoretical model in the third chapter whereby technological
change will tend to increase the eﬃciency of constrained inputs, and is aﬀected in
its direction by energy constraints. We then develop a method to introduce induced
technological change in computable general equilibrium models, so as to increase the
accuracy of the assessment of the impacts of economic constraints on the economy.
To do so, we build our work on Sue Wing (2001), and propose a method for im-
plementing induced technological change through the stock of knowledge approach in
energy-economy models. We suppose that there is a stock of human capital that exists
and is available for the whole economy, from which flow human capital services, which
are intangible inputs that may be used as inputs to production. This human capital
4For technological change to be Harrod-neutral it is necessary for the share of capital α in the
capital-energy bundle to be equal to 1 (this would mean that there is no energy in the production
function). But in this case, the existence of an emission constraint on energy would have no sense if it
is not an input to production. Similarly, technological change will be Hicks-neutral if α = 0 meaning
that there is no capital in the capital-energy bundle. Therefore, technological change will increase the
productivity of both non reproducible labor and constrained energy in the same way.
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stock is increased through investments in human capital (in the same way that the
physical capital stock is increased through investments in physical capital). Induced
technological change kicks in following an emission constraint, as firms will demand
more of the intangible input, and less of the tangible constrained good.
To implement endogenous technological change in our computable general equilib-
rium model for France, we create an inter-industry technology matrix using data for
the French economy on patent flows, from the Johnson and Evenson Patent data set
(see Evenson and Johnson (1997)), and values of investment in R&D for France. We ex-
tract this matrix, proxy for the industries knowledge flows, from the social accounting
matrix (SAM) on which our model for France was initially calibrated. After extracting
knowledge also from the labor row, we modify the SAM for France, and create an extra
column representing investment in research and development and a new row represent-
ing knowledge services. We rebalance the SAM such that human capital and physical
capital may grow on the balanced growth path at the rate of growth of the economy.
We then calibrate a forward looking version of the model replicating the French
economy, on this new SAM. The object of this work is to give conclusions on the eﬀects
of an environmental constraint such as policy similar to the French National Allocation
Plan on the French economy, in the case where technological change is modeled as an
endogenous process.
We show, similarly to Nordhaus’ (2002) findings, that in the case of the introduction
of as policy similar to the French National Allocation Plan the process of induced tech-
nological change (ITC) is not as important as the substitution eﬀects that take place
between the tangible inputs in the years following the introduction of the constraint.
We show, that in the case where ITC is modeled, sectors that are not subject
to the constraint increase their demand for human capital services more than sectors
that are constrained by the energy policy, because of the substitution eﬀect leading to
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an increased demand for the production of unconstrained sectors, which mechanically
increases their demand for input.
We show that there is an eviction eﬀect or crowding out eﬀect that relates the
demand for human capital services and the demand for physical capital services, be-
cause of the aggregate income accounting equation. When investment in research and
development increases this leads to a necessary decrease in the investment in physical
capital.
Finally, we show, similarly to Popp (2002) that there are peaks in the demand for
human capital services, the first years of the introduction of the NAP, for both types of
sectors, which disappear the following years during which the constraint is still active.
We conclude, that technological change is therefore a shortly lived process that can
be induced solely through the constant increase in a policy’s stringency.
The purpose of this thesis is to address how technological change can be aﬀected
by an emission constraint such as the French National Allocation Plan, and how this
constraint impacts the rest of the economy. To seek to answer these questions, we study
the consequences on the French economy of the introduction of such an environmental
policy. We build our own CGE model to carry out our simulations on France. We
study the model’s results both in the case where technological change is modeled as
an exogenous process and where it is modeled as an endogenous process. Finally, we
propose a newmethod for modeling technological change in forward looking computable
general equilibrium models, and implement it in our model for France.
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Même si des doutes persistent encore sur la cause du réchauﬀement de la planète,
à savoir si elle est la conséquence de comportements humains passés, ou simplement
le témoignage de changements climatiques entièrement naturels et récurrents, il n’y
a pourtant aujourd’hui aucun doute sur le fait que les choix économiques et environ-
nementaux des entreprises ou des hommes aujourd’hui, influenceront demain leur bien-
être économique et environnemental. La ratification du protocole de Kyoto par l’Union
Européenne en Mai 2002, a non seulement reflété cette position, mais a aussi contribué
à relancer le débat sur la protection de l’environnement sur les scènes nationales et
internationales. En ratifiant le protocole de Kyoto en 2002, l’Union Européenne a re-
connu l’urgence d’agir pour réduire les émissions des gaz à eﬀet de serre aujourd’hui,
afin de limiter demain les conséquences sur l’environnement des dommages liés à la
croissance de ces émissions. Ainsi, avec d’autres, l’Union Européenne a accepté d’être
sujet à de nouvelles contraintes qui peuvent mettre sa croissance économique en péril.
En eﬀet, l’existence d’une dichotomie entre la protection de l’environnement et une
croissance économique illimitée peut devenir une pierre d’achoppement majeure pour
nombre de pays dont les préoccupations d’ordre environnementales peuvent être, et
ceci se comprend aisément, outrepassées par les pressions politiques et sociales de la
poursuite de la croissance économique. En eﬀet, la recherche du bien-être économique
et financier est l’objectif premier de tout pays démocratique, et ce parfois au détri-
ment de principes idéologiques. C’est pour cette raison, que les gouvernements parfois
choisissent de ne pas se soumettre à des contraintes d’ordre environnementales qui
peuvent leur sembler à première vue en contradiction avec leurs objectifs premiers. En
eﬀet, il est souvent présupposé que l’introduction d’une politique environnementale5,
dont l’objectif est la protection de l’environnement, aura nécessairement des impacts
5Les objectifs d’une politique environnementale peuvent être multiples. Ils peuvent aller de la
volonté de protéger sur terre la biodiversité, en prévenant l’extinction de diﬀérentes races animales,
à la protection dans le ciel de la couche d’ozone. Mais, alors que les objectifs des politiques environ-
nementales sont nombreux, les instruments qui peuvent être utilisés sont eux peu bien moins nombreux
et bien connus. Par exemple, les normes, les quotas, les permis d’émissions négociables, les subventions
ou la publicité peuvent servir ces propos.
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négatifs sur le reste de l’économie. C’était d’ailleurs l’argument fondamental du Prési-
dent Américain George Bush, pour expliquer pourquoi son Administration a refusé de
signer le Protocole de Kyoto. Dans un interview donné à la télévision Danoise en juin
2005, le Président Américain George Bush, expliqua son refus de signer le Protocole
de Kyoto en suggérant que le traité sur le changement climatique détruirait l’économie
Américaine. Mais il rajouta :
"And so my hope is [...] to move beyond the Kyoto debate and to col-
laborate on new technologies that will enable the United States and other
countries to diversify away from fossil fuels so that the air will be cleaner
[...]" .
Au vu de l’apparente dichotomie entre la nécessité d’instaurer des politiques en-
vironnementales, et la poursuite d’une croissance illimitée, l’Agence Internationale de
l’Energie (IEA (1999)) a entrepris une consultation internationale pour identifier les
technologies qui pourraient dans le futur contribuer à réduire les émissions de gaz à
eﬀet de serre. Une liste, surprenante par sa longueur, fut publiée. Prenant acte de cette
publication, Maurice Claverie (ancien président du conseil scientifique de l’ADEME),
avec d’autres, réconcilie ces deux trajectoires apparemment opposées, avec la solution
du changement technologique.
"As it is morally inacceptable, and in any case completely unrealistic, to
curb economic development, and specifically in the Third World, the ways
that we may have to control greenhouse gas emissions are those of tech-
nological progress, lifestyle choices, and better organisation of the society."
(see Maurice Claverie (2000))
Nous plaçons cette thèse au coeur de ce débat liant les contraintes d’émissions,
ou plus généralement les politiques environnementales, la croissance économique et le
changement technologique. L’objet de cette thèse est d’étudier, la question du change-
ment technologique dans un contexte de contrainte des émissions et de développer
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une méthode pour modéliser le progrès technique induit dans les modèles économie-
énergie. Le but est d’améliorer les projections de ces modèles et de déterminer comment
le changement technologique peut modifier l’eﬀet d’une contrainte énergétique sur une
économie.
Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, nous présentons les diﬀérentes méthodes
pour modéliser le progrès technique dans les modèles économie-énergie. Nous notons
premièrement tout particulièrement les incertitudes liées à la diﬀusion ou à l’utilisation
de nouvelles technologies, en raison de phénomènes de "lock-in" ou de "crowding-out".
Nous notons ensuite que le changement technologique peut être représenté comme un
processus exogène ou endogène, en fonction de si le modélisateur suppose que son
taux ou sa direction peuvent être influencés ou non par une politique. Nous définissons
mathématiquement, comment le paramètre Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Improve-
ment (AEEI) ainsi que les backstop technologies peuvent être incorporés dans les mod-
èles économie-énergie comme méthode pour modéliser le changement technologique
exogène. Nous élaborons une liste des modèles qui utilisent de telles formulations pour
le progrès technique. Nous adressons de plus, les avantages et les inconvénients liés à
l’utilisation de telles formules. Nous définissons ensuite mathématiquement, comment
le processus de "Learning by Doing" (LBD) ainsi que l’"Approche du Stock de Connais-
sance" peut être introduit dans les modèles économie-énergie, comme méthode pour
modéliser le progrès technique endogène, et nous élaborons une liste de modèles qui
utilisent de telles formulations.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous construisons un modèle d’équilibre général dy-
namique pour l’économie Française, dans lequel nous modélisons le Plan National
d’Allocation des Quotas (PNAQ), ainsi que les objectifs dictés par le Protocole de
Kyoto. Nous calibrons ce modèle sur des données de 1995, pour l’économe française,
et nous utilisons les élasticités de substitution du modèle MIT-EPPA (Paltsev et al.
(2005)). Nous modélisons le changement technologique comme un processus exogène
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grâce à l’ AEEI et nous supposons que, chaque année, l’eﬃcience énergétique croît
de 0.75 %. De plus, nous diﬀérencions entre deux types de qualifications du travail
(qualifié et non qualifié), et nous modélisons le chômage des travailleurs qualifiés grâce
à une courbe de salaire, et le chômage des travailleurs non qualifiés grâce au salaire
minimum. Nous prenons ainsi en compte ces deux déséquilibres sur les marchés du
travail. Dans ce contexte de changement technologique exogène, nous étudions le Plan
National d’Allocation des Quotas, et les objectifs de Kyoto en dérivant les prix des
permis d’émissions négociables, et en détaillant les eﬀets de ces contraintes d’émissions
sur l’économie. Nous explicitons quels secteurs se porteront acheteurs de permis sur le
marché des permis d’émissions et quels secteurs se porteront vendeurs. Nous concluons
sur la rigueur du PNAQ.
Réussir à capturer dans les modèles économie-énergie, le processus de changement
technologique endogène ou induit reste une tache complexe. Il est pourtant aujour-
d’hui largement accepté qu’un modèle dans lequel le changement technologique n’est
pas représenté comme induit ou endogène, risque de ne pas pouvoir mettre en évidence
les interactions économiques majeures que l’on peut s’attendre à observer dans la réal-
ité. Nous prenons donc note des limites quant à l’utilisation de l’AEEI pour modéliser
le changement technologique dans notre CGE pour la France, et cherchons à déterminer
comment une contrainte d’émissions peut influencer le changement technologique. En-
suite, à travers la construction d’un modèle d’équilibre général nous cherchons à déter-
miner les eﬀets sur le reste de l’économie du changement technologique induit par une
contrainte d’émissions.
Dans le chapitre 3 de cette thèse, nous donnons donc des conclusions sur la direc-
tion du progrès technique dans le cas d’une contrainte d’émissions, et nous montrons
que dans un modèle d’équilibre partiel, une telle contrainte influence en eﬀet sa di-
rection. Dans le chapitre 4, nous proposons ensuite une méthode pour modéliser le
changement technologique induit dans un CGE en reprenant l’ Approche du Stock de
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Connaissances. Nous appliquons cette méthode dans une version "forward-looking" du
modèle décrit dans le chapitre 2. Notre objectif est de déterminer comment une con-
trainte d’émissions peut influencer le changement technologique, mais aussi, comment
le changement technologique peut influencer le reste de l’économie.
Dans le chapitre 3, nous étudions ainsi comment la direction du progrès technique
peut être aﬀectée par une contrainte d’émissions ou d’utilisation d’énergie. En eﬀet,
l’exogèneité du changement technologique contraint la réactivité d’un modèle, alors
que dans la réalité, on peut s’attendre à ce que le changement technologique accroisse
l’eﬃcience énergétique de certains facteurs de production contraignant la croissance.
C’est pourquoi, pour déterminer comment on peut s’attendre à ce que le changement
technologique réagisse face à une contrainte, nous nous plaçons dans le cadre de travail
de Nordhaus (1968). Nous travaillons avec un petit modèle théorique représentant
une économie sur le sentier de croissance de long terme. Nous modifions la fonction
de production de Nordhaus, et rajoutons un facteur de production supplémentaire,
l’énergie. Dans cette nouvelle fonction de production, le capital physique et l’énergie
sont reliés grâce à une fonction Cobb Douglas. Cet agrégat est ensuite relié au travail par
une fonction CES, à élasticité de substitution constante. Le capital peut être accumulé,
le travail est un facteur non reproductible, et l’énergie est produit chaque année (de la
même manière que l’électricité par exemple).
L’objectif de notre travail dans ce cadre, est de mettre en lumière comment la
direction du changement technologique est aﬀectée quand il existe une contrainte sur
l’utilisation d’énergie (cas d’une politique environnementale ou d’une contrainte d’émis-
sion). Nous montrons que, dans le cas où les émissions ne sont pas contraintes dans
l’économie, le progrès technique reposera sur le facteur non reproductible, le travail.
Le progrès technique sera donc neutre au sens de Harrod. Nous montrons ensuite, que
dans le cas où les émissions sont contraintes, la direction optimale du progrès technique
dépendra de la part du capital dans l’agrégat capital-énergie ; plus cette part est pe-
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tite, plus le progrès technique tendra vers la neutralité au sens de Hicks. Ces résultats
nous permettent de conclure que le progrès technique reposera sur le facteur de pro-
duction contraint par des limitations, que ces limitations soient la non reproductibilité
(comme les limitations inhérentes au travail) ou simplement des contraintes d’ordre
environnementales. Enfin, nous montrons que la direction du progrès technique est en-
tièrement indépendante de l’intensité de la contrainte environnementale. Ce chapitre
nous permet de soutenir que modéliser le changement technologique comme un proces-
sus exogène et donc indépendant, est une méthode sous-optimale.
Dans le dernier chapitre de cette thèse, nous prenons note des conclusions de notre
premier chapitre listant les diﬀérentes méthodes pour modéliser le changement tech-
nologique dans les modèles économie-énergie, ainsi que la limitation inhérente à mod-
éliser le progrès technique comme un processus exogène, comme cela était fait dans
le chapitre 2. Nous prenons note de plus des conclusions de notre modèle théorique,
détaillé dans le chapitre 3, où le progrès technique est influencé dans sa direction par
les contraintes énergétiques, et tend à reposer sur les facteurs de production qui sont
soumis à des contraintes. Nous développons ensuite une méthode pour modéliser le
progrès technique induit dans des modèles d’équilibre général, de façon à améliorer la
précision des prédictions de ces modèles sur les impacts de contraintes, quelles qu’elles
soient, sur l’économie .
Pour ce faire, nous fondons notre travail sur les travaux de Sue Wing (2001), et
proposons une méthode pour modéliser le progrès technique induit à traver l’Approche
du Stock de Connaissances. Nous supposons qu’il existe en eﬀet un stock de capital hu-
main dans l’économie, d’où proviennent des flux de services de capital humain, qui sont
tout simplement des facteurs de production intangibles (non matériels). Ce stock de
capital humain croît grâce à des investissement en capital humain (de la même manière
que le stock de capital physique croît grâce à l’investissement en capital physique). Le
progrès technique induit apparaît clairement à la suite d’une contrainte d’émissions,
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comme les entreprises demanderont plus du bien intangible et moins des biens tangibles
comme le travail, le capital physique ; l’énergie, les matériaux...).
Pour modéliser le progrès technique induit dans notre modèle d’équilibre général
pour la France, nous créons une matrice technologique inter-industrielle grâce à l’u-
tilisation de données sur les flux de brevets dans l’économie française provenant du
"Johnson and Evenson Patent data set", ainsi que de valeurs sur l’investissement en
R&D en France. Nous extrayons cette matrice, Proxy des flux de connaissance inter-
industriels, de la matrice de comptabilité sociale (MCS) sur laquelle notre modèle pour
la France a initialement été calibré. Après avoir extrait la connaissance de la valeur du
travail de la matrice, nous modifions la MCS pour la France, et créons une colonne sup-
plémentaire représentant les investissements en R&D et une nouvelle ligne représentant
les services de capital humain.
Nous calibrons ensuite une version forward-looking du modèle pour la France dé-
taillée dans le chapitre 2 de cette thèse, sur la nouvelle MCS. L’objet de ce travail est
de pouvoir donner des conclusions quant aux eﬀets d’une contrainte environnementale
telle que le PNAQ sur l’économie française, dans le cas où le progrès technique est
modélisé comme un processus induit.
Nous montrons que, similairement à Nordhaus (2002), dans le cas où le Plan Na-
tional d’Allocation des Quotas est introduit, l’eﬀet du progrès technique induit n’est pas
aussi important que les eﬀets de substitution entre les facteurs de production tangibles
qui ont lieu les années qui suivent l’introduction de la contrainte.
Nous montrons, que similairement à Sue Wing (2001), dans le cas où l’ITC est mod-
élisé, les secteurs qui ne sont pas soumis à la contrainte vont accroître leur demande de
services de capital humain plus que les secteurs qui sont visés par la contrainte énergé-
tique. Ce phénomène provient de l’eﬀet de substitution qui permet à la production des
secteurs non contraints de croître suite à l’introduction de la contrainte énergétique sur
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les secteurs couverts. Cette croissance de leur production leur permet de mécanique-
ment accroître leur demande de facteurs de production et donc de services de capital
humain.
Nous montrons qu’il existe un eﬀet d’éviction ou eﬀet de "crowding out", qui relie
la demande de services de capital humain à la demande de services de capital physique.
Quand l’investissement en R&D augmente ceci entraîne nécessairement une chute de
l’investissement en capital physique.
Enfin, nous montrons que comme Popp (2002), il existe des pics de demande de
services de capital humain les premières années de l’introduction du PNAQ, pour les
deux types de secteurs, et qui disparaissent les années qui suivent alors même que la
contrainte est encore active.
Nous concluons que le progrès technique est un processus à courte espérance de vie,
qui ne peut être induit qu’à force de politiques de plus en plus contraignantes.
L’objet de cette thèse est d’étudier comment le changement technologique peut être
aﬀecté par une contrainte d’émission telle que le PNAQ, et comment cette contrainte
influence le reste de l’économie. Pour chercher à répondre à ces questions, nous étu-
dions les conséquences sur l’économie française de l’introduction d’une telle politique
environnementale. Nous construisons un CGE pour la France. Nous étudions les résul-
tats du modèle dans le cas où le progrès technique est modélisé comme un processus
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1.1 Introduction
Today, due to political and social pressure, the solution to ever increasing carbon
emissions is not to be found in the constraining of economic growth. While production
is carbon emitting, all now agree on the fact that economic growth and the generation
of emissions must be decoupled, in order to tackle the problem of climate change. For
this reason, technological progress, the process by which fewer inputs are needed to
produce the same amount of output, is now seen as the "saving grace" which allows
for unconstrained economic growth, and controlled emissions. Views, however, on tech-
nological progress may diﬀer quite significantly. Some are convinced that technological
change has a "life of its own", and will kick in, in due time, to lighten the burden
of environmental constraints. Others believe that technological change responds to an
inducement process and is the result of well designed policies. Both schools of thought
however converge on one aspect of technological change, namely that it is most certainly
the "key" to attenuating the painful economic side-eﬀects of environmental constraints.
In other words, it is the source of the decoupling of economic growth and emissions.
These two views on technological change are echoed in the chosen modeling tech-
niques. If technological change (TC) is considered an independent time trend entirely
unaﬀected by any sort of constraint, whether economic or environmental, it will be
modeled as an exogenous process. In this case, if emission restrictions are introduced
in a energy-economy model, the model will yield no immediate reaction that may lead
to technological progress, and the rate of abatement will stay unaﬀected. Mitigation
of the economic costs incurred by environmental constraints will be obvious only once
technological change kicks in, following a predefined and entirely independent exoge-
nous time trend. For this reason, these types of models can only assess in which way
technological progress can aﬀect an economy, but never how technological change oc-
curs. Therefore, such a modeling choice leads to the inaptitude of the energy-economy
model to enhance any substitution process between inputs to production, and favors a
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"wait and see" model reaction (Sue Wing I., Popp D. (2006)).
In the case where technological progress is expected to be driven by inducement
or impulses deriving from a constraint, whether economic or environmental (Grubb et
al. (1995)), technological change will be modeled as an endogenous process. Mitiga-
tion of economic costs due to environmental constraints will be visible as soon as the
constraint is introduced, as abatement, or enhanced substitution reactions in the pro-
duction function, are induced. As opposed to a "wait and see" model reaction, whereby
no immediate response is given to the introduction of environmental constraints when
technological change is modeled as an exogenous process, models with endogenous tech-
nological change will favor an "act now" strategy. In such model configurations, the
very fact of introducing an emission restriction is the solution to the mitigation of its
costs. It is to be noted, however, that the direction and bias of technological change
may have to be fostered by appropriate policies, and not all technological change is
environmentally friendly (see Carraro C., Galleotti M. (2004)). Indeed, the simple fact
of constraining the economy on one side can lead to development of other industries
or sectors leading to the production of new harmful pollutants. All the more so, the
simple investing of research and development is not emission free.
In energy-economy models, whether the eﬀect of technological change is sizeable
enough to be relevant, does not only depend on the type of technological progress,
namely exogenous or endogenous. Indeed, the impacts of technological change in energy-
economymodels will also depend on the chosen modeling method within these two types
of TC, as well as on the category of the model itself, whether top-down, bottom-up
or hybrid. In this paper, we will seek to assess the four main methods to model tech-
nological change, and seek to define more precisely the advantages and disadvantages
to modeling technological change through the Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Improve-
ment parameter (AEEI), Backstop Technologies, the Learning by Doing process, or the
Stock of Knowledge approach. For a thorough survey of the various methods to model
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technological change see Löschel (2001).
In the following section, we will first seek to assess the uncertain impacts of environ-
mental policies on technological change. Then, we will define exogenous and endogenous
technological change in detail as well as the main four methods to model these pro-
cesses in energy-economy-environment models. We will underline the implications of
these methods on the models’ behaviors facing an emission constraint.
1.2 Environmental Policies and the Eﬀect of Tech-
nological Change : An Uncertain Outcome
Joseph Schumpeter (1942) was the first to give a three step definition to the intro-
duction on the market of a superior technology. According to his now widely-agreed-
upon categorization, invention is the first step in the development of a new technological
or scientific product or process. Then comes innovation, namely the introduction into
the market of this new product or process1. Usually private companies with profit-
maximizing goals are at the origin of these two first steps, invention and innovation, as
a result of their investments in research and development. And finally, the third step
is the diﬀusion of the new product or process which allows any individual or company
to have access to it and to introduce it into their production process. The process of
technological change is the cumulated eﬀect of these three steps on the economy or the
environment.
A first question that arises here is whether investment in research and development,
the goal of which is always the increasing of the company’s future profits, and therefore
the technological progress that derives from this investment eﬀort, rcduces compliance
costs to an environmental policy. Indeed, there is no certainty that the introduction
of an environmental constraint (tax, norm, subvention etc..) will lead to investment
1One can note, that a company can innovate simply by introducing on a market a product that is
based on a technology that had simply not been previously commercialised.
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in research and development the fruit of which will reduce compliance costs to it or
the economy’s emissions. A certain number of theoretical papers such as Milliman and
Price (1989), Fisher, Parry et Pizer (1998), address diﬀerent environmental policies such
as taxes, subventions, tradable permits, command and control policies to assess their
eﬀect on environmentally-friendly innovations. Most of the theoretical papers show
that market-based approaches2 are preferable to induce more environmentally-friendly
innovations, as opposed to command and control policies. But while uncertainties still
remain as to the eﬀects of such induced technological change on the economy, the
diﬀusion of any new process may also not necessarily be straightforward, and the wide
adoption of a new technology can be thwarted by other barriers.
1.2.1 Diﬀusion Barriers
In industrial countries, new technologies are the result of many phenomena. The
companies’ internal decisions, subventions to research and development, environmental
regulations, policies of energy taxation are some examples (Climate Change 2001 :
Mitigation). It is important, however, to note that there resides a tendency to want
to optimise the utilisation of some well installed and widely used technologies in solid
infrastructures. This creates entry barriers for new technologies. This entry barrier
is the consequence of infrastructure changes as well as institutional developments or
social developments that operate around the dominant technology in the system. For
this reason, a new technology may not so easily be adopted, even if its advantages in
terms of the firms’ future productivity for instance are certain (see David (1985)).
This so-called "lock-in" process leads to two eﬀects. The first one, is that the older
technologies that are already installed in the infrastructures will condition the choice
and the entry of the future new technologies. Indeed, social habits and aptitudes can
be so deeply embedded in an older and more widely used technology, that the choice
2Market-based approaches are for instance taxes or tradable permits.
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between two new technologies will not only result in the comparison between their
performances, but will also depend on their "closeness" to the older technology. The
second eﬀect is relative to the fact that the productivity of a new technology is deeply
linked to the infrastructure, the workers, the repairmen, the knowledge of employees
in charge of the on-the-job training or education. All these institutional infrastructures
are not easily replicated (Unruh (1999), (2000)). Such considerations support the "path
dependence approach" to technological change (Weyant and Olavson (1999)), whereby
once a dominant technology is chosen, it tends to be "locked-in", leading the economy
on a path dependency, where the choice of the new technology then depends on his-
torical facts and not on its competitiveness at all. Such "lock in" processes can refrain
the economy from moving to a more competing path.
Another study by Rogers (1995), suggests that the rate of diﬀusion and adoption of
a new technology is never straightforward but, follows an S-shaped curve. In the early
stages, the fraction of users of this new technology increases slowly, then the number of
users increases more rapidly as the technology matures with "learning by using" and
"learning by doing". At the end of the technology’s life cycle, when the technology is
mature and approaches saturation, the increase of number of users slows down (see
following figure).









Having acknowledged that the results of research and development can lead to
technological change that is not necessarily going to be adopted, or will slowly be so,
because of the deeply embedded institutional frameworks, or the S-shaped rate and
diﬀusion of innovations over time, the questions of whether the technological change
resulting from an environmental constraint can lead to the reduction in compliance
costs, or in emissions, remains.
1.2.2 Cost Assessment
Today, all the research on the relationship between technological change and envi-
ronmental policies is subject to two hypotheses : Social and economic activities have
impacts on the environment, the evolution of which is linked to the direction and rate
of technological change. And environmental policies create new constraints and incen-
tives that aﬀect the process of technological change (see Jaﬀe Newel Stavins (2002)).
Although it may seem intuitive to assume that the induced innovations of an envi-
ronmental policy lead to the reduction of the social costs of its implementation, some
complexities need to be addressed. For instance, in the case where an environmental
policy leads to the reduction of the marginal cost of depollution, then its implemen-
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tation will be at a lower social cost than in the case where the policy induces no
innovation3.
Goulder and Schneider (1999) study the case where a carbon tax incites firms to
invest in R&D which could lead to technological progress. According to these authors,
the impacts of a carbon tax on R&D diﬀers significantly among industries. To take
solely into account the sectors where the impacts on research and development are
positive, leads to an over-estimation of the eﬀect of environmental policies on the
GDP. The authors therefore specifically show that the investment in R&D by some
sectors might "crowd-out" the investments in R&D by other sectors therefore possibly
leading to a slowdown of output and GDP. Moreover, Goulder and Schneider show that
induced technological progress, while reducing the net costs of the emission reduction
policies, leads to an increase in the gross costs (positive eﬀects on the environment not
yet taken into account) of a carbon tax.
Accounting for the general equilibrium eﬀects, Schmalensee (1994) also suggests
that it is necessary to question the eﬀects on the innovations of the rest of the economy,
of technological change induced by an environmental policy. Indeed, if innovations are
the fruit of investments in research and development, it is important to evaluate the
elasticity of the supply of inputs in R&D. In the case where the supply of inputs
is inelastic, the innovations induced by the environmental policy will be done at the
expense of other innovations in the economy. Schmalensee suggests that opportunity
costs (or eviction costs) could therefore emerge, which could contribute to reducing the
positive eﬀects of environmental innovations on the economy.
Before tackling the methods of modeling technological change, we have chosen to
take into consideration the diﬀerent barriers that can be expected to thwart its induce-
3In the case of a flat marginal benefit function evaluated at the optimun, the total spendings in
depollution are increased although the marginal cost of depollution has decreased.(voir Jaﬀe et al.
(2002))
State of Art 35
ment, such as diﬀusion barriers, costs uncertainties, or crowding out eﬀects. Taking
note of these intricacies, we now take a closer look in the following two sections at
the diﬀerent methods for modeling technological change in energy-economy models.
We will initially make a distinction between exogenous and endogenous technological
change and then define the diﬀerent modeling methods within these two groups.
1.3 Exogenous Technological Change
While modeling technological change as an exogenous process has theoretically lost
most of its popularity in the energy-economy field, it is still widely used in such models
because of its relative simplicity. It therefore remains necessary to give an overview of
the chosen methods to model technological change as exogenous. In this section, we
will see that exogenous technological change can commonly be modeled either through
an Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Improvement parameter (AEEI) or through the
introduction of Backstop Technologies.
1.3.1 The Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Improvement Pa-
rameter
In earlier models technological change was initially introduced as an exogenous pro-
cess. The Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Improvement parameter (AEEI) was therefore
an earlier means to the decoupling of economic growth and energy use. More specifically,
the AEEI reflected the rate of change in energy intensity (Energy Use / GDP) with
energy prices held constant. Through such a specification, technology improvements
are thus modeled independently of any price inducement, or scarcity constraint.
One of the main diﬃculties in adopting such a formulation is linked to the estimation
the value that is attributed to the AEEI. According to the "Climate Change 2001 :
Mitigation" its value ranges from 0.4% to 1.5% per year for all regions of the world,
and lead to major diﬀerences between the baseline scenarios.
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“Unfortunately there is relatively little backing in the economic litera-
ture for specific values of the AEEI (...) the inability to tie it down to a
much narrower range (...) is a severe handicap, an uncertainty which needs
to be recognized.” Dean and Hoeller (1992)
Indeed, whether the modeler’s choice of the value of the AEEI is closer to 1.5%
or 0.4%, has major impacts on the model’s conclusions relatively to the cost of an
environmental constraint. The higher the AEEI, the faster emissions will decrease over
time, and the smaller the impact of an environmental constraint on the economy.
Choosing a disproportionately high AEEI can therefore lead to the under-estimation
of the costs of a climate policy. A study by Edmonds and Barns (1990) confirms the
importance of the value of the AEEI on the estimation of costs. But, more than the value
itself, uncertainties also reside on the AEEI’s supposed time trend, namely, whether it
follows a linear or non linear time trend.
Formally, one can generally define the AEEI as in the equation 1.1. We suppose a
production function F with two inputs to production, capital Kt and energy Et used
at time t. We define Yt as the production that derives from the relation between Kt
and Et at time t. We have :
Yt = αtF [Kt, αetEt] (1.1)
We note αt the neutral rate of technological change and αet the energy specific




change is biased in favor of a lesser use of energy. The Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency
Improvement is therefore α˙etαet .
There are a number of models that included the AEEI as a method for modeling
technological progress. The most famous one might be the Integrated Assessment Model
(IAM) RICE by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). More recently, the MIT-EPPA (Babiker et
al. (2001)) and PACE (Böhringer (1999)), two computable general equilibrium models,
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also incorporate an autonomous energy eﬃciency improvement parameter, to allow for
technological change.
In top-down models, the AEEI is probably the most widely-spread method to model
technological change as an exogenous process. However, another technique to account
for exogenous technological change is through the introduction of backstop technologies.
While entirely self-suﬃcient to address exogenous technological progress, this method
may also be coupled to the AEEI. Usually used in bottom-up models, it’s use is also
subject to many assumptions.
1.3.2 Backstop Technologies
A backstop technology is generally considered a technology that is available in un-
limited quantities at a give time, but whose purchase price is initially very high. This
high price reflects the research and development that is involved in producing it. There-
fore, backstop technologies are usually seen as a pool of existing not yet commercialized
technologies that are at a given price, easily available and widely accessible.
As prices of technologies are determinant of whether a production technology is
chosen or not, the higher the price, the longer it will take before this technology will
be chosen as a production technology. However, as new technologies mature over time,
their costs fall. At the same time, older conventional technologies may become more
expensive due to, for example, environmental policies that increase the prices of the
conventional energy sources. Therefore, because of the price increases of conventional
energy sources and the price decreases of backstop technologies, new technologies over
time can become more competitive than conventional technologies. Introducing back-
stop technologies thus alleviates the consequences of the price increases of conventional
technologies and mitigates the costs of an environmental policy. Through the existence
of backstop technologies, increasing energy costs are hampered, as these technologies
are often, in the long term, expected to provide significant amounts of energy.
State of Art 38
ptBACK  ptCONVptBACK  ptCONV t
t
Fig. 1.1 — Relative prices of backstop and conventional technologies relatively to t
Formally, modeling backstop technologies is a relatively easy task (see Sue Wing
and Popp (2006)). Traditionally, to model the penetration of a backstop technology, one
can define output as the outcome of two diﬀerent production processes, a production
process with conventional fuels FCONV and one with the backstop technology FBACK .
The "bang-bang" behavior is such that, after a certain point in time, the output result-
ing from the backstop technology production technique "kicks in", as this technology
becomes relatively cheaper and the conventional technology becomes relatively more
expensive. The backstop technology then overtakes the whole market, and the con-
ventional technology is immediately eliminated from production functions. Such model
behavior is found in the DICE models. Formally, with Yt the output at a time t and
Int inputs to production at time t :
Yt = FCONVt (Int) + F
BACK
t (Int)
We note t¯ the point in time before which the price of backstop technologies is more
expensive than the price of conventional fuels, and after which the price of backstop
technologies is cheaper than the price of conventional fuels (see figure 1.1).
When t < t¯, then one can determine the output as solely a function of the conven-
tional techniques of production.
Yt = FCONVt (Int)
Similarly, when t > t¯ , then the output can be defined as solely the function of the
backstop technique :
Yt = FBACKt (Int)
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This specification can only represent the "bang-bang" behavior, by which one tech-
nique is used for production, entirely ruling out another technique. Indeed, in the case
where the output of the old and new technologies are perfectly substitutable, then the
newer technology will completely eradicate the older one once it has penetrated the
market. In fact, as soon as the price of the backstop is lower than the price of the older
technology it will take over the entire market and the older technology will become
completely obsolete. The relevance of such a "bang-bang" behavior in energy-economy
models is needless to say questionable especially in the light of our previous remarks
on the slow and sometimes entirely thwarted diﬀusion of new techniques.
The unlikeliness of the "bang-bang" behavior was assessed recently by some authors
who sought to eliminate the exaggerated model behavior due to the penetration of
backstop technologies. Indeed, the way in which a backstop technology penetrates the
economy, depends on the chosen elasticities of substitution between the outputs of
the two production functions (Sue Wing and Popp (2006)). By setting an imperfect
elasticity of substitution between the two activity outputs (one being entirely due to
the older technology and the other one being entirely due to the backstop technology),
a modeler can control the penetration rate of a backstop technology (Gerlagh and van
der Zwaan (2003)) and thus hinders the "bang-bang" backstop eﬀect. Popp (2004) also
allows for such a "softer" entrance of backstop technologies by modeling these backstop
technologies as imperfect substitutes to the fossil fuels, allowing for what he calls "niche
markets", even when the price of the backstop technology is higher than the price of
the conventional technology4.
Although the use of backstop technologies is widely criticized as being an exogenous
process, hindering any reactivity of the model to an environmental policy, Popp (2004)
suggests that the use of backstop technologies mitigates these policy costs much more
4Such "niche markets" cannot exist in the case of the bang-bang behavior, as a backstop technology
will be used only if it is cheaper than the conventional technique. If the price of the backstop is higher,
the output of all goods will be subject to the conventional technique, solely.
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eﬀectively than induced technological change would. To show this, he introduces in the
ENTICE-BR model two sorts of technological change. Exogenous technological change
through a backstop technology, and induced technological change through investments
is research and development. Popp shows that cost mitigation is greater with the mod-
eling of the backstop technology than with endogenous technological change due to
investment in research and development, simply because of the opportunity costs (or
"crowding out" eﬀects5) of research and development.
The main problem, however, with the backstop technology approach to modeling
technological change, apart from its exogenous specification, is that it is often very
closely linked to the personal assumptions of the modeler. Most of the time it depends
on engineers’ assumptions specifically relatively to the availability date of the backstop
as well as to its degree of penetration, its price and its emissions. Such choices can
lead to great variations in the model’s results and on the policy costs assessments.
Moreover, due to their intrinsic specification, backstop technologies are not found in a
social accounting matrix which is a snapshot of an economy at a time t.
A well known model that includes backstop technologies is the OECD GREEN
Model (Burniaux, Martin, Nicoletti, and Martins (1992)). In this model, three back-
stop technologies are assumed to be available, a carbon based synthetic fuel, and two
carbon free techniques. The model’s main assumptions are linked to the timing of dif-
fusion of each technology and their respective prices. Indeed, once the technologies are
introduced, they become available over all the countries modeled in GREEN, in un-
limited quantities and at constant marginal costs. One specificity of the model relies in
the fact that technology innovation possibilities are supposed fixed at a present level
of knowledge for the entire simulation period. What essentially drives the model’s be-
5Crowding out occurs when new investments in research and development hinder other investments
in research and development, thus leading to opportunity costs. Such eﬀects are expected to limit the
potential positive contributions of R&D. Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Popp (2003) both point
to this crowding out eﬀect as a result of investments in research and development induced by an
environmental constraint.
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havior relative to the introduction of new technologies is the exogenously given price
of the technological options. The evolution of prices of backstop technologies, are of
course at the discretion of the modeler.
Apart from these questions, the main criticism that would be made to these two
diﬀerent modeling techniques, lies in the inaptitude of the model to react to any sort of
environmental policy. This has lead modelers to explore diﬀerent methods to endogenise
or induce technological change so as to permit for such reactivity. In the following
section, we will present the two modeling methods that allow technological change to
be influenced by an energy policy.
1.4 Endogenous Technological Change
As our focus in this thesis is specifically on energy-economy models it is necessary
to distinguish between energy-related technological progress and simple general pro-
ductivity increases. In fact, in many energy-economy models, technological change is
modeled separately and endogenously in the energy sector, total factor productivity
remaining an exogenous process. Incorporating induced technological change in cli-
mate models allows for a more realistic approach of an economy’s reactivity facing an
environmental or energy restriction. In such a framework, an economy can then be
expected to seek to adjust its reaction or technology choices to a new economic envi-
ronment through an endogenous specification of technological change. In this section
we will explore the two main diﬀerent modeling methods to account for endogenous
technological progress, and will seek to assess the advantages and limitations of both
these methods.
Basically, the growth literature suggests that knowledge capital may accumulate
either through investments in physical capital, or through research and development
expenditures, or through a combination of both. It remains clear, however, that the
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accumulation of knowledge capital is central to the inducement process of technological
progress, and such accumulation will impact the production functions. Taking these
considerations into account, induced technological change has until now been modeled,
either through the learning by doing process (the main underlying hypothesis being
that knowledge accumulates as a side eﬀect of production) or through investments
in research and development (knowledge accumulation being the outcome of R&D
expenditures) or through a combination of both (knowledge accumulates as a side eﬀect
of production, as well as derives from expenditures in research and development).
However, the complexities linked to the process of technological change remain
diﬃcult to take into account in energy-economy models, and specifically the lack of
certainty in the outcome of investments in research and development. Diﬃculties also lie
in accounting for increasing market demands for new-high-priced-low-carbon products,
which are the outcomes of research and development6. Moreover, slow diﬀusion of new
technologies due to technology lock-ins and path dependence, are also diﬃcult to assess.
Finally, the existence of spillovers leading to sub-optimal investments in research and
development may increase the models’ complexities. While some of the aspects cited
above can be assessed to a certain point, it is clear that the general method of inducing
technological change in energy-economy models cannot take all these restrictions into
account and suppose much clearer market reactions.
In this section we will seek to define more precisely both, the process of learning
by doing, and the stock of knowledge approach as methods to endogenise technological
change.
6While the price of these low-carbon goods may be high, demand for these goods may still increase.
Consumers will not simply base their consumption decisions on the price factor, but may desire the
"environmental friendliness" of these goods, overlooking the cheaper more coal intensive products.
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1.4.1 Learning by Doing
The concept of learning by doing was introduced by Arrow (1962) who was the first
to suggest that unit costs decline over time as producers accumulate knowledge through
the production process. Indeed, while new goods are initially expensive to produce,
their production costs decline over time because of the emergence of new production
methods that render its production easier and more straightforward. Therefore, the
accumulation of a stock of knowledge is not a decisional factor, but is by-product or
side-eﬀect of the production of a good. Similarly, the concept of "learning by using"
emerged, as a process whereby knowledge accumulates over time through the simple
usage of a technology or a good7. Learning by doing is therefore simply a free "side-
eﬀect" of a growing economy.
It follows that investment in a new technology is initially more expensive than in-
vestment in widely-used technologies. But as the new technology’s market share grows,
its cost also declines and will become at some point in time cheaper than the older
technology which is less subject to cost reductions, as it is more mature. Basically,
learning by doing is therefore another "manna from heaven" as it links declining costs
of a technology, with the expansion of its production.
Christer Berglund and Patrik Söderholm (2006) note three sources to the learning
by doing eﬀect. The first source of learning comes from the labor force. Indeed, labor
force involved in producing a good, accumulates knowledge over time. The consequence
is therefore that progressively less labor is needed to produce a given amount of out-
put. A second source of the learning by doing eﬀect can come from the management
level who, over time, gains know-how and can rearrange the production processes and
7Incorporating a new technology in a production function is expensive. The costs that it incurs
count for instance learning costs for the workers involved in production, institutional costs (changes
in production techniques needed for the incorporation of the new technology) as well as training
costs for workers who will be using the new technique. The more workers get used to the technique,
the less expensive it gets to incorporate it in the production methods, as workers are trained and
infrastructures are adapted to the technology.
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reassign jobs in a more eﬃcient manner. Finally, technological change that derives from
a repetitive use, can be seen as learning that was acquired by the production process
infrastructure. These three sources simply lead to the enhancement of production ef-
ficiency or performance over time, through the experience gained in the production
process.
Grübler et al. (1999) and Azar and Dowlatabadi (1999) argue for the relevance of
using this method for modeling technological change in global energy models.
Sue Wing (2001) underlines three major problems to the modeling of learning by
doing as a means of introducing endogenous technological change. The first one is the
lack of empirical data as to specific estimated learning curves, and this being specifically
the case for new technologies. Indeed, following their introduction, their declining costs
are unknown and are often modeled following a "generalized" learning curve, result of
an amalgam of other diﬀerent learning curves. The second problem is relative to the
partial equilibrium assessment of the learning by doing process. In fact, it is necessary
to assess the diﬀerent general equilibrium eﬀects of a specific policy, leading to price
or quantity variations in order to take into account all the possible feedbacks that may
derive from these policies. It follows that ignoring the general equilibrium feedbacks
and spillover eﬀects of learning induced productivity improvements can seriously alter
the general result and initial cost reductions in a sector. Finally, the process of learning
by doing is a mechanistic process, where learning and cost reductions are immediate
consequences of cumulative production.
The Single-Factor Learning Curve
Formally, modeling technological change through the learning by doing approach is
relatively straightforward. In this approach, costs decline as knowledge is accumulated
over time, and as production increases. Therefore, one can model a good’s production
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cost function as the function of one single factor, the cumulative installed capacity :
C = C0 ∗Ex−α
With C the cost of a specific technology or good, C0 the cost at unit cumulative
capacity, Ex the cumulative (installed) capacity (a proxy for experience and only ex-
planatory variable to the cost of the specific technology), and α the learning elasticity
or learning index. Therefore, if the cumulative capacity doubles then the cost of the
technology increases only by 2−α. This is called the progress rate. The learning-by-
doing rate is 1− 2−α, which is the complementary of the progress rate. Basically, the
progress rate simply determines how fast one learns. The learning-by-doing rate, on
the other hand, is determined in percentages and is the percentage of cost reduction
that derives from the doubling (in our case) of the installed capacity.
Argote and Epple (1990) suggest that learning-by-doing rates can be very diﬀerent
according to sectors and to technologies that are studied, even if they belong to the
same industry. In fact they estimate that this rate can range from 5% to 35%! Leading
to similar results, Köhler J. et al (2006) surveyed the literature quantifying learning
curves, and adapted work previously done by McDonald and Schrattenholzer (2001)
suggesting that the learning-by-doing rates for energy technologies could range between
3% and 35%. However, learning rates that are incorporated in models are often not
the result of serious econometric studies. Its value can often be chosen to influence the
models’ results.
Regarding the impacts on the optimal timing of abatement of modeling technolog-
ical change through learning by doing, all three papers Messner (1997), Grübler and
Messner (1998) and Mattson and Wene (1997) reach similar conclusions : with learning
curves as a means for introducing technological progress, early investment in energy
technologies are necessary to stimulate learning and ultimately cost reductions8. Most
8In these models, the choice between diﬀerent energy technologies is optimized given diﬀerent costs
of abatement and emission targets.
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bottom up models in fact study the optimal abatement over time, and suggest that
modeling learning by doing leads to early action in the timing of abatement9, compared
to the exogenous technological change case.
Regarding environmental policy cost assessments, Manne and Richels (2004) assess
the costs of stabilising CO2 emissions in the case where technological change is the
consequence of LBD. They study in particular the case of the electricity sector and
seek to determine the impacts of taking the learning by doing process into account on
the costs of abiding by environmental constraints. Their major finding is that learning
by doing does indeed reduce the costs of the environmental policy. The main reason
behind this result is the fact that the business as usual emissions are lower in the case
where learning by doing is introduced in the model. It is therefore much easier to abide
by environmental constraints as the additional constraints that are necessary to reach
the emission stabilization policy are much smaller when the business as usual emissions
are low. Manne and Richels do not strictly speaking study the "policy induced" eﬀects
of learning by doing. In fact, they assess the cumulative eﬀects of business as usual
learning by doing, and policy induced LBD. To isolate the policy induced LBD, Goulder
(2004) suggests comparing two scenarios with the model. One, with the two learning
by doing eﬀects cumulated, and one constraining the model so as not to allow for
additional policy induced learning by doing. However, Manne and Richels do show
that incorporating learning by doing in energy-economy models does in fact reduce
costs significantly.
Learning by doing is more often modeled in bottom-up rather than in top-down
models. Two well known bottom-up models incorporating learning by doing are the
MESSAGE model (Messner (1997)) and the MARKAL model (Barreto and Kypreos
(1999)). In these models technological progress derives from a learning or experience
9Note that Manne and Richels (2004) suggest the contrary : early abatement is not necessarily the
result of modelling learning curves.
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curve which is a function of experience that accumulated through production or through
the use of a technology during its diﬀusion.
The Two-Factor Learning Curve
Recently, modelers have tried to incorporate another explanatory variable to the
cost function. Indeed, they incorporate cumulative investments in R&D or an R&D
based knowledge stock as a factor impacting the production cost of a good (see Söder-
holm, P. Sundqvist, T. (2003)). In this setting, two rates are taken into account : the
"learning by doing" rate, and the "learning by searching" rate, which derives from
the investments in research and development. Formally, one can model the two-factor
learning curve as in equation 1.2 :
C = C0 ∗Ex−α ∗R−β (1.2)
With, as above, C the cost of a specific technology, C0 the cost at unit cumulative
capacity, Ex the cumulative (installed) capacity, α the learning elasticity or learning
index, R the cumulative investments in research and development or R&D based stock
of knowledge, and β the searching index. Similarly to the single-factor learning curve,
a doubling of R&D based knowledge stock, will lead the technology cost to increase by
2−β.
Controversies remain concerning the learning by searching approach. Kouvaritakis
et al. (2000) in the POLES model, Barreto and Kypreos (2003) with the ERIS model,
and Klaassen et al., (2003) all prefer the two-factor learning curve, and take research
and development into account in their models. However, Miketa and Schrattenholzer
(2002) and Criqui et al. (2000) suggest that this additional term to the learning
function, increases rather than decreases the investment costs !
One critic that can be made towards choosing the learning by doing method to
incorporate induced technological change, is that is does not assess the opportunity
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costs of acquiring new knowledge as eviction eﬀects are not accounted for (see Goulder
and Schneider (1999)).
In the two factor learning curve, technological change may partly result from invest-
ments in research and development. Assuming that such investments can be the source
to cost alleviation, some energy-economy modelers have considered that the accumu-
lation of the stock of knowledge may be the only source to endogenise technological
change. They consider knowledge as a stock which accumulates over time through R&D
investments, and the services of which are used as production inputs. In the following
section we address the stock of knowledge approach to modeling technological change.
1.4.2 The Stock of Knowledge Approach or Investments in
R&D
Modeling technological change through a learning by doing process has been more
commonly found in bottom up models than in top down models. In top-down models,
technological change can be modeled through the accumulation of knowledge as a result
of investments in research and development. Indeed, industries choose to invest in R&D
as a response to an environmental constraint, which leads to the increase in the stock
of knowledge, which in turn aﬀects technological progress. In this framework, firms
are profit-maximizing, and investment in research and development will be undertaken
only if it is a profitable activity.
Modeling technological change with this method proves to be a complex task, partly
due to the diﬃculty in attributing a value to knowledge, as such information is not avail-
able in a social accounting matrix. However, it builds on the macro-economic growth
theory by which technological change innovation is a decisional factor, as opposed to
the "free side-eﬀect" aspect of learning by doing. The stock of knowledge approach is
therefore a more attractive formulation to an economist who sees technological change
as the result of a decision.
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Intricacies in the Innovation Literature
The literature on innovation is now quite exhaustive, and underlines the many
intricacies linked to modeling it theoretically. A major underlying diﬃculty is that
innovation is not a straightforward process, whereby investment in research and devel-
opment always leads to a certain outcome such as a new technology or a blueprint etc...
Indeed, not all investments in research and development necessarily lead to increases
in the knowledge stock. Therefore, in energy-economy models, introducing induced in-
novation as the result of investments in research and development, and assessing the
uncertainties that derive from this specification, may prove to be somewhat diﬃcult.
Precisely, spillovers and uncertainties as to the outcome are two major issues in the
innovation literature that are often assessed in these models10.
Uncertainty Uncertainties have important implications on the modeling of endoge-
nous technological change in energy-economy models, as the price of future technologies
are unsure and may not necessarily become cheaper than conventional technologies.
Montgomery et al. (forthcoming) refer to the aspects of uncertainty that are specifi-
cally linked to climate research and development. They suggest that markets do not
necessarily prefer low-carbon products to conventional products. Very often in fact,
the price of the conventional (carbon intensive) products does not reflect the external-
ities that derive from its use, and are cheaper than low-carbon products. The natural
consequence is therefore a sub-optimal investment in research and development by
profit-maximizing firms to develop low-carbon products, simply because of the high
uncertainties of the market preferences and of the concept of climate change.
Moreover, there are also uncertainties as to the outcome of investments in research
and development. Taking such uncertainties into account is a diﬃcult task. In fact, very
10Köhler et. al (2006) discuss four issues to be taken into account when modeling induced techno-
logical change with the stock of knowledge approach, namely path dependency, uncertainty, spillovers,
and technology diﬀusion.
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often, modelers choose to model the outcome of investment in research and development
as a "certain" process as does Otto et al. (2005) who argue that uncertainty matters
less at an aggregate level when averaged out (see Romer (1990))11.
Spillover Eﬀects Apart from the uncertainties linked to the R&D process and mar-
ket preferences, the literature on innovation suggests that spillovers are an impor-
tant factor to take into account when assessing the impacts of investments in research
and development. Indeed, spillovers allow for the dissemination of knowledge intra-
sectorally, inter-sectorally and internationally through many diﬀerent channels such as
patent flows, published materials or even simply through the learning by doing process.
Otto et al. (2005) for instance choose to assess the spillovers eﬀects from a stock of
blueprints (resulting from some manufacturer’s investment in knowledge capital) that
lead to productivity increases in other production sectors.
Spillovers allow knowledge to cover the general economy at a very low cost, and
R&D investments may allow the economy to grow infinitely12. Not all industries, how-
ever, will be interested in the knowledge of one particular industry, and spillovers may
therefore be profitable to the industries that are technologically closer or simply more
able to apply it. Also, as spillovers can disseminate the knowledge resulting from private
investments in research and development by one firm, this destroys the full appropri-
ability of the resulted knowledge, leading to a possibly lessened incentive to invest in
R&D. In fact, whether the stock of knowledge accumulated through investments in
research and development is firm specific, or not, will determine the existence or mag-
nitude of spillovers in an economy. As noted previously, spillovers aﬀect the magnitude
of investments in research and development, in the sense that it aﬀects the rate of
return of these investments. Indeed, the diﬀerence between private and social returns
11Wehrli and Saxby (2006) however model such an eﬀect by postulating that the results of R&D
are indeed uncertain and innovations therefore occur following a Poisson process.
12Although they may also be subject to decreasing marginal returns.
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of research and development have often been assessed through empirical models. Due
to the existence of spillovers, private returns to R&D are estimated to be significantly
smaller than social returns to R&D. Empirical studies estimate private returns to be
between 20% to 50% the size of social returns (Bosetti et al (2006)a). Whether the
knowledge that derives from these investments is appropriable or not, and condition-
ally to the relative magnitude of the appropriability, the rate of return of investments
in research and development will be aﬀected, and R&D may be under-invested.
Therefore, three cases are possible (see Sue Wing (2003) for an in depth discussion).
A first case supposes that firms invest in research and development which increases
their respective stocks of human capital. These stocks are appropriable, and therefore
firms cannot benefit from the knowledge stocks of other firms. Consequently, there are
as many prices of human capital as there are firms, and there are no inter-sectoral
or intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers. Each firm benefits solely from the knowledge
services that derive from its own investments in research and development. A firm
cannot benefit from other firms’ R&D eﬀorts.
In the second case, knowledge spillovers exist and suppose that investments in re-
search and development by one firm can benefit other firms. All firms have access to a
general pool of research and development, which is then allocated to the firms’ diﬀerent
knowledge stocks according to their capacity to "absorb" research in development. In
this case, knowledge is not appropriable, and diﬀerent firms can benefit together from
the same pool of research and development. Therefore, through the non-excludability
of knowledge, firms can allocate a certain amount of resources to research and de-
velopment, but see their knowledge stocks increased by more than their investment.
In the third case, firms invest in R&D, which increases an economy-wide stock of
human capital or knowledge. The knowledge that derives from it is therefore not an
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appropriable fruit of the investment in R&D. In the same way that capital services
are allocated to the firms according to its price and the way in which it enters the
production function, firms demand a certain amount of knowledge services as inputs
to production, according to its price and how it enters the production function13.
The Stock of Knowledge Approach
Biased Technical Change Often in energy-economy models, when technological
change is induced, modelers seek to assess how the productivity of energy relative
to the productivity of other production factors is aﬀected by an environmental policy.
Technological change can however influence the productivity of all factors of production
or simply the energy factor.
Endogenous technological change can be specified formally as in the equation 1.3.
Yt = AtHStF (KSt, Lt, Et) (1.3)
Yt is the value of production at time t, and F the production function. KSt, Lt
and Et are respectively capital services, labor and energy inputs used at time t14. Pro-
ductivity increases are defined by the value of At which is the Hicks-neutral exogenous
technological progress parameter at time t. Moreover, in this specification, increases in
the use of human capital services HSt in the production function automatically lead to
a lesser use of all the factors of production : their productivity increases, and techno-
logical progress is Hicks-neutral. Basically, firms facing an environmental or emission
constraint, may choose to increase their demand for human capital services HSt (the
intangible production factor) and decrease their demand for tangible inputs such as
capital services, labor and energy.
In climate models, some modelers seek to address how investments in research
13We choose such a specification in our model in the chapter 4 of this thesis, to account for inter
and intra-industry spillovers.
14The FEEM-RICE model has such a production function specification.
State of Art 53
and development, following an environmental constraint, will lead to an increase in
energy eﬃciency, and therefore a more clear-cut decrease in emissions. Put diﬀerently,
they try to address how technological change induced by a policy will lead to the
decreasing of the emission/output ratio. In this specification, knowledge services reduce
the level of carbon emissions that flow from the use of energy. Formally, human capital
services can enter the production function as simply increasing the energy factor’s
eﬃciency (see equation 1.4). Investments in research and development, being the firms’
response to environmental constraints, lead to energy eﬃcient technological change,
the productivity of other factors remaining unaﬀected.
Yt = AtF (KSt, Lt, HStEt) (1.4)
Facing an environmental or emission constraint, firms may increase their demand
for knowledge services (the intangible input to production) and thus limit their demand
for energy. In this specification, technological change is biased and favors of a lesser
use of energy.
Modelers may model induced technical change through one or the other process, or
also through both as in Buonnano et al.(2003).
Models Incorporating the Stock of Knowledge Approach Goulder andMathai
(2000) allow for a smooth transition between the learning by doing process previously
described and the stock of knowledge approach as they take investments in research and
development into account to study the optimal dynamics of carbon emission reduction.
Indeed, they use a partial equilibrium model where technological progress is either the
result of investment in research and development and consequently the accumulation
of the stock of knowledge (in their specification, the stock of knowledge is a function
of the level of emission reduction), or the result of a learning by doing process in
carbon abatement. A central planner facing an emission constraint, chooses time paths
of abatement and eﬀorts in research and development, that minimize the present value
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cost of abatement. The cost function is therefore a function of both the accumulated
stock of knowledge (that grows with R&D eﬀorts) and the abatement (learning curve).
The authors underline that the optimal dynamics of emission reduction as well as the
dynamics of carbon taxes depend on the form of the technological progress, i.e.
whether it derives from the learning eﬀect or from the investments in R&D, but also
on the criteria of analysis, whether it be a criteria of cost-eﬃciency or cost-benefit.
Through analytical studies they show that in the case where knowledge derives from
investments in R&D, it is optimal to reduce the emissions in the future. However, in the
case where the knowledge derives from a learning eﬀect, the impact on the dynamics
of the optimal reduction is ambiguous.
Goulder and Schneider (1999) use a general equilibrium simulation model to study
the eﬀects of induced technological change on the costs incurred by abiding by en-
vironmental constraints. In their model, there is no learning by doing process and
technological change is solely the result of investments in research and development. As
environmental policies are introduced, profit-maximising firms are aﬀected by changing
relative prices, and they adjust their level of investment in research and development
so as to maximise their profits in this new framework. As opposed to the Goulder and
Mathai model, induced technological change reduces the costs of abatement by about
15% which is half of what Goulder and Mathai predict in the middle cases. There may
be many reasons for such diﬀering results, but one may be linked to the fact that in
the Goulder and Mathai case, the environmental policy is more aggressive or more
stringent, which thus leads to higher abatement costs. Another explanation to these
diﬀerent results may lie in the marginal abatement cost functions in these two models.
Indeed, the producers’ marginal abatement cost functions in the Goulder and Schneider
model increase faster with higher abatement levels, than in the Goulder and Mathai
model (Goulder (2004)).
Otto et al. (2006) study with a forward looking CGE of the Dutch economy the
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cost-eﬀectiveness of an environmental constraint such as a cap and trade constraint. In
their model knowledge capital is sector specific which cause positive technology exter-
nalities on the production of sectors leading profit maximizing firms to underinvest in
R&D. The authors find that it is more cost eﬀective to direct CO2 constraints towards
CO2 intensive sectors rather than impose a uniform CO2 constraint on all sectors.
Moreover, they show that diﬀerentiated CO2 prices bias technological change towards
non CO2 intensive industries. Indeed, CO2 intensive sectors see their growth "discour-
aged" by diﬀerentiated CO2 prices while non CO2 intensive sectors see their growth
"encouraged". The authors also find that it is better to direct R&D subsidies towards
non CO2 intensive sectors as it reduces emissions and increases welfare compared to
the BAU, concomitant with an R&D tax on CO2 intensive sectors to slowly disappear.
Kemfert (2004) uses the WIAGEM model, a multi-regional, multi-sectoral inte-
grated assessment model, to introduce induced technological change as the result of
investment in research and development, the spending of which influences the produc-
tivity of the energy input. In such a framework, investments in research and devel-
opment therefore increase energy eﬃciency. While, knowledge is here not modeled as
a stock but as a flow. The model results suggest that induced technological change
due to investments in research and development diminishes the compliance costs to an
environmental policy. Kemfert shows that in the case of no technological change, abid-
ing to environmental constraints can be managed only through a reduction in output
leading therefore to welfare losses. Inducing technological change thus allows for the
decoupling of emissions and output, and mitigates the costs of climate policies without
leading to output reductions.
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A Relatively Small Impact of R&D Induced Technological Change
This method is not without controversies. Nordhaus (2002) using the RICE model
incorporates induced technological change through investments in R&D. His paper is
often cited by opponents to induced technological change as his results suggest that
induced technological change is not as eﬀective as simple input substitutions. Indeed,
input substitutions in his framework of the RICE model reduce carbon intensity twice
as much as induced technological change does. He thus concludes that, when needing
to reduce carbon intensity, investing in research and development is not as important
as input substitutions. While his work with the RICE model supposed a rigid frame-
work (there were no investments in physical capital and therefore no economic growth
in the induced technological change version of the RICE model), Popp (2003), who
allows for such optimal economic growth, still argues that the overall impacts of mod-
eling technological change through investments in research and development tends to
have relatively small impacts. Although the eﬀects on the economic and environmental
variables do exist, in comparison to the case where technological change is exogenous,
they stay relatively small15.
SueWing (2001), incorporates the stock of knowledge approach as a method to
model technological change in a computable general equilibrium model for the US
economy. In his model, a general economy-wide knowledge stock increases through
investments in R&D, the services of which are used as inputs to production. The
knowledge stock grows in the same way as the physical capital stock does. Sue Wing
seeks to assess the eﬀects of ITC on the costs of limiting carbon emissions, and shows
that, similarly to Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Nordhaus (2002), the eﬀect of
technological change is small.
Although a small eﬀect, the "crowding out" eﬀect, can lead to unexpected modeling
15In our model for the French economy, we also show that modeling technical change through the
stock of knowledge appraoch has small eﬀects on the economy.
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results. Modeling technological change through the stock of knowledge approach, where
industries invest in research and development when facing a constraint, leading to
productivity increases due to the accumulation of the knowledge, does not necessarily
suggest that research and development "as a whole" increases over time in the economy.
Such environmental constraints may lead to the contraction of general (or economy-
wide) R&D. Two papers support in fact the notion of a "crowding out eﬀect", whereby
research and development is supplied inelastically, and investment in R&D in one sector
of the economy, may lead to reductions in the amount of R&D investments in the rest
of the economy. Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Popp (2004) argue in this direction.
1.5 Conclusion
As determined in the previous sections, technological change can be modeled either
as an exogenous or as an endogenous process. In the following table we display a certain
number of models and their method for modeling technological change.
Omitting to account for technological progress in a climate model may lead to
great overestimations of the costs of a climate policy. But, if one wants to account for
such progress, choosing between an endogenous process or an exogenous process is not
without consequence and can lead to very large diﬀerences in model results. The choice
of the modeling method, i.e. Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Improvement parameter,
Backstop Technologies, Learning by Doing, or the Stock of Knowledge Approach im-
plies many hypothesis and modeling constraints, which in the essence hinder rigorous
model comparison. Also, the choice of parameter values within one unique modeling
method aﬀects short and long term predictions quite sensitively. Indeed, as we have
seen in the previous chapter, as the autonomous energy eﬃciency rate can range be-
tween 0.4 and 1.5, the learning by doing rate for energy technologies can range between
5% and 35%, and may not be rigorously determined by econometric analysis. Choosing
to incorporate backstop technologies in the modeling process, also leads to great varia-
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tions in modeling results because of the diﬀerences in the modelers’ sensitivity relative
to the timing of incorporation of technologies, their estimated price, as well as the
future use of a disputed technology16. Finally, the modeler’s assessment of the diﬀerent
inter-sectoral, intra-sectoral, international spillovers, as well as outcome uncertainties
following investments in research and development, and possible crowding-out eﬀects,
lead to a wide range of modeling results.
For these reasons, comparing energy-economy model results in the case of environ-
mental constraints remains a very tricky task.
In the table 1.1, we give an overview of the most recent energy-economy models
and the modeling methods chosen.
In the chapter 4 of this thesis, we build a forward-looking model for the French
economy, and incorporate induced technological change through the stock of knowl-
edge approach. Our goal is to assess the impacts on the economy of an environmental
constraint. Our work builds on the knowledge of the state of art of technological change
modeling techniques, and describes the intricacies of modeling endogenous technologi-
cal change through this approach, when the value of embodied knowledge is unknown,
and must be estimated.
16Some modelers may or may not, for instance, consider the use of hydrogen or fusion power as
possible production techniques in the next decade.
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Technological Change in Energy-Economy Models
Model Name Type Techn. Change Specification References
RICE IAM AEEI Nordhaus et Yang (1996)
DICE IAM R&D Nordhaus (2002)
FEEM-RICE IAM R&D, LBD Bosetti et al. (2006)
ETC-RICE IAM R&D, LBD Castelnuovo et al. (2003)
WIAGEM IAM R&D Kemfert (2004)
ENTICE IAM R&D, backstop Popp (2004)
DEMETER - 2E ES LBD, R&D Gerlagh et Lise (2003)
ERIS ES two fact. Learning curve Klaassen et al. (2003)
POLES ES two fact. Learning curve Kouvaritakis et al. (2000)
MESSAGE ES single fact. Learning curve Messner (1997)
MARKAL ES single fact. Learning curve Barreto et Kypreos (1999)
MIT-EPPA CGE AEEI, backstops Babiker et al. (2001)
PACE CGE AEEI, backstops Böhringer (1999)
MERGE CGE backstop, LBD Manne et Richels (2004)
OECD GREEN CGE backstop Burniaux et al. (1992)
MODEL for USA CGE R&D Sue Wing (2002)
MIND IO R&D Edenhofer et al. (2006)
IAM : Integrated Assessment Model, ES : Energy System Model
CGE : Computable General Equilibrium, Model, IO : Input-Output Model,
AEEI : Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Improvement, Backstop : Backstop technologies
R&D : Investment in Research and Development
LBD : Learning by Doing,
Tab. 1.1 — Technological Change in Energy-Economy Models
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2.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to study the impacts of an emission constraint in a
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the French economy, with technical
change modeled as an exogenous process. We seek to show how the economy reacts
to the introduction of an environmental policy, in the case where technological change
cannot be influenced in its rate of direction.
To carry out this analysis, we construct our own recursive dynamic CGE model
for the French economy, and model technological change with the autonomous energy
eﬃciency improvement parameter (AEEI)1 described in the chapter 1 of this thesis2.
In this framework, technological change will be entirely unaﬀected by the constraint,
and will simply increase the eﬃciency of energy according to this predetermined rate
independently of any framework changes. Therefore, studying the eﬀects of an emission
constraint in such a framework, may lead to underestimations of the firms’ reaction to
a policy change.
Applied general equilibrium (AGE) models have been the principal tool used to an-
alyze the welfare eﬀects of climate change mitigation. However, these simulations are
typically constructed on the premises that all of the economy’s markets are in equilib-
rium and all of its factors are fully employed, thus involuntary unemployment is rarely
modeled. Indeed, there have been numerous studies on the general equilibrium eﬀects
of carbon abatement in Europe, but a comparatively small number have sought to in-
vestigate the eﬀects of mitigation policies on employment. In this chapter we account
for the relative scarcity of studies on employment eﬀects in single countries3. Indeed,
these last two decades, the French labor market has been characterized by relatively
1In fact we use the inverse AEEI, which render the same results.
2The value of the AEEI that we introduce in the model is that of 0.75%, which is relevant consid-
ering that in most studies the value of the AEEI is between 0.4% and 1.5%.
3Indeed, very few papers (for Holland, Bovenberg, A. et al (2000), for Germany, Böhringer, Boeters
and Feil (2002)) have addressed the employment impacts of an environmental reform within individual
European countries.
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high unemployment rates. This has lead policy makers to estimate the quality of diﬀer-
ent policies according to their eﬀect on employment (i.e., the law reducing the number
of working hours, environmental taxation etc..). In light of the specificities of France’s
labor market, it appears that modeling unemployment as solely voluntary, leads to
major general equilibrium biases. We therefore model unemployment as involuntary,
the rates of which we determine as skill specific. What distinguishes our approach here
is our treatment of unemployment as an involuntary and skill diﬀerentiated process.
We apply a policy similar to the National Allocation Plan to this model for France
with exogenous technological change and skill diﬀerentiated unemployment. Indeed, in
June 2004, France released its National Allocation Plan, a proposal describing how the
country had planned to allocate emissions trading allowances to diﬀerent individual
emitting operators. The goal of this allocation plan is to determine a cap on the green-
house gas emissions of the sectors that participate in the European Emissions Trading
System (E.U. E.T.S.) and to allow the country to begin reducing its carbon emissions.
The E.U. E.T.S. entered into force on January 1st 2005. Participating entities in
the trading system are all the European countries whose National Allocation Plans
(NAP) have been approved by the European Commission. These NAPs are to be im-
plemented during the period 2005 to 2007, and are designed as the first step for each
participating country towards meeting its target under the burden sharing agreement.
In fact, France’s carbon emissions are expected to increase until 2012 generally due to
the country’s economic growth. The Energy Information Administration (International
Energy Outlook 2004) suggests that the country’s emissions in 2012 in the reference
case, will be above the 1990 threshold emissions for France in the Kyoto agreement
by some 4 Mt C. A constraining of France’s emissions is therefore necessary to help
France reach its burden sharing agreements. For this reason it is relevant for France to
abide by a National Allocation Plan (NAP), as the country will be unable to satisfy
the burden sharing agreement in the reference case without a specific constraint.
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Under the NAP, France’s Energy producing sectors, which in the simulations of the
paper cover the coal, oil, gas and electricity sectors, are constrained to emit a maximum
of 17.96 mega tons of carbon (Mt C) per year4. Energy intensive sectors, which we here
treat as ferrous and non ferrous sectors, chemical products and other energy intensive
sectors, may not emit more than 15.49 Mt C each year until the end of 2007. The French
National Allocation Plan indeed does not constrain all the sectors in the economy. In
fact, even sectors such as the transportation sector are not covered by the NAP and are
therefore not issued any allowances that would constrain their emissions. For the sake
of clarity in the analysis and conclusions, we choose to call "covered sectors", all energy
intensive and energy producing sectors whose carbon emissions are constrained by the
NAP and "non covered sectors" all other sectors that are not mentioned in the NAP
and that are not expected to reduce their emissions to any required predetermined level
during the first period the plan is enforced5.
Therefore, starting 2005, all covered sectors received this pre-specified amount of
allowances, that they can now trade on the market for tradeable permits. The price of
the allowances is determined according to the stringency of the NAP, as well as the
demand and supply of allowances. From 2008 onwards, the Kyoto protocol is expected
to enter into force6. In this second period, the NAP will be reevaluated and possibly
made more stringent. Moreover, previously ”non-covered” sectors will be required to
reduce their emissions, in order for the country’s emissions to fall back to its 1990
levels.
In this paper we analyze three diﬀerent environmental policies, and study the econ-
4That is, the sum of all emissions of all four energy producing sectors may not be greater than
17.96 MtC.
5The National Allocation Plan entered into eﬀect on January 1st 2005. Between 2005 and 2007,
the plan is enforced as is. Starting 2008, the caps on the covered sectors can be reevaluated, most
possibly made more stringent in order to reach France’s Kyoto target. Therefore "another" NAP is
expected to be issued. Also, while they were not constrained in the NAP, non covered sectors starting
2008 will be constrained by the enactment of the Kyoto protocol.
6The Kyoto protocol requires France to reduce its average emissions between 2008 and 2012 to its
1990 level of 103 MtC.
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omy’s reactions to such constraints, in the case where technological change is not mal-
leable.
In the first policy, although the proposed NAP is only supposed to be implemented
during the first period (2005-2007), we suppose that it will be extended unchanged
to the next period. Our goal in modeling such a policy is to assess the stringency of
the NAP, to get a closer look at its impacts on permit prices, as well as to assess the
importance of the need for further emission constraints to attain the Kyoto limits. We
therefore initially ignore the Kyoto agreements that are to constrain the economy’s
emissions starting 2008, and we solely study the eﬀects of a possible further implemen-
tation of the NAP during the next period (2008-2012) as is. We show that the model
predicts a slight increase in carbon prices, which will be over these five years close to
$9 per metric ton of carbon. The sectors that will sell their excess allocations are the
coal, ferrous and non ferrous and electricity sectors. The oil, gas, chemical products,
and other energy intensive sectors, whose emission reductions are insuﬃcient, will buy
these allowances on the market for tradeable permits.
In a second step, we implement the NAP as is until 2012, concomitant to which we
take the Kyoto constraints into account in the model starting 2008 and constrain both
covered and non covered sectors to limit their emissions to France’s 1990 level7. We
derive conclusions as to the eﬀects of these two policies on the economy and specifically
in terms of permit prices. We find that when Kyoto constraints are taken into account
between 2008 and 2012, non covered sectors’ emissions fall. Covered sectors’ emissions
are thus mechanically reduced, as their use as inputs to production of the now less
polluting non covered sectors’ goods, falls mechanically. This emission reduction slightly
relaxes the constraint on covered sectors, as they eﬀortlessly emit less (because they are
simply less demanded and therefore less produced), and carbon prices fall to $3.4 per
metric ton of carbon between 2008 and 2012. The sectors that sell their permits on the
7The NAP implemented alone until 2012, did not allow France to attain its Kyoto limits.
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market for tradeable permits, are the coal, oil and gas sectors. The oil and gas sectors
were not sellers of permits in the previous policy. This change is due to the fact that
non covered sectors, whose emissions are taxed, choose to demand less highly polluting
fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) as inputs to their production. The law of supply and
demand therefore constrains the production of fossil fuels to be equally reduced which
mechanically leads to a reduction in their emissions. Their reduction in emissions is
such that they have an excess of pollution permits, which they sell on the market for
tradeable permits.
In the third policy, we suppose that the NAP will be made more stringent in the
second period (between 2008-2012). But as we still ignore the degree of the possible
contraction, we first model the implementation of the NAP until 2007 unchanged, and
then constrain total covered sectors’ emissions to a maximum of 32 Mt C in the second
period. While this third policy is dependant on the fact that we were compelled to make
a hypothesis as to the importance of the additional constraint, it remains of interest
to the reader in that it gives insights on the interactions that reside between the NAP
and the Kyoto constraints (and the relations between permit prices and taxes), and the
eﬀects of their concomitant implementation on the economy. Under our projections of
baseline emissions the proposed cap is not very constraining the first period (2005-2007)
and permit prices are close to $1.2 per metric ton of carbon, as was the case in the
first period in the first policy. In the second period, a further constraining of the NAP
after 2008, coupled with the introduction of the Kyoto constraints until 2012, induces
the covered sectors’ permit price to jump up to $25 per metric ton of carbon between
2008 and 2012, while it was that of $3.4 in the previous policy. Sectors that choose
to sell pollution permits are now coal, ferrous and non ferrous sectors and electricity.
This change is now due to the fact that the Kyoto constraints are negligible compared
to the constraints on covered sectors. Therefore, the general equilibrium eﬀects on the
production of coal, oil and gas, are not strong enough to counter the direct eﬀect of the
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covered sectors’ constraint, and the market situation is the same as in the case where
the Kyoto constraints are not taken into account.
In the next section, we describe the model8, then we lay out the diﬀerent policies we
study linked to France’s National Allocation Plan, finally we underline the conclusions
on the French economy as a whole. The object of this chapter is to get a clear idea
of the impact of an emission constraint on the substitution possibilities of the French
economy when technical change is modeled as exogenous. Indeed, in this framework,
the only reaction of the firms to an emission constraint is through input substitutions,
the mechanisms of which we determine here.
2.2 Description of the Static Model
In this section we define the diﬀerent theoretical modeling choices on which our
model is based. We follow the standard formulation of a CGE model representing a
small open economy in complementarity format (e.g. Boehringer and Vogt (2003)).
There are seventeen sectors, seven of which will be constrained by the French NAP.
2.2.1 Database and Calibration
We model France as a small open economy and calibrate the model on data for the
French economy in 1995. The data source used for calibration was extracted from a
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for France compiled by EUROSTAT and GEM-E3
researchers (see National Technical University of Athens).
The Production Sectors
Seventeen sectors are accounted for in this model.
Agriculture
Coal
8A formal description of the model is to be found in the Annexes A and B.
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Each sector is modeled as a representative firm that combines inputs of primary
factors, fuel and non fuel intermediate goods according to a nested Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) production function. Four of the model’s sectors are energy
sectors (coal, oil, gas, electricity). The model accounts for three production factors,
physical capital services, skilled labor and unskilled labor.
The produced good Y , is a CES function linking KL, a bundle of physical capital
services KS and labor L (labor itself being a CES function of skilled and unskilled
labor9), and EM which is a CES function of energy inputs E, and materials M . The
bundle of energy goods E links F the fossil fuel bundle and elect electricity also ac-
cording to a constant elasticity of substitution function, while F is a similar function of
9Skilled and unskilled labor are related through a Cobb Douglas function, which we have not
represented on the graph.
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coal oil and gas ( F1...F3 in the graph). The bundle of material inputs M is a function
of all the material inputs in the economy10. Finally, each intermediate input in this
graph is in fact an Armington good (Armington P. (1969))11, relating domestic goods
produced in the economy and the imported goods produced in the rest of the world12,
and all goods are produced for both the export and domestic market. The detailed
formulas of the diﬀerent functions and bundles making up the production function are

















10It is a bundle of all the goods produced in the economy by all sectors that are used as inputs to
production in one sector.
11The only inputs that are not Armington goods are the factors of production capital and skilled
and unskilled labor.
12This armington good relationship is in fact described in the graph only for the n th good of the
material bundle. In is the value of the imported good n, and Dn is the value of the domestically
produced good n. However, all intermediate inputs are Armington goods.
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Substitution Elasticities
The production function in the model being a standard KLEMmodel it relates bun-
dles of inputs according to elasticities of substitutions that are defined in the following
table.
Values of elasticities of substitution
σY Top layer armington 0.7
σKL Capital versus labor 1
σME Materials versus energy 0.75
σE Electric versus fossil fuel 0.7
σM Between materials 0.6
σF Between fossil fuels 1
σA Armington elasticity 2
σL Elasticity skilled vs. unskilled 1
The Tax System
The SAM for the French economy in 1995 assesses the major relevant taxes for that
year. We can thus describe the total tax burden for all sectors in the French economy
in 1995, as well as their relative share in the government budget (see figures 2.1, and
2.2).
Factor taxes (taxes on capital and labor taxes) represent close to 60% of the total
tax revenues for the government, and is therefore the major source of revenue. It follows
from these simple statistics, that further study relative to revenue neutral green tax
reforms, consisting in the introduction of an energy tax, the revenues of which are
redistributed to the economy through the reduction of labor taxes, are relevant in the
French economy.
The fact that both coal and agriculture have a negative tax burden simply suggests
that they are subsidized sectors.
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Fig. 2.1 — Benchmark tax shares in the government budget
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Fig. 2.2 — Tax burden per sector as a percentage of production
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2.2.2 Labor Market Diﬀerentiation and Unemployment
Two Types of Qualifications
The model’s key innovation is its disaggregation of the labor input into skilled and
unskilled labor for each sector, and the modeling of unemployment for these two types
of labor. Indeed, the social accounting matrix for France does not separate between
skilled and unskilled labor, as it gives a general value of total labor used in the economy.
We therefore use data from the Enquête Emploi, a French household level employment
survey (INSEE (2002)), to disaggregate the labor input to each sector in 1995 into
the separate contributions of skilled and unskilled workers13. By so doing, we specify
unemployment for skilled workers to be determined diﬀerently than for the unskilled.
It follows that each group of workers will be subject to a diﬀerent unemployment rate.
With additional data from Audric-Lerenard et al (2000), we estimate14 the relative
unemployment rates for qualified and unqualified working agents in France in 199415.
We then model unemployment for the skilled workers with a wage curve specifi-
cation, and model unemployment for the unskilled as the result of the existence of a
minimum wage.
The Reasons for Unemployment Depend on Workers’ Qualifications
The Wage Curve Specification for High Skilled Workers In this model, we
chose to model involuntary unemployment for qualified workers through a wage curve
specification as in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). The wage curve hypothesis as-
13We chose to follow the INSEE’s definition of skilled and unskilled labor.
14Audric Lerenard et al (2000) report unemployment rates for five categories of labor, namely
skilled employees and skilled workers, managerial employees, as well as unskilled workers and unskilled
employees. Following this desaggregation, we estimate two unemployment rates for the unskilled and
the skilled, without making a distinction between employees and workers.
15Audric Lerenard et al (2000) determine the unemployment rates for 1994. We did not have access
to data for 1995. We therefore chose to consider that the unemployment rates had not changed
dramatically over the year, we approximate them to be equal in 1995 to their estimation of them in
1994. Our estimation leads to an unemployment rate for non skilled workers to approximately 20.4
%, while the unemployment rate for skilled workers is close to 10.4 %.
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sumes that wages are determined according to the local unemployment level. Indeed,
local unemployment is negatively correlated to the wage rate. This phenomenon reflects
eﬃciency wages or bargaining : if unemployment is high, then competition for job op-
portunities is stronger, enabling companies to oﬀer lower wages, and if unemployment
is low, then high skilled workers have their pick of a range of job opportunities, forcing
each firm to oﬀer higher wages in order to attract qualified labor. In the case where
unemployment is high, firms do not have an incentive to induce workers to high eﬃ-
ciency, as they fear losing their job. On the contrary, when unemployment is low, firms
must oﬀer high wages in order to incite workers to high eﬃciency, and also because
trade union bargaining power is higher when unemployment is low.
In the graph 2.3, the real wage rate that would clear the market, that is to say
would allow the supply of labor to equal the demand of labor, is w0. However, the
demand of labor intersects the wage curve and leads to a real wage w1, where w1 > w0.
The result is the existence of unemployment, viewed on the graph as the diﬀerence
between the actual labor that would have been supplied for a wage equal to w1and the
labor that is in reality supplied by the wage curve function. The consequences for the
labor market are shown in figure 2.3.
Blanchflower and Oswald estimate that at the local level, the elasticity of annual
labor earnings with respect to the local unemployment rate is in fact equal to −0.1.
Montuenga, Fernández, and García (2004) estimate the elasticity for France to be
−0.106. We follow Rutherford, Miles Light and Hernandez (2002), and Boehringer et
al. (2001) to model the wage curve specification in our CGE model.
A Fixed Minimum Wage for Low Skilled Workers In this model, unemploy-
ment for low skilled workers is modeled through the existence of a minimum wage
rigidity which does not allow the labor market to clear. Unemployment for unskilled
workers is thus also modeled as involuntary. This is particularly relevant for France.
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Fig. 2.3 — Wage curve specification
Indeed, workers in France are guaranteed a minimum wage (SMIC : Salaire Minimum
Interindustriel de Croissance) under which it is illegal to employ a worker16. Following
the classical unemployment theory, in the case where the minimum wage is higher than
the wage allowing the labor market to clear, that is to say, allowing supply to equal
demand, then, unemployment is the diﬀerence between the amount of labor supplied to
the economy for that wage and the amount of labor demanded by firms. The existence
of the SMIC is considered by some to be one of the causes to unemployment of non
qualified workers in France however this view is not generally shared by all17. Indeed,
some political parties or activist groups do not recognize this minimum wage to be too
high for the labor market to clear. In our model, however, we choose as a hypothesis
16The minimum wage in France called the SMIC (Salaire Minimum Interprofessionel de Croissance)
is determined by the government. While, adjustments in the SMIC are usually due to administrative
procedures taken each year, the governement has sometimes enacted additional increases in the SMIC.
In 1995, the minimum wage was that of 958.53 ecus per month.
17Work by Laroque et Salanie (2000), suggests that 20 % of the french unemployed between 25 and
49 years of age, are cast out of the market because of their productivity being too low for the SMIC
(while 57% of the unemployment is voluntary). On the contrary papers such as Machin et Manning
(1997) or Dolado et al (1996), suggest that there is little evidence of a negative impact on employment.







Fig. 2.4 — Classical unemployment
to recognize that for the low skilled workers, this lack of wage flexibility could be the
cause for unemployment. The following figure shows how unemployment in a classical
framework is created because of a minimum wage that is higher than the one allowing
supply to be equal to demand (see figure 2.4).
A Relative Concentration of Skilled Labor in the Non Covered Sectors
We derive statistics from the data from the Enquête Emploi (INSEE 2002) - ex-
ploitation DARES 1982 - 2002, in order to assess the relative shares of the value of
skilled and unskilled labor within the economy18 (see graph 2.5).
Labor, whether skilled or unskilled is more concentrated in non covered sec-
tors then in covered sectors. As we distinguish between these two types of labor, it
follows that their relative unemployment rates are also diﬀerent19. The relative con-
18We multiply the ”quantity” of skilled and unskilled labor in the economy by an estimation of their
average wages.
19Indeed, we derived relative unemployment rates from Audric Lerenard et Alice Tanay (2000), such
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Fig. 2.5 — Concentration of workers per category of sector and per qualification
centration of labor in the non covered sectors will have important eﬀects on the eﬀects
on unemployment of the introduction of the National Allocation Plan and the further
implementation of Kyoto constraints.
2.2.3 The Government
In our specification, the government is a tax collector, who collects the revenues of
all taxes on the economy, and uses these revenues to demand part of the consumption
goods.
2.3 Policy Descriptions
In this section we present our projections of the impact on the French economy of the
French National Allocation Plan. To do so, we first describe the Business as Usual
(BAU) scenario, which is a forecast of the French economy’s growth in terms of GDP
(Growth Domestic Product), unemployment and emissions, when no policy is intro-
that we estimate the unemployment rates in 1995 for unskilled labor to be that of 20.43 % and the
unemployment rate for skilled workers to be that of 10.38 %.













Fig. 2.6 — Business as Usual growth of GDP
duced, that is when the economy simply grows as is. This forecast, shows that the
economy grows due to an increase over time in active population, capital, as well as
due to the autonomous energy eﬃciency improvement parameter.
2.3.1 Business as Usual General Forecast
Economic Variables Trends in the Business as Usual Setting
We here present the model’s business as usual projections of GDP, unemployment
and emissions. We calibrate the model such that the growth of GDP follows OECD
projections20 (see figure 2.6).
Unemployment rates change slightly over the two periods. Indeed, over time, the
unemployment rate of skilled workers decreases due to the wage curve specification.
As the economy grows, the price of skilled labor increases leading the unemployment
rate of skilled workers to mechanically decrease over time (see figure 2.7). Such a
mechanism flows from the wage curve specification that was introduced in the model.
20We estimate the average growth rate according to the past GDP growth rates for France. We
calibrate our model on the GDP growth rate from tables in the Annex 1 of ”Sources of growth in
OECD countries” in OECD, Economic Outlook n◦ 70.
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Fig. 2.7 — Skilled workers unemployment rate general trend
On the contrary, unskilled workers’ unemployment rate increases generally during the
same periods of time, as simply more skilled workers are used in the economy, and
therefore less unskilled are necessary for production (see figure 2.8).
Estimated Emissions Trends in the Business as Usual Setting
Emissions follow an increasing trend as seen in the following figure21 (see figure 2.9),
and replicate the Energy Information Administration / International Energy Outlook
(2004) reference case emissions forecast for France.
Indeed, between 2005 and 2012, France’s carbon emissions are estimated to increase
steadily mainly due to the country’s economic growth. However, on average between
2008 and 2012, France’s carbon emissions are expected to be higher than the 1990 Kyoto
threshold22. Indeed, the Kyoto protocol ties France’s average yearly carbon emissions
during that period to be no greater than its level of emissions in 1990, i.e.103 Mega
21We calibrate our model such that the emission predictions follow a trend very similar to what is
predicted by the International Energy Outlook 2004 / Energy Information Administration’s emissions
reference case for France.
22Our model predicts France’s carbon emissions to be close to 107 Mega tons of Carbon (MtC)
in 2012 while Kyoto constraints suggest that France’s total emissions must not be greater than 103
MtC. This is coherent with the projections of The Energy Information Administration (International
Energy Outlook (2004)) that suggest that the country’s emissions in 2012 in the reference case, will
be above the 1990 threshold emissions for France in the Kyoto agreement by some 4 Mt C.
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Fig. 2.8 — Unskilled workers unemployment rate general trend
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Fig. 2.9 — Business as Usual emissions for France
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Fig. 2.10 — Benchmark sectoral emissions
tons of carbon.
In order to study the sectoral eﬀects of the National Allocation Plan, we initially
define the benchmark sectoral emissions for all covered sectors (see figure 2.10). As
seen on the following graphs, the emissions of all these sectors are expected to increase
steadily in the baseline scenario.
The following chart presents the model’s projections of the share of each covered
sector’s emissions the first year of the introduction of the NAP, namely in 2005. In
2005 the oil sector is expected to have emitted much more than the other sectors
covered by the plan, while coal, chemical products, and other energy intensive sectors
and ferrous and non ferrous sectors are responsible as a whole for close to a half of
France’s emissions in 2005 (see chart 2.11). The electricity sector, in France, mostly
representing the production of nuclear energy emits very little due to its fundamental
characteristics.
Similarly, we specify the estimated benchmark emissions for non covered sectors
as well as the energy producing and energy intensive sectors covered by the NAP.
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Fig. 2.11 — Estimated business as usual relative emissions for covered sectors in 2005
















Fig. 2.12 — Covered and non covered sectors benchmark emissions
Non covered sectors’ emissions keep increasing over time as there is no constraint on
them (see figure 2.12). It is worthy to note that non covered sectors’ emissions are
relatively high considering the fact that they are not taken into account in any way by
the National Allocation Plan.
In the following sections we will assess how an emission constraint aﬀects the dif-
ferent sectoral specificities we specified in the benchmark.
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2.3.2 The French National Allocation Plan
The National Allocation Plan was first implemented in January 2005 and is sup-
posed to be enforced for three years until the beginning of the Kyoto protocol in 2008.
After 2008, the plan will either continue to be implemented as is23 if it is considered
a relevant policy to enable France to meet its Kyoto target, or will be made more
stringent. As is, the plan limits the total amount of emissions of all energy producing
sectors (i.e. coal, oil, gas and electricity) to 17.96 Mt C a year during the three years the
plan is to be implemented. It also requires that the total amount of emissions of energy
intensive sectors (i.e. in our specification we suppose that energy intensive sectors are
ferrous and non ferrous metals sectors, chemical products producing sectors, and other
energy intensive sectors) does not exceed 15.45 Mt C a year24.
The Mechanism of the Emission Trading System
When the National Allocation Plan came into eﬀect in 2005, all sectors constrained
by the NAP received the amount of permits predetermined in the plan. In the new
market that has now emerged, permits are priced simply according to law of supply
and demand. Therefore, the more stringent the policy, the higher the price of the
emission permits. In fact, if the policy is stringent the supply of permits will be small
and therefore the price of emission permits will be high, as demand is greater than
supply. Therefore, we can expect a small permit price when the NAP hardly constrains
the sectors, and a high permit price when the policy is very stringent.
23The first period of the implementation lasts three years, starting January 1st 2005. After that, the
plan is implemented for five year periods running consecutively. The allocation of the permits is done
before the beggining of each period. Once a period is started, the amount of permits to be allocated
cannot be altered, such that industries may not rely on specific lobbying action within a period in
order to be allocated more permits.
24It is important to note that only the sectors concerned by the NAP (covered sectors) will receive
permits, and sectors that are not covered by the plan will not be given any allowances. However, non
covered sectors can buy these allowances to covered sectors, if they choose to do so, as can any person.
In our paper, for the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account the possibility for non covered
sectors to buy allowances from covered sectors.
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Moreover, not all sectors covered by the NAP will manage or choose to reduce
their emissions identically. In fact, sectors will theoretically compare their marginal
abatement costs to the permit prices, and choose to abate as long as the cost of abating
one metric ton of carbon is smaller than the pollution permit price for one metric ton
of carbon. Those whose marginal abatement costs are greater than the emission permit
prices, will stop abating and choose to buy the permits from sectors whose marginal
abatement costs are lower than the permit prices. Indeed, in the case for example where
the energy producing sectors as a whole manage to reduce their emissions without using
all the emission permits that they are allocated (case where these sectors found that
abating was cheaper than buying emission permits), they will be able to sell their
supplementary emission permits to the energy intensive sectors if the cost of abating
for them is more expensive than buying an emission permit.
Banking
Banking is allowed in the National Allocation Plan. Indeed, firms can choose to
allocate emission permits as they wish, over the two periods that we are studying25.
We therefore suppose that in 2005, as all sectors know the number of permits they
will receive in 2005, 2006 and 2007 (the first period), they are allowed to allocate their
permits over these three years as they wish. Similarly, firms over the second period (2008
- 2012) can allocate their allowances over the five years as they wish in order to level
their emission reductions over time. During the first period, firms will therefore choose
to level their eﬀorts such that the price of emission permits the first year equalizes the
permit price the second year corrected by the interest rate, which will also be equal to
the price of the third also corrected by the interest rate. Namely, firms seek to allow
25While banking is allowed over the two periods by the french NAP, it is the only country that has
allowed such a mechanism. We here suppose that these are two distinct periods and we do not allow
for such banking procedures.
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Where p1 is the price for an emission permit in 2005, p2 its price in 2006, and p3
its price in 2007. In this specification r is the interest rate. Banking, basically levels
the prices of permits over the three years, as frms will choose each year the level of
abatement that can allow for this equality. For the sake of simplicity we choose to set
the interest rate to one, and we constrain the model to derive the emission reductions
such that the price of carbon is the same each year.
Three Environmental Policies
In this chapter we shed light on the consequences of the NAP on global emissions,
permit prices, GDP, as well as on unemployment rates for both skilled an unskilled
labor. We address three diﬀerent policy situations :
— We first derive preliminary conclusions on the stringency of the NAP. We suppose
that the NAP will be implemented from 2005 until 2012 without being made
more stringent in 2008. By so doing we ignore the additional constraints that are
necessary, in order for France to abide by the Kyoto levels. As the NAP supposes
that the allowances are to be allocated at the beginning of each period, i.e. in
2005 and in 2008, we therefore suppose that banking is possible during these two
periods.
— Then we model the introduction of the National Allocation Plan until 2012 un-
changed, but also take into account the constraints determined by the Kyoto
protocol which we model through the introduction of a second carbon tax this
time on non covered sectors26. We therefore study the impact of the NAP on the
first period, and then of both the NAP and an additional tax on non covered
26As our model represents one single region (France) we cannot model the exchange of permits from
one region to another in the Kyoto process. We therefore proxy the price of the new emission permits
with a fixed carbon tax.
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Fig. 2.13 — Percentage production diﬀerence relative to the BAU.
sectors, in the second period. We choose the necessary value of the tax on non
covered sectors in order to allow for the burden sharing targets to be met over
the five year period from 2008 to 2012.
— Finally, we assess the impacts of the NAP between 2005 and 2007, the stringency
of which we increase starting 2008, and couple with a tax on non covered sectors
that is necessary to satisfy the Kyoto targets.
First Policy : The National Allocation Plan is Implemented Until 2012, the
Kyoto Constraint is Not Introduced in the Second Period
In this section, we choose to study the eﬀects of the National Allocation Plan on
condition that it is extended until 2012 unchanged. We do not take into account the
fact that starting 2008 the Kyoto protocol is to enter into eﬀect2728.
Eﬀect on Production We here study the eﬀects of the introduction of the NAP on
the production of both covered and non covered sectors, between 2005 and 2012.
27This hypothesis will be relaxed in the following sections.
28We address these policies independantly in order to single out the diﬀerent eﬀects linked to the
policies.
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Following the introduction of the NAP, the production of covered sectors falls,
while the production of non covered sectors increases relative to the BAU. Indeed, as
all sectors reduce their demand for the production of covered sectors as a consequence
of the emission constraint on them, the production of covered sectors falls mechanically
to satisfy the law of supply and demand. In fact, both covered and non covered sectors
substitute between their inputs to production and demand more goods produced by the
non covered sectors (leading to an increase in the production of non covered sectors
as seen on the graph) and less goods produced by the covered sectors, as inputs to
production. Such a drop in the demand for covered sectors’ goods leads to a drop in
covered sectors’ production.
Proposition 1 Non covered sectors’ production increases following the introduction of
the NAP constraining covered sectors.
Eﬀect on Total Emissions and Carbon Price Following the introduction of the
NAP in 2005, France’s total emissions decrease relative to the BAU as seen in the
graph 2.14. It appears however, that the NAP is not suﬃcient for France to reduce its
emissions to the level that is required in the Kyoto agreements (average of 103 MtC
over the second period).
More precisely, in the figure 2.15, we determine the percentage diﬀerences of total
emissions between the policy case and the BAU, once the NAP is introduced. During
the first period, the graph shows that France’s total emissions fall by close to 0.12 %
during the first three years. For the sake of analysis, we suppose that the NAP is not
further constrained during the second period 2008 - 2012, that is to say, that the caps
that are determined in the NAP for the first period, are not modified. Therefore, in
the second period the percentage diﬀerence of total emissions between the policy case
and the BAU reaches almost 1%29.
29The increase in this percentage diﬀerence in the second period is simply due to the fact that the
economy is growing. Therefore, a stable emission constraint over the two periods acts as a tighter
constraint in the second period in comparison to the first period.
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Fig. 2.15 — Percentage total emissions reductions for France relative to the BAU
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Fig. 2.16 — Carbon price in dollars per metric tons of carbon
As the constraints are tighter in the second period (because of the natural increase
in emissions over time in the business as usual setting), the prices for emission permits
will be very small during the first period and greater during the second period (see
figure 2.16). Indeed, during the first period, the permit price is close to $1.2 per metric
ton of carbon, and the second period, it reaches $8.5 per metric ton of carbon.
Eﬀect on Sectoral Emissions It appears moreover, that both covered and non
covered sectors see their emissions fall because of the NAP, while covered sectors’
emissions fall more than non covered sectors emissions.
In fact, although only covered sectors are required to reduce their emissions to
satisfy a constraint, non covered sectors also see their emissions fall very slightly. These
non covered sector’s emission reductions occur due to the price increases of the covered
sectors’ production and specifically of the energy sectors. Indeed, the new costs that
derive from the constraints and the permit prices, increase the price of the energy
goods, from which emissions flow, and which are delivered by the energy sectors (coal,
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Fig. 2.17 — Emission reductions for covered and non covered sectors relative to the
BAU
oil and gas). The price increases lead non covered sectors to reduce their demand for
these energy goods as inputs to production as they are more expensive and increase the
use of other factors that are relatively cheaper. For this reason, non covered sectors use
less energy goods as inputs to production, which mechanically reduces their emissions.
Buying and Selling Sectors Theoretically, following the introduction of the con-
straints defined by the NAP, not all sectors covered by the NAP manage, or choose to
reduce their emissions identically. In fact, sectors compare their marginal abatement
costs to the permit prices, and choose to abate as long as the cost of abating one metric
ton of carbon is smaller than the pollution permit price for one metric ton of carbon.
Those whose marginal abatement costs are greater than the emission permit prices,
stop abating and choose to buy the permits from sectors whose marginal abatement
costs are lower than the permit prices.
The graph 2.18, gives a precise idea of which sectors covered by the NAP manage
to reduce their emissions enough to sell their permits on the market for tradeable
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permits, and which become buyers of permits. In this graph, the bold blue line, is the
average emission reduction percentage that is necessary for covered sectors to satisfy
the constraint given by the NAP3031.
Sectors that reduce their emissions less than the average, are buyers of emission
permits, while sectors who manage to reduce their emissions more than the average,
will become sellers of pollution permits on the market for tradeable permits. The graph
2.18 shows that the electricity sector as well as the coal and ferrous and non ferrous
metals sectors, in this policy case, will reduce their emissions above what is required of
them by the NAP, and will sell their excess permits on the market for tradeable permits.
Indeed, the SAM shows that these sectors are all more intensive in coal and electricity
(which has the highest carbon coeﬃcient) than they are in oil and gas. Therefore, the
demand for these goods falls, and their emissions fall proportionnally. On the contrary,
sectors such as oil, gas, other energy intensive sectors, and chemical products all use
oil and gas (with smaller carbon coeﬃcients) intensively as inputs to production. The
demand for these inputs falls less, and they must therefore buy emission permits on
the market for tradeable permits.
Eﬀect on Unemployment The eﬀect on the unemployment rates of the implemen-
tation of the NAP, without any additional constraint or any increase in its stringency
over time, are to be studied while keeping in mind that all results are very small due
to the non stringency of the plan.
The eﬀects of the NAP on unemployment for skilled and unskilled workers, although
very small, remain of interest. Indeed, both the unemployment rates of skilled and
unskilled labor decline (see figure 2.19), that is more labor is used as inputs in the
30In the case where there is no market for tradeable permits, all covered sectors would have to
reduce their emissions at that exact level, whatever their cost of abatement.
31Covered sectors indeed must reduce their emissions in average by 2.34 % over the first period in
order to satisfy the Kyoto constraints. Those who have abated more than 2.34 % can sell their excess
permits to sectors who have abated less then this average percentage.





















Fig. 2.18 — Sectoral emissions reductions due to the introduction of the NAP.
production functions. Two eﬀects explain this decrease in unemployment rates : a
substitution eﬀect, and a general equilibrium eﬀect.
— The first eﬀect leading to these decreases in unemployment rates, is the substi-
tution eﬀect following the increase in the prices of the goods produced by the
covered sectors. As the prices of these inputs go up due to the new constraints,
firms choose to use inputs relatively cheaper and increase their demand for labor,
both qualified and unqualified (while reducing their demand for covered sectors
goods).
— The other eﬀect leading to a decrease in the unemployment rate of both types
of workers, is the general equilibrium eﬀect that increases the production of a
majority of non covered sectors, as the demand for their goods as inputs to
production increases32. These production increases lead to a higher demand in
labor as inputs to production. The key issue to the decrease in the unemployment
rates lies in the heavy concentration of both skilled an unskilled workers in non
32The demand for non covered sectors’ goods as inputs to production increases as they are not
taxed or constrained, and their price therefore becomes competitive relatively to covered sectors’
goods. Therefore, a constraint on covered sectors increases non covered sectors’ production.
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Fig. 2.19 — Unemployment rates for skilled and unskilled workers relative to the BAU
covered sectors (see graph 2.5). If non covered sectors see their production increase
following the introduction of the NAP, this will decrease both skilled and unskilled
unemployment rates, as they need more inputs to satisfy the production increase.
It follows that, had there been a decrease in non covered sectors production,
this would have lead to the contraction of their demand for labor. As labor is
concentrated in non covered sectors, this would have lead to a general increase
in France’s unemployment rates.
Therefore, the eﬀect of the diﬀerent policies on non covered sectors’ production,
will be crucial to assess in order to understand the unemployment variations.
In this scenario, the eﬀect on the economy of the introduction of the NAP, is a small
decrease in the unemployment rates33. However, the unemployment rate for unskilled
labor decreases faster than for skilled labor. This is due to our modeling choices. Indeed,
as the wages for unskilled labor are lower than the wages for skilled labor, and because
the elasticity of substitution between both types of labor, is equal to one, firms choose
33The decrease in the unemployment rates are very small however and could be close to not being
significant.
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to demand more unskilled labor than skilled in order to counter the eﬀects of the price
increases of their inputs. These percentages are very small however, due to the non
stringent characteristic of the policy, and are hardly noticeable in the first period for
skilled workers.
These preliminary conclusions rely on multiple hypotheses as previously noted,
specifically on the non existence of the Kyoto constraints. In the following section we
choose to take into account the Kyoto constraint aiming at reducing France’s average
emissions over the five year period of 2008 to 2012 to be equal to France’s emissions in
1990.
Second Policy : The National Allocation Plan is Implemented Until 2012,
Kyoto Constraints are Modeled
In this section, we take into account that the Kyoto protocol enters into eﬀect in
the beginning of 2008. According to the Kyoto protocol, France is to reduce its total
emissions to its level in 1990, that is between 2008 and 2012, France’s average emissions
cannot be greater than 103 Mega tons of carbon34. We therefore model the NAP as
well as the Kyoto constraints.
We suppose that France’s NAP is extended as is until 2012. That is to say each
year the covered sectors are constrained to not emit more than what is determined
in the plan. According to the plan however, non covered sectors are not required to
reduce their emissions in any way. However, the plan in itself does not enable France
to reach the Kyoto target of an average of 103 MtC between 2008 and 2012. It appears
necessary for non covered sectors to be constrained to reduce their emissions over the
period 2008-2012 in order for France to satisfy the Kyoto targets. As a member of the
protocol, France will receive in 2008 a certain number of emission permits that the non
covered sectors can choose to use or sell to other countries in order to meet its target.
34103 Mt C is the amount of carbon that was emitted by France in 1990. In our benchmark simu-
lations, we consider France’ average emissions between 2008 and 2012, to be close to 106.6 Mt C.
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In order to study the protocol and the way in which each country chooses to buy
or sell their permits, it is necessary to have an integrated model for all European
countries. However, our model describes the French economy alone. To counter the
diﬃculty in modeling the Kyoto constraint with a single country model, we introduce
an additional tax on non covered sectors. This serves as an approximation of the eﬀect
of the allocation of European pollution permits on the French economy. The policy we
now study is the implementation of the National Allocation Plan until 2012, coupled
with the introduction in 2008 of a "pollution tax" on the non covered sectors, of a value
of $26 per metric ton of carbon3536.
Eﬀect on Production It appears here that the eﬀect of the Kyoto constraint in-
creases the positive impact on the production of non covered sectors, and worsens the
negative impact on the production of covered sectors (see figure 2.20). Indeed, in the
case of the NAP alone, covered sectors’ production falls by −0.2% relative to the BAU,
while its production falls by −0.5% in the case where the Kyoto constraints are taken
into account.
The introduction of a tax on non covered sectors’ emissions, leads these sectors to
further decrease their demand for fossil fuels as inputs to production. Total covered
sectors’ production therefore decreases even more than in the case of the NAP alone,
as non covered sectors turn away from the production of covered sectors, and reduce
their use as inputs. Moreover, the demand for non covered sectors goods increases
even more following the introduction of the Kyoto constraint, and this because non
covered sectors demand more of their own goods as inputs to production (through the
35The carbon tax that will aﬀect non covered sectors will necessarily have to be, in our framework,
$26 per metric ton of carbon. It is the only tax price that allows France’s emissions to average 103
metric tons of carbon over 2008 and 2012.
We derive this price by simply simulating the country’s emissions with diﬀerent tax prices, until we
find a carbon price that allows France’s emissions to average 103 MtC over the second period.
36The pollution tax aﬀects non covered sectors as well as the demand sectors also responsible for
emissions. Therefore, consumption as well as investment are taxed at the same rate as non covered
sectors.
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Fig. 2.20 — Sectoral production change relative to the BAU.
substitution eﬀect), as their demand for fossil fuels decreases.
However, while the total production of covered sectors decreases due to the Kyoto
constraint relative to the BAU, the production impacts are not uniform among all
the covered sectors. The graph 2.21, determines how the tax on non covered sectors
aﬀects the production of covered sectors. To isolate the eﬀect of the Kyoto constraint,
we compare the production variations for all sectors in the case where the NAP is
introduced with the Kyoto constraint, to the case where only the NAP is introduced.
We see that the production of coal, oil and gas, decreases due to the Kyoto constraint,
while the production of ferrous and non ferrous, chemical products, electricity and
other energy intensive goods see their production increase slightly or remain stable.
The production reductions derive from the fact that the demand for these fossil fuels
by non covered sectors decreases, as non covered sectors who are taxed according to
their emissions, prefer inputs that are not fossil fuels. As the demand for coal, oil and
gas decreases, their production also decreases, to satisfy the law of supply and demand,
which mechanically pulls total emissions downwards. The other sectors’ productions
increase slightly relative to the case where the NAP is introduced, simply due to the
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Fig. 2.21 — Eﬀect of the Kyoto constraint on the production of covered sectors
substitution eﬀects that lead to a strong decrease in the demand for the fossil fuels,
which need to be substituted by other less emitting inputs.
Eﬀect on Total Emissions and Carbon Price The eﬀect of the Kyoto protocol
on France’s total emissions is predicted to follow a pattern close to the figure 2.22.
The pink line reflects France’s business as usual emissions, while the yellow line is the
Kyoto constraint fixed at 103 Mega tons of carbon. The blue line is France’s emissions
following the introduction of the National Allocation Plan in 2005 and the entering
into eﬀect of the Kyoto constraints in 2008. In 2005, France’s emissions are lower but
parallel to its Business as Usual emissions, as banking is allowed and sectors level out
their emission reductions over the first period. However, in 2008, the Kyoto constraint
enters into eﬀect, and France’s emissions are severely constrained by both the NAP
and the Kyoto constraints. Indeed, a tax on non covered sectors is introduced in order
for France’s average emissions between 2008 and 2012 to be equal to the country’s
emissions in 1990.
The eﬀect of these two policies impact the emissions for covered and non covered
sectors. Indeed, we represent the impacts of the NAP and the tax on non covered
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Fig. 2.22 — France’s total emissions with NAP and Kyoto constraints
sectors for emissions for both types of sectors (see figure 2.23).
The figure 2.23 describes the diﬀerent eﬀects of the introduction of the Kyoto con-
straints on both covered and non covered sectors.
In 2005, the NAP enters into eﬀect, and covered sectors’ emissions are slightly lower
than in the baseline. Non covered sectors’ emissions are also slightly reduced due to
the general equilibrium eﬀect and substitution eﬀect previously described.
In 2008 the Kyoto protocol enters into eﬀect, and non covered sectors are subject to
a carbon tax. Covered sectors’ emissions are now further reduced by the unconstrained
NAP as well as by the introduction of the Kyoto constraints (which aﬀect the covered
sectors’ emissions mechanically as the demand for fossil fuels as inputs to production
decreases).
The first period, as policies are unchanged, the permit price stays at $1.2 per metric
ton of carbon (see figure 2.24). The following period sees an increase in the prices of
permits such that it stays during the five years starting 2008 at $3.4 per metric ton of
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Fig. 2.23 — Covered and non covered sectors emissions with the NAP and Kyoto
carbon (this is however lower than the permit price of $9 for the second period in the
previous policy). The price of permits exchanged by the covered sectors is therefore
reduced following the introduction of the Kyoto constraint on non covered sectors. This
price reduction is due to the fact that the production of covered sectors falls relative
to the first policy. Indeed, in the second period, non covered sectors are taxed at the
level of $26 per metric ton of carbon emitted. Covered sectors’ production falls as seen
in graph 2.20. Therefore, it becomes less diﬃcult for covered sectors to abide by the
NAP, and the demand for permits falls, which leads to a fall in permit prices.
Proposition 2 Due to general equilibrium eﬀects, the enactment of the Kyoto protocol,
although solely concerning non covered sectors, reduces the price of permits that covered
sectors will exchange on the market for tradeable permits by almost two thirds.
Eﬀect on Sectoral Emissions A closer look at the eﬀects for both covered and non
covered sectors of the NAP coupled with the Kyoto constraints, shows how emissions
fall relative to the BAU in approximately the same proportions.
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Fig. 2.24 — Covered sectors permit price after the introduction of the Kyoto protocol













Fig. 2.25 — Covered and non covered sectors emission reductions






















Fig. 2.26 — Covered sectors’ sectoral emissions changes with the Kyoto and the NAP
Buying and Selling Sectors In the case where the National Allocation Plan is
implemented as is, and the Kyoto constraints are taken into account in order for the
country to satisfy the burden sharing agreements, the sectors that reduce their emis-
sions more than the average necessary reduction are not the same as in the case where
the Kyoto constraints are not taken into account (see graph 2.26). Indeed, the sectors
that reduce their emissions more than the average emission reduction necessary to sat-
isfy the target, are now the oil, coal and gas sectors, which are the fossil fuel sources of
energy3738. All sectors that buy the pollution permits are now the electricity, ferrous
and non ferrous metals, other energy intensive goods, and chemical product sectors3940.
We therefore see that the oil and gas sectors, who were buyers of emission permits
37When the Kyoto constraints were not taken into account, sectors that sold emission permits on
the market for tradeable permits, were the coal sector as well as ferrous and non ferrous metals and
the electricity sector.
38These were precisely the sectors whose production fell further following the introduction of the
Kyoto constraints.
39These were precisely the sectors whose production increased slightly or stayed stable following the
Kyoto constraints.
40In the case where the Kyoto constraints were not taken into account, sectors that bought emission
permits were chemical products, oil, gas and other energy intensive goods.
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Fig. 2.27 — Sectoral eﬀects of the Kyoto constraints on the buyers and sellers of pollu-
tion permits
in the case where the NAP is introduced without the Kyoto constraint, now sell them.
Now also, the electricity sector, who initially sold permits when the Kyoto constraints
were not taken into account, is now a buyer of permits (see figure 2.27).
The reason behind this change lies in the fact that the introduction of the Kyoto
constraint leads to a reduction in the demand for fossil fuels as inputs to production
(their production falls relative to the case where only the NAP is introduced). Indeed,
non covered sectors see their emissions now taxed. They therefore choose to reduce
their demand for fossil fuels as inputs to production, which leads to a contraction
in the production of coal, oil and gas as seen in graph 2.21. As this production fall
mechanically reduces the emissions of these sectors, these three fossil fuel sectors have
a surplus in emission permits, and become sellers of emission permits on the market for
tradeable permits. The other four covered sectors see their production increase slightly
or stay relatively stable following the introduction of the Kyoto constraint, which forces
them to have to demand more permits on the market for tradeable permits.
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Eﬀect on Unemployment According to the graph 2.28, both unemployment rates
decrease slightly between 2005 and 2007, in the same proportions as in the case where
the NAP is implemented without the Kyoto constraints. These decreases in unemploy-
ment rates are due to substitution eﬀects favoring the use of labor instead of more
expensive inputs following the introduction of the NAP. They are also due to the rev-
enue eﬀects following the introduction of the NAP. These revenue eﬀects, are such that
covered and non covered sectors use more non covered sectors goods as inputs to pro-
duction, as these are not exogenously constrained, which leads to an increase in non
covered sectors production, and therefore an increase in their demand for labor41.
In 2008, as we introduce the additional constraint on non covered sectors in order
to reproduce the eﬀect of the enactment of the Kyoto protocol, the unemployment
rate for both skilled and unskilled workers keeps decreasing, but much less than in the
case where the NAP is implemented alone42. Indeed, the introduction of the Kyoto
constraint has a negative eﬀect on the unemployment rates. To assess this, we isolate
the eﬀects of the enactment of the Kyoto protocol in 2008, by simply comparing the
unemployment rates of both skilled and unskilled workers in the case where the NAP is
implemented without the Kyoto protocol and the case where the NAP is implemented
with the Kyoto protocol. The graph 2.29 underlines the impact of the Kyoto protocol,
that is the additional tax on non covered sectors.
Indeed, the figure 2.29 shows that the unemployment rates for unskilled and skilled
workers in the case where the Kyoto protocol is enacted are greater than when the
NAP is implemented alone. The Kyoto protocol has a negative eﬀect on skilled and
unskilled unemployment rates. Nonetheless, skilled workers seem to be slightly less
41As labor is concentrated in non covered sectors, an increase in non covered sectors’ production
leads to an increase in the demand for labor as an input to production, and therefore a decrease in
their unemployment rates.
42In the case where the NAP is implemented alone, the unemployment rates of skilled labor and
unskilled labor fall by 0.02% and 0.06% respectively in 2012. In the case where the Kyoto constraints
are introduced with the NAP, the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled labor only fall by
0.012% and 0.015% respectively in 2012.
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Fig. 2.28 — Percentage diﬀerence in unemployment rates relative to the BAU
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Fig. 2.29 — Unemployment rates percentage diﬀerence between the NAP without the
Kyoto constraints and the NAP with the Kyoto constraints starting 2008
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aﬀected than the unskilled whose unemployment rate is higher than its rate when the
NAP is implemented alone, by close to 0.05 % in 200843. Indeed, the unemployment
rate for skilled labor is very strongly related to its specification.
The introduction of the Kyoto constraint in 2008, leads to a strong contraction
of covered sectors’ production (see figure 2.29). The production reduction in the case
of covered sectors is much stronger than the production increase in the case of non
covered sectors. Indeed, covered sectors’ production falls by 0.48% in 2012 in the case
where the Kyoto constraints are implemented compared to 0.16% in the case where the
Kyoto constraints are not implemented. Non covered sectors’ production increases by
0.054% relative to the BAU in the case where Kyoto is taken into account, compared
to 0.031% in the case where Kyoto is not implemented44. It is clear that the covered
sectors’ production contraction is greater than the non covered sectors’ production gain
from the Kyoto constraints.
The eﬀects of the Kyoto constraints on the unemployment rate of unskilled workers,
are more drastic than those for skilled, because its value is not guided by a relation
similar to the wage curve, which controls the skilled unemployment rate.
These conclusions are given in the case of the implementation of the National Allo-
cation Plan until 2012, coupled with the enactment of the Kyoto protocol in 2008 until
2012. The major hypothesis behind this policy is that the NAP will not be modified
or made more stringent after 2007. We relax this hypothesis in the following section in
order to specify the eﬀects of making the NAP more stringent between 2008 and 2012,
coupled with the enactment of the Kyoto protocol until 201245.
43Of course these increases are very small and marginal, and have to be taken with precaution, but
they do reveal general tendancies given by the model.
44This is not clearly visible on the graph, but these values derive from the tables that were used to
make these graphs.
45The value of the tax on non covered sectors that is needed to reduce France’s emissions to its level
in 1990, will thus be smaller than $26 per metric ton of carbon, as smaller constraints will be needed to
attain the Kyoto objectives due to the further constraining on covered sectors of the emission limits.
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Third Policy : The National Allocation Plan is Implemented as is Until
2007, Made More Stringent Between 2008 and 2012, Kyoto Constraints are
Modeled
In this policy, we suppose that the NAP will be made more stringent after 2008. We
are forced to make a hypothesis ad hoc concerning the additional constraint because of
the lack of information on the amount that will be constrained. We therefore suppose,
as a means to study the behavior of the economy, that starting 2008, non covered
sectors cannot emit as a whole more than 32 Mega tons of carbon a year46. In order
for the country to abide by the burden sharing agreement, the level of the tax on non
covered sectors will therefore not need to be as high as previously, and a tax equal to
$8.5 per metric ton of carbon allows for the Kyoto constraints to be satisfied4748.
Eﬀect on Production In the second period, when the NAP is constrained and
the Kyoto protocol is introduced, it appears that covered sectors’ production falls
even more relative to the BAU than in the case of the two previous policies and non
covered sectors’ production increases more relative to the BAU than in the case of
the two previous policies. This is simply due to the fact that the greater constraint
on covered sectors’ emissions leads non covered sectors to demand even less covered
sectors production (as the price of their goods increases) and to favor their own goods
as inputs. Moreoever, the tax on non covered sectors being now 8.5$ per MtC, non
covered sectors’ production becomes even more attractive than in the case where the
tax on emissions was of 26$ per MtC.
46This represents a constraint of 1.45 Mega tons of carbon a year, as the total of all permitted
emissions is that of 33.45 Mega tons of carbon in the initial French NAP. This is a very optimistic
constraint.
47$8.5 per metric ton of carbon is the tax on non covered sectors, investment and consumption,
that, coupled with the National Allocation Plan, constrains France’s emissions to its 1990 level.
48We recognize that this is evidently somewhat constraining, as we here ”force” the French economy
to not emit more than its Kyoto limit. Therefore we do not take into account the fact that France, as
a member of the European Community, can also buy emission permits from other European countries,
in the case where it cannot, or will not, satisfy the Kyoto constraints.
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Fig. 2.30 — Covered and non covered sectors production variations relative to the BAU
Eﬀect on Emissions and Carbon Price These two constraints generate important
emission reductions (see graph 2.31).
In graph 2.32, we report the permit prices that derive from this new constraint. In
this graph we compare the prices of the emission permits that were allocated to the
covered sectors between 2005 and 2012. Two scenarios are taken into account. The first
one, in which we derive the price of the pollution permits in the case where the NAP
is implemented as is, and Kyoto is enacted starting 2008 (red batons). The second one
derives the prices of the pollution permits in the case where the NAP is implemented
as is until 2007, and starting 2008 is constrained by 1.45 Mega tons of carbon a year,
concomitant with the enactment of the Kyoto protocol (blue batons).
In 2007, before the plan is made more stringent, the price of emission permits
is close to $1.2 per metric ton of carbon. The prices of pollution permits increase
drastically starting 2008. Indeed, as the NAP is made more stringent, the demand for
these permits increase while their supply is smaller than in the case where the NAP is
unconstrained. The constraint on the NAP in 2008 creates a jump in the prices that
reach $25 per metric ton of carbon during the period 2008 to 2012. This price increase
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Fig. 2.31 — The eﬀect on the emissions of covered and non covered sectors in the case
where the NAP is made more stringent in 2008
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Fig. 2.32 — Pollution pemit price comparaison with Kyoto : NAP forever and NAP
constrained after 2008
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Fig. 2.33 — Sectoral eﬀects of the NAP constraint on the buyers and sellers of pollution
permits
follows directly from the increase in the stringency of the NAP, making it harder for
the covered sectors to attain the caps that they are submitted to.
Eﬀect on Sectoral Emissions Covered sectors’ emissions decrease rapidly following
the constraining of the NAP in 2008. Indeed, the sectors that decrease their emissions
more than the necessary average to satisfy the constraints, choose to sell their permits
on the market of tradeable permits to those who do not reduce their emissions suﬃ-
ciently (see graph 2.34). This policy, is very similar to the policy where the NAP is
implemented as is, and the Kyoto constraints are not taken into account.
Indeed, the figure 2.34 shows that the coal, electricity and ferrous and non ferrous
metals sectors are those that sell their excess emission permits to the oil, gas, chemical
products and other energy intensive sectors. And this for the same reason as in the first
policy. Indeed, the SAM shows that the coal, electricity and ferrous and non ferrous
metals sectors are all more intensive in coal and electricity, (and coal has a higher
carbon coeﬃcient) than they are in oil and gas. Therefore, the demand for the coal,























Fig. 2.34 — Sectoral emission reductions in the case where the Kyoto protocol is im-
plemented and the NAP is constrained
electricity and ferrous and non ferrous metals sectors falls which leads their emissions
to falls proportionally. On the contrary, sectors such as oil, gas, other energy intensive
sectors, and chemical products all use oil and gas (with smaller carbon coeﬃcients)
intensively as inputs to their production. The demand for these inputs falls less and
they must therefore buy emission permits on the market for tradeable permits.
Basically, the further constraining of the NAP, leads to a greater decrease in covered
sectors’ emissions therefore only a very small tax on non covered sectors is necessary to
satisfy the Kyoto constraint. It follows that the general equilibrium eﬀects that arise
from a tax on non covered sectors are too small to have a real visible eﬀect on the
situation of the trading system.
The Eﬀect on Unemployment The constraints having changed, the eﬀects on
unemployment are once more considered. Over the two periods, the unemployment
rates for unskilled workers decrease relative to the benchmark (see graph 2.35). In
order to understand the changes more precisely we compare the policy where the NAP
is constrained after 2008 and we introduce no additional tax on non covered sectors,
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Fig. 2.35 — Unemployment rate percentage diﬀerence relative to the BAU
to the policy where the NAP is constrained, taking into account the Kyoto tax on non
covered sectors to allow France to reach its Kyoto objectives (see graph 2.36).
The graph 2.35, shows how the introduction of the NAP in 2005, further constrained
in 2008, and coupled with the Kyoto constraints in 2008, aﬀects the unemployment rates
of both the skilled and unskilled workers.
In the case of both skilled and unskilled workers the unemployment rate begins
to fall in 2005, due to the substitution eﬀects and general equilibrium eﬀects that
follow from the introduction of the NAP. Non covered sectors’ production increases
which leads to an increase in the demand for labor as inputs into their production.
A comparison of the unemployment rates for both skilled and unskilled labor, sheds
light on the fact that in the case where the NAP is constrained further in 2008 and the
tax on non covered sectors is $8.5 per metric ton of carbon, the unemployment rates
decrease more than in the case where the NAP is unconstrained in 2008 and the tax
on non covered sectors is close to $26 per metric ton of carbon.
The constraining of the NAP has a positive eﬀect on the production of non cov-
ered sectors (as can be seen in the case of figure 2.30). The introduction of the Kyoto
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Fig. 2.36 — The impact on unemployment rates of the introduction of the tax on non
covered sectors
constraints leads to an increase in the unemployment rates of both skilled and un-
skilled labor, due to the fact that the contraction of covered sectors’ production is
greater than the increase in non covered sectors’ production. The final impact on both
unemployment rates is the result of the constraining of the NAP (which reduces the
unemployment rates) and the Kyoto tax on non covered sectors (which increases the
unemployment rates). These two eﬀects influence the unemployment rates in opposite
directions. However, the constraining of the NAP will lead to a permit price of $25
per metric ton of carbon which will have more weight than a $8.5 per metric ton of
carbon tax on the emissions of non covered sectors. The eﬀect of the constraining of
the NAP is greater than the Kyoto constraint. For this reason the unemployment rates
fall more in the case of the constraining of the NAP with the Kyoto constraints mod-
eled, than simply in the case where the Kyoto constraints are modeled without any
further constraining of the NAP. Indeed, the positive eﬀect on the production of non
covered sectors, of the constraining of the NAP is greater than the negative eﬀect on
the production of covered sectors following the introduction of the Kyoto constraints.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the eﬀects of the implementation of the National Allocation
Plan on the French economy with a Computable General Equilibrium Model for the
French economy, with exogenous technological change. We show that the NAP is hardly
constraining as permit prices during the first period are close to $1.2 per metric tons
of carbon.
Indeed, the NAP leads to very low permit prices and therefore very minor eﬀects
on the economy. Allowing for the National Allocation Plan to be implemented as is
in the second period, between 2008 and 2012, leads to carbon prices close to $9 per
metric ton of carbon. Unemployment rates for both types of labor, decrease in this
scenario relative to their benchmark values, mainly because of substitution eﬀects in
their favor, and an increase in the production of non covered sectors, in which labor is
concentrated. The electricity, coal, and ferrous and non ferrous metals sectors sell their
excess permits on the market for tradeable permits.
To reach the Kyoto objectives, the introduction of a carbon tax on non covered
sectors and the continuous enforcement of the NAP, continues to reduce the unemploy-
ment rates of both skilled and unskilled labor, but the unemployment rate reduction
is not as strong as in the case where the NAP is implemented alone. Carbon prices fall
relative to the case where the NAP is implemented alone, and attain $3.8 per metric
ton of carbon, in the covered sectors market for tradeable permits. This decrease is the
consequence of the contraction in the use of fossil fuels by non covered sectors, leading
to a mechanical reduction of their production, and their emissions. This time, the coal,
oil and gas sectors sell their excess permits on the market for tradeable permits, as
their production drops mechanically. They therefore need less permits.
Finally, a possible further constraining of the NAP in the second period, coupled
with a tax on non covered sectors, lead carbon prices to attain $25 per metric ton of
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carbon. The unemployment rates still fall relative to the BAU, due to the fact that
the NAP has greater eﬀects on the non covered sectors’ production than the Kyoto
constraints have on covered sectors’ production. Again, the electricity, ferrous and non
ferrous metals and coal sectors sell their excess permits on the market for tradeable
permits.
In this version of our model for France, technological change is modeled as an
exogenous process, it is therefore unaﬀected by the emission constraints. It simply
over time, increases the eﬃciency of energy. However, in the first chapter of this thesis
we suppose that modeling technological change as an exogenous process may lead to
underestimating some of the economy’s reactions. Indeed, in this model, we have showed
that the only way firms may react to the NAP and the Kyoto constraints is to engage
in substitutions between their tangible inputs (capital, labor, and intermediate inputs).
We detailed such susbstitutions. But, in this framework, we are simply underestimating
all the possible reactions of the firms. In fact, in the reality, firms may react diﬀerently to
the eﬀects of an emission constraint, and may want to direct technological change such
that it releases the constraint of the environmental policy. In the following chapter, we
will seek to study how an emission constraint will aﬀect the direction of technological
change. We will then model endogenous technical change in this model for France to
determine the other possible reactions of firms.
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ANNEXE A : Main Functions of the Model
In this appendix we formally determine the static and dynamic model.
The production functions in this model are Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
functions. There are 17 sectors in the economy, each sector producing one unique good
i, with i=(1..,j,..n), and n = 17. In our specification, each sector uses as inputs to
production its own output, a fraction of all other sectors’ outputs, as well as capital
and labor.
A1 - The Production Function
We determine in this subsection, the following production function for all sectors i
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αME,i + αKL,i = 1
We note yi the production of the good i. We define aME,i as the share of MEi (the
materials-energy bundle), and αkl,i as the share of the physical capital services-labor
bundle in the production function of the sector i. KSi and Li, are respectively the
quantity of physical capital services and labor used in the production of the good
i. We suppose that physical capital services and labor are linked together through a
Cobb Douglas specification, k being the share of physical capital services in the Cobb
Douglas function. We define MEi as the quantity of the materials-energy bundle used
in the production of the good i. Finally σY is the elasticity of substitution between the
physical capital services-labor bundle and the materials-energy bundle.
We suppose the sum of the shares of inputs to production to be equal to one in
order to render constant returns to scale.
In this general equilibrium model, producers maximize their profits subject to the
production function, thus they determine their demands for each intermediate input.
The program of a producer of the good i is the following :
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We define pi as the price of the output i, and TC, the total cost of the inputs to
production. Through this maximization program, each producer seeks to determine
the quantity of inputs of material goods, energy goods, physical capital services and
labor that allow for profit maximization.
A2 - The Materials-Energy Bundle
With αE,i and αM,i respectively the share of energy and materials in the materials-
energy bundle, we define the MEi as following, with σME the elasticity of substitution


















αM,i + αE,i = 1
In order to render constant returns to scale we specify that the sum of the shares of
materials and energy are equal to one. In this specification,Mi and Ei are the materials
and energy bundles.
A3 - The Energy Bundle
There are four sectors in the economy that we define as the energy sectors. They
are namely the coal, oil, gas and electricity sectors. Within the energy sectors, we
distinguish between the fossil fuel energies (coal, oil and gas) and the non fossil fuel
energies (electricity sector ). In this model, we therefore create an aggregate energy
good Ei, which is a CES function of an aggregate fossil fuel good (a composite of coal,
oil and gas) and the electricity good. This energy good, which is a function of all four
energy goods, is introduced in the production functions of the all production sectors,
with a price pE,i, the price of this energy bundle per sector. In order to render more
realistic results, the price of energy varies according to the sector in which it is used as
an input.
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We define Ei as the quantity of energy used in sector i, and, determined as a nested










In this specification, the elasticity of substitution between Fi, fossil fuel energies, and
electricity is defined as σE. We suppose that σE = 0.7. In order for the specification to
render constant returns to scale, we also need to introduce the constraint such that the
sum of the shares of fossil fuel energies and of the electricity good, within the energy
bundle used in sector i, is equal to unity.
ηF,i + ηEl,i = 1
The fossil fuel energy bundle Fi, is a function of all fossil fuels within the economy, i.e.
coal, oil and gas. Consistent with the EPPA model specification, we suppose that the
elasticity of substitution between fossil fuel goods is equal to one, that is, Fi is a simple
Cobb Douglas function of all fossil fuel energies. The following equation determines the








In this specification, Coi, Gi, and Oii represent the quantity respectively of coal, gas
and oil used in the i sector. The powers to these quantities are the shares of each fossil
fuel in the fossil fuel bundle, and their sum equals to unity. Here, ρCo,i, ρG,i, and ρOi,i
are respectively the shares of coal, gas and oil, in the fossil fuel bundle in sector i.
A4 - The Materials Bundle
The materials bundleMi is in fact a CES function of all materials armington goods
aj, and that are linked together with an elasticity of substitution of σM . We determine
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A5 - An Armington Good Specification
In this model, France is considered as a small open economy, therefore, part of the
goods produced is sold to the domestic market, and the remaining, to the rest of the
world. As a small open economy, France cannot influence international prices that are
taken as given reference prices.
In order to allow for consumers to demand domestically produced and imported goods,
we define an Armington good, which is a bundle of these domestically produced and im-
ported goods (see Armington (1969)). Moreover, producers demand Armington goods
as inputs to production, as previously specified in the production functions of all sec-











In this specification, ai is the Armington good, which is a bundle of the domestically
produced good yi and the imported good mi. The elasticity of substitution of the bun-
dle, is σA with σA < 1. Moreover, βi is the share of domestically produced goods in the
Armington specification. This specification allows for a more realistic determination of
the demand for goods, prices are therefore not the only basis for decision. Note that
all inputs in the production function are Armington goods. For example, the amount
of oil used for the production of good i is in fact a CES function of the oil produced
domestically and imported from the rest of the world.
A6 - The Labor Inputs
Labor in this model is diﬀerenciated according to its qualification. Therefore, in-
dustries demand a bundle of qualified and non qualified labor as inputs to production.
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We consider qualified and non qualified labor to have an elasticity of substitution equal







With qi and nqi respectively the shares of qualified labor (Qi) and non qualified
labor (NQi) in the labor bundle in the sector i, the sum of which is equal to one.
A7 - The Government
In our specification, the government is a tax collector, who collects the revenues of
all taxes on the economy, and uses these revenues to demand part of the consumption
goods.
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ANNEXE B : Description of the Dynamic Model
In this annex, we describe the dynamic framework of the model. We create a re-
cursive dynamic framework such that the model is solved as a sequence of static one
period equilibria for future time periods. Each step t, represents one year starting in
1995, which is the baseline year the model is calibrated on, and we solve the model
until 2012. In the recursive dynamic framework, the driving forces of the economy are
increases in the endowment of labor and physical capital services. The endowment of
labor increases according to an estimated active population growth coeﬃcient. The
capital stock increases due to investments in physical capital.
B1 - Labor Supply
The active population is the quantity of labor in the economy, that, in each pe-
riod t, is allocated to the production sectors. We exogenously increase the quantity of
both skilled and unskilled active population according to an estimation49 of the active
population growth over the years. We therefore obtain the following equation.
L¯t+1 = L¯t ∗ (1 + gactive_pop)
In this equation, the endowment of active population in the period (t+ 1), L¯(t+1),
is equal to the amount of active population in period t, increased by an estimated rate
of growth of the active population gactive_pop. We postulate this rate of growth to be
0.139% according to Amar M. Topiol A. (2001).
B2 - Capital Supply
Physical capital increase in the economy according to the accumulation of invest-
ment, i.e., the investment in the period t, increases the stock of physical capital in t+1.
Therefore, the stock of physical capital grows according to this equation :
Kt+1 = (1− δK) ∗Kt + It
49We derive the estimation of the growth of France’s active population over time from Amar et
Topiol (2001).
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The stock of capital in year t+ 1,Kt+1, equals the sum of the depreciated stock of
capital (1− δK)Kt in the year t, and investment It in year t. We account for the yearly
depreciation of capital defined in this equation as δK .
Physical capital services derive from the stock of physical capital according to the
following equation (see Paltsev (2004) and Rutherford et al. (2002)).
KSt = (r + δk)Kt
With KSt the total value of capital services or the total capital returns for a given
period, used each year as inputs into production, and r the interest rate of the economy.
B3 - An Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Parameter
In our paper, technological change is specifically modeled through an inverse au-
tonomous energy eﬃciency parameter (AEEI), whereby each year more energy is pro-
duced with less inputs. This is equivalent to modeling an AEEI. Indeed, the definition
of technological change is the process by which less inputs may produce the same
quantities of outputs, or the same quantities of inputs may produce a higher amount of
ouputs (this is what we model here). We therefore suppose that the eﬃciency of coal,
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3.1 Introduction
L’objectif de ce chapitre est d’étudier l’impact d’une contrainte environmentale sur
la direction du progrès technique. Pour ce faire, nous cherchons à déterminer, dans un
modèle théorique simple à trois facteurs de production, si et comment l’introduction
d’une contrainte d’émission va influencer la direction du progrès technique. En eﬀet,
dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse nous avons montré que modéliser le progrès
technique comme étant un facteur exogène tendait à sous-estimer la réaction d’une
économie face à une politique environ mentale. Dans le chapitre 2, nous avons ensuite
montré à travers un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique représentant l’économie
française, comment une contrainte environnementale peut aﬀecter l’économie. Dans ce
contexte, le progrès technique étant modélisé comme exogène, les secteurs contraints
par la politique n’avaient d’autre choix de réaction que d’eﬀectuer des substitutions
entre ses facteurs de production. Or, l’intuition économique et la littérature que nous
avons détaillée dans le premier chapitre suggère que la direction du progrès technique
peut être influencée par une contrainte environnementale, ce que le modèle du chapitre
2 ne pouvait pas mettre en évidence.
Pour étudier cette question de plus près nous proposons ici l’étude d’une fonction de
production à trois facteurs, le capital, l’énergie (tous deux liés par une fonction Cobb
Douglas) et le travail, dans laquelle il est possible que le progrès technique repose
soit sur le travail, soit sur l’agrégat capital-énergie, soit sur le travail et l’agrégat en
même temps. Nous cherchons à déterminer la direction optimale du progrès technique
sur le sentier de croissance optimale tout d’abord dans le cas simple de la fonction
de production non contrainte. Nous introduisons ensuite une contrainte d’émissions et
étudions comment elle influence la direction du progrès technique.
Dans le domaine de l’endogénéisation de la direction du progrès technique, les
travaux déjà anciens de Kennedy (1964) et de Nordhaus (1968) demeurent encore la
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référence. En transposant le concept de frontière des possibilités de production, à celui
de "frontières de possibilités d’innovations", ces auteurs ont exposé clairement les choix
qui s’oﬀraient à tout moment au planificateur d’une économie ou à un entrepreneur
représentatif, entre le progrès technique qui augmente l’eﬃcacité du travail et le progrès
technique qui augmente l’eﬃcacité du capital, dans le cas où il n’existe que ces deux
facteurs de production.
Partant du modèle formalisé de Nordhaus (1968), nous étendons la fonction de pro-
duction à un facteur énergie. Nous introduisons ensuite dans le modèle une contrainte
environnementale libellée sous la forme d’une consommation maximale d’énergie par
tête. L’objectif de ce papier est d’évaluer la manière dont une contrainte énergétique
pourrait modifier le résultat canonique de Nordhaus, à savoir que le progrès technique
s’applique seulement au facteur non reproductible, le travail (progrès technique neutre
au sens de Harrod).
Pour étudier ce problème, nous traitons ici essentiellement du modèle centralisé c’est
à dire de l’optimisation intertemporelle d’une fonction d’utilité par un planificateur.
À partir de conditions d’optimalité nous caractérisons quelques propriétés des sentiers
de long terme, afin d’en déduire les nouvelles formes que peuvent revêtir le progrès
technique dans le cas où le planificateur est soumis à une contrainte énergétique.
Dans le but d’étudier l’eﬀet sur la direction du progrès technique dans le cas de
l’introduction du facteur énergie dans la fonction de production, nous envisageons
successivement le cas simple où il n’existe pas de contrainte sur ce facteur, et ensuite
le cas où le planificateur doit prendre en compte une contrainte sur les émissions.
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3.2 Le Cas d’une Technologie CES à Trois Facteurs
Sans Contrainte Energétique : Confirmation du
Résultat de Nordhaus
Nous présentons ici tout d’abord le problème d’optimisation, puis les conditions
nécessaires d’optimalité, et enfin discutons les propriétés du sentier de long terme.
3.2.1 Présentation de la Fonction de Production
La fonction de production adoptée dans ce papier est de type KLE, avec une tech-
nologie à trois facteurs de production, le capital, l’énergie et le travail. Nous adoptons
les notations de Nordhaus de façon à préserver l’homogénéité du travail. Dans ce con-
texte, on suppose que l’énergie est un facteur reproductible et qu’il est produit comme
tous les autres biens1 et, à chaque période, entièrement utilisé dans le processus de
production. L’énergie ne s’accumule pas, c’est une variable décisonnelle du planifica-
teur. Ceci le diﬀérencie du facteur capital, qui est accumulable dans le temps. Enfin,
on considère que le travail est un facteur non reproductible, qui évolue au taux de
croissance de la population constant.
La fonction reliant ces trois facteurs de production est de type Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) emboîtée à deux niveaux : le regroupement adopté combine tout
d’abord l’énergie et le capital en un facteur composite, qui est à sont tour combiné au
travail. Ce regroupement permet en eﬀet de préserver la spécificité du facteur travail
(facteur non reproductible).
Y = CES(λ;CD(K,E);µ;L)
Dans la fonction 3.2, Le capital K et l’énergie E sont reliés par une fonction Cobb
Douglas (CD). L’agrégat capital-énergie est relié au travail L par une fonction CES.
1L’énergie peut être considérée comme un bien produit, de la même manière que l’électricité ou
encore le pétrole après raﬃnage.
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On note λ, le progrès technique accroissant l’eﬃcacité de l’agrégat capital-énergie, et µ
le progrès technique accroissant l’eﬃcacité du travail uniquement. Y est la production.
On peut rééecrire Y comme suit :
Y = F (λ(K,E), µL) (3.1)
F est la fonction de production. F satisfait les conditions d’Inada habituelles, c’est
une fonction croissante et concave, deux fois diﬀérentiable avec F
0
> 0 et F
00
< 0. F
est homogène de degré 1.
Plus précisément nous utlilisons une fonction de type Cobb Douglas CD pour relier
le facteur composite capital-énergie, combiné au travail par une fonction à élasticité







¤1− 1σ + (1− b)(µL)1− 1σ´ 11− 1σ (3.2)
Comme le capitalK et l’énergie E sont reliés par une fonction Cobb Douglas l’élasticité
de substitution entre le capital et l’énergie est égale à 1, et on note α la part du capital
dans l’agrégat capital-énergie2. L’agrégat capital-énergie est relié au travail L par une
fonction CES. On note σ l’élasticité de substitution entre l’agrégat capital-énergie et
le travail et b la part de l’agrégat capital-énergie dans la production.
3.2.2 La Technologie de Production et d’Innovation
Le choix, par le planificateur, de la direction du progrès technique s’eﬀectuera dans
notre cas sur la frontière des possibilités d’innovations (F.P.I.) comme introduit par
Kennedy (1964) (voir le graphique 3.1). En abscisse nous inscrivons le taux de croissance
de progrès technique qui augmente l’eﬃcacité du travail µ˙µ , et en ordonnée celui de
l’eﬃcacité du facteur composite capital-énergie, λ˙λ .
2La valeur de α se révèlera très importante dans les conclusions de notre modèle sur la direction
du progrès technique dans le cas d’une limitation de l’utilisation d’énergie.









Fig. 3.1 — Frontière des possibilités d’innovation
Du coup, sur la frontière des possibilités d’innovation, le progrès technique reposant
sur l’agrégat capital-énergie est une fonction du progrès technique reposant sur le tra-














Avec g une fonction décroissante deux fois diﬀérentiable telle que g0 < 0 et g
00
< 0.
Dans ce cadre, une valeur jouera un rôle important, c’est l’abcisse du point A, qui
indique le taux maximum de progrès technique neutre au sens de Harrod. A l’abcisse
du point A, le progrès technique repose uniquement sur le travail, et pas sur l’agrégat
capital-énergie. C’est en eﬀet un repère absolu puisqu’il porte sur la croissance d’un
facteur non reproductible, le travail. En ce sens il va jouer un rôle important dans la
composition du taux de croissance et on le retrouvera dans les formules de convergence.
Notons qu’en particulier le taux de préférence pour le présent ρ de la fonction d’ulilité,
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sera postulée supérieure à ce taux pour satisfaire les formules de convergence.
3.2.3 La Dynamique du Modèle
Le capital croît dans le temps et s’accumule selon la fonction 3.4 :
K˙ = I − δK (3.4)
avec I l’investissement en capital physique et δ le taux de dépréciation du capital.
Dans notre cadre, tout ce qui est produit, est soit consommé C, soit investit en
capital I ou soit utilisé comme énergie E.
Y = C + I +E
Il en suit nécessairement que l’investissement est la résultante de l’équation suivante
3.5.
I = Y − C −E (3.5)
Pour simplifier la présentation du problème, on peut réécrire la fonction 3.1 en
valeurs intensives, c’est à dire en divisant chaque terme de la fonction de production
par µL, le travail intensif. On obtient ainsi :
Y
µL = F (
λ(K,E)
µL , 1)
⇔ y = µf(x)
(3.6)
Avec y = YL et x =
λ(K,E)
µL . Plus précisément, la valeur de x peut aussi être réécrite sous
la forme x = λk
αe1−α
µ avec k =
K
L et e =
E
L .
De la même manière on écrit la croissance du capital, équation 3.4, en valeurs
intensives. Nous supposons que le travail croît de manière exogène, au taux n, taux de
croissance fixe de la population, c’est à dire que L = Loent . On obtient donc :
k˙ = K˙L −
L˙
L2K
⇔ k˙ = I−δKL −
K
Ln
⇔ k˙ = i− (δ + n)k
Avec i = IL c’est à dire l’investissement par tête.
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3.2.4 Le Programme du Planificateur : Détermination duHamil-
tonien
En accord avec les programmes d’optimisation économiques et notant ρ le taux
de préférence pour le présent de la fonction d’utilité, le programme du planificateur
est simplement la maximisation de la consommation totale par tête, sur la période de









exp−ρt(µf(xt)− it − et)dt (3.7)
Dans le programme de maximisation, il existe trois varables d’état qui sont λ, µ,et k
et qui croissent comme précisé dans la section précédente, selon les fonctions suivantes :
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ λ˙λ = g(β)µ˙µ = β
k˙ = i− (δ + n)k
De plus, il existe trois variables de contrôle, qui sont des variables de décision du
planificateur, qui sont β, e et i.




(µf(xt)− it − et) + p1(it − (δ + n)kt) + p2 expht λtg(β) + p3µtβ
ª
sous les contraintes : ¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ µf(xt) ≥ it + et + ctct ≥ 0
et ≥ 0
it ≥ 0
On note p1la variable adjointe associé à la croissance du capital, p2 expht la variable
adjointe associée au progrès technique portant sur l’agrégat (K,E), et enfin p3, la
variable adjointe associée au progrès technique portant sur le travail.
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3.2.5 Détermination du Sentier de Croissance de Long Terme
Dérivées Par Rapport aux Variables d’Etat k, λ et µ
Pour ne pas allourdir l’écriture des équations, nous retirons ici les indices temporelles
dans le reste de la section. Sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, les prix implicites
sont nécessairement constants. Ainsi, on aura p˙1 = p˙2 = p˙3 = 0.





(x)− p1(δ + n)
= −p˙1 + ρp1
Avec p˙1 = 0 sur le sentier de croissance de long terme :
λαkα−1e1−αf
0
(x) = p1(ρ+ δ + n) (3.8)





(x) + p2 expht g(β)
= −p˙2expht − hp2 expht+ρp2
Avec p˙2 = 0 sur le sentier de croissance de long terme :
kαe1−αf
0
(x) = p2 expht(ρ− h− g(β)) (3.9)
Dérivée du Hamiltonien par rapport à µ :
δH
δµ
= f(x)− f 0(x)λ
µ
kαe1−α + p3β
= −p˙3 + ρp3
Avec p˙3 = 0 sur le sentier de croissance de long terme :
(f(x)− xf 0(x)) = p3(ρ− β) (3.10)
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Dérivées du Hamiltonien Par Rapport aux Variables de Contrôle β, i, e
Les conditions nécessaires d’optimalité du programme supposent que les dérivées
du Hamiltonien par rapport aux variables de contrôle s’annulent.
Sur le domaine de commande, on dérive le Hamiltonien par rapport à β :
δH
δβ
= p2 expht g
0
(β)λ+ p3µ = 0 (3.11)
De même, on dérive le Hamiltonien par rapport à e :
δH
δe






(1− α)λf 0 (x) = 1
⇔ kae−α(1− α)λf 0 (x) = 1
Il est en revanche impossible de procécer à la dérivée du Hamiltonien par rapport à i car
H est linéaire en i. Si p1 > 1 alors dans ce cas, cela conduirait à maximiser i, et donc à
minimser e (la consommation d’énergie par tête) et à minimiser c (la consommation par
tête), ce qui est en contradiction avec le programme de maximisation du planificateur.
Si p1 < 1 alors, dans ce cas, l’investissement est nul i = 0 et le capital devra décroître
nécessairement au taux (δ + n), ceci est aussi un cas impossible économiquement. On
peut donc en conclure que nécesairement p1 = 1.
Enfin, pour résoudre ce programme à l’optimum, il est nécessaire que le programme
satisfasse les conditions initiales : ¯¯¯¯
¯¯ λ0 = λ(0)µ0 = µ(0)
k0 = k(0)
Les conditions de transversalité doivent de plus vérifier l’égalité suivante :
lim
t→+∞
p2 expht exp−ρt = lim
t→+∞
p1 exp−ρt = lim
t→+∞
p3 exp−ρt = 0
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3.2.6 Détermination du Taux de Progrès Technique sur le
Sentier de Croissance de Long Terme
Détermination de x sur le Sentier de Croissance de Long Terme
Pour déterminer la valeur de x sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, faisons le









f(x)− xf 0(x) (3.13)
















f(x)− xf 0(x) (3.14)
D’après l’équation 3.14 on en conclut que x est constant sur le sentier de croissance
de long terme.
Détermination de ek sur le Sentier de Croissance de Long Terme
Pour déterminer le rapport ek sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, faisons le







ρ+ δ + n
(3.15)
Comme ρ, δ, α et n sont des constantes, il est suit que sur le sentier de croissance
de long terme ke est une constante et donc que
k˙
e˙ = 0. Ceci signifie que le capital par
tête et l’énergie par tête croissent au même taux sur le sentier de croissance de long
terme.
Confirmation du Résultat Canonique de Nordhaus
D’après notre définition, nous savons que x = λk
αe1−α
µ . Or nous avons montré que
sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, x est nécessairement constant. Il en suit que
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+ (1− α) e˙
e
= 0
Cette équation peut être réécrite comme suit :
g(β)− β + αk˙
k
+ (1− α) e˙
e
= 0
Or d’après l’équation 3.15, on sait que l’énergie par tête et le capital par tête est







Il en suit que sur le sentier de croissance de long terme :






Reprenons l’équation 3.12 :
kae−α(1− α)λf 0 (x) = 1
Comme nous avons montré que sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, x est
constant, λ croit au taux g(β) et ke est une constante, α est une constante et f
0
(x) est
une constante, il en suit nécessairement que sur le sentier de croissance de long terme
on a la relation suivante :
g(β) = 0 (3.17)
Ceci implique que sur ce sentier de croissance de long terme, le progrès technique
est nécessairement neutre au sens de Harrod, c’est à dire qu’il n’y a aucun progrès






(x) = p2expht(ρ− h− g(β))
Sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, k˙e˙ est nul, e croit au taux β (voir equation
3.16), p˙2 est nul, ρ et h sont des constantes donc leurs taux de croissance sont nuls, et
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g(β) est nul donc son taux de croissance est nul. Il en suit que nécessairement on a la
relation suivante :
β = h (3.18)
Nous retrouvons ici le résultat canonique de Nordhaus, qui dans un modèle avec
deux facteurs de production, le capital et le travail, soutient que le progrès technique
accroît l’eﬃcacité du facteur non reproductible, le travail.
Proposition 3 Dans le cas d’une fonction CES à trois facteurs où le capital et l’én-
ergie sont reliés par une Cobb Douglas, le progrès technique est neutre au sens de Harrod
sur le sentier de croissance de long terme.
3.2.7 Caractérisation Complète de l’Etat Stationnaire
Sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, toutes les variables par tête (k, e, c, i, y)
croissent au taux de croissance du progrès technique neutre au sens de Harrod, c’est à
dire croissent au taux h.



















α (n+ δ + ρ)
i








Il s’agit donc d’une économie qui croît de façon homothétique au taux h ce qui du
point de vu des émissions liées à la consommation d’énergie risque de poser un problème.
Les émissions provenant de l’utilisation de l’énergie vont aussi croître au taux h si
aucune contrainte n’est imposée. En eﬀet, dans le cas où il n’existe pas de contrainte sur
l’utilisation d’énergie, le progrès technique n’augmente pas la productivité du facteur
composite capital-énergie, mais repose uniquement sur le facteur non reproductible, le
travail. Il n’y a donc aucune possibilité d’augmenter l’eﬃcacité du facteur composite
capital-énergie.
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Proposition 4 Sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, l’économie croît au taux de
progrès technique, et les émissions liées à l’énergie croissent de même.
3.2.8 Les Conditions Necessaires de l’Optimum sont Suﬃsantes
si σ < 1
Les conditions de transversalités déterminées plus haut ne sont vérifiés que pour h <
ρ. Or les conditions de transversalités sont nécessaires et non suﬃsantes pour soutenir
que l’équilibre est optimal. La question à laquelle il est donc nécessaire de répondre est
celle de l’optimalité de ce sentier de croissance de long terme en fonction des valeurs
de l’élasticité de substitution σ entre l’agrégat capital-énergie et le travail. Dans notre
définition de la fonction de production, la valeur de l’élasticité de susbstitution n’a en
eﬀect pas été fixée.
Nous nous intéressons donc au cas où l’économie se trouve initialement sur un sentier
de croissance de long terme, où le progrès technique est neutre au sens de Harrod. Nous
allons montrer dans cette section, que dans le cas où σ < 1, la fonction de préférence
du planificateur est maximisée, tandis que dans le cas où σ > 1, le progrès technique
neutre au sens de Harrod ne sera pas un sentier optimal car la fonction de préférence
du planificateur est minimisée en un point. Dans ce cas seulement, le progrès technique
neutre au sens de Harrod n’est plus optimal.
Dans cette section, nous cherchons à prouver que les conditions nécessaires de l’op-
timum sont suﬃsantes et maximisent le programme du planificateur dans le cas où
σ < 1.
Pour ce faire, comme nous engageons notre analyse dans le cas où nous nous trou-
vons déjà sur le senter de croissance de long terme, linéarisons g(β) en β = h. Nous




= −hg0(h) + βg0(h) (3.19)
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Demême que Nordhaus, nous posons comme hypothèse que µ = 1 et λ = 1 à l’optimum.
Ceci ne contraindra en rien notre discussion par rapport à la valeur de l’élasticité de
substitution σ, mais permet de rendre les résultats plus lisibles. Par ailleurs on définit























lnλt − lnλ0 = −AB (3.20)
Or comme λ = 1 on obtient :
λt = exp−AB








β(v)dv = B + ht
lnµt − lnµ0 = B + ht
Or comme µ = 1 on obtient :
µt = expht expB (3.21)
On considère maintenant un sentier optimal dans ce système linéarisé dont les variables
de contrôle sont B(t), s(t), e(t).On définit le Hamiltonien du système qui est tel que :
H = exp−ρt
©
(1− s) expht expB f(x)− e+ q[s expht expB f(x)− (δ + n)k]
ª
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Ici, le Hamiltonien est légèrement modifié par rapport à la section précedente. En eﬀet,
nous avions comme contrainte initiale y = c+ i+ e. Ici nous posons comme hypothèse
que i = sy. C’est à dire que la valeur de l’investissement dépend du taux d’épargne s.
Du coup notre contrainte se réécrit :
y = sy + c+ e
Le taux d’épargne s de l’économie est une variable contrôlée par le planificateur et
appartient à ]0; 1[. Ainsi comme le planificateur maximise la consommation par tête,
il maximise (1 − s). La définition du problème est ici légèrement modifiée, mais ceci
ne contraint en rien notre discussion. Dans le problème précédent, le planificateur
contrôlait l’investissement par tête i, ici, il contrôle simplement le taux d’épargne s.
Dans cette équation on note q le prix implicite.
Avec les nouvelles notations définies dans les équations 3.20 et 3.21, on définira la
valeur de x comme suit :




⇔ x = exp−B(A+1)−ht(kαe1−α)
(3.22)
Dérivée du Hamiltonien Par Rapport à la Variable d’Etat k




= −q(δ + n) + γ exp−BA akα−1e1−αf 0(x) (3.23)
= −q˙ + ρq
Avec
γ = (1 + sq − s)
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Ce qui nous donne :
q˙ = q(δ + n+ ρ) + γ exp−BA akα−1e1−αf
0
(x)
Par ailleurs on a :
k˙ = s expht expB f(x)− (d+ n)k
On définit la condition de transversalité qui est telle que :
lim
t→∞
exp−ρt q(t) = 0
Dérivée du Hamiltonien Par Rapport aux Variables de Contrôle B, s, e
Dérivée du Hamiltonien par rapport au taux d’épargne s :
δH
δs
= 0⇒ q = 1 (3.24)
Dérivée du Hamiltonien par rapport à l’énergie e :
δH
δe
= 0⇒ γ exp−AB(1− α)kαe−αf 0(x) = 0 (3.25)
Avec A = −g0(h) et x = exp−B(A+1)−ht(kαe1−α) on obtient la dérivée du Hamiltonien
par rapport à B. Nous obtenons ainsi la relation suivante :
δH
δB = γ exp
−ρt expht expB[f(x)− (A+ 1)xf 0(x)]



















Nous cherchons maintenant à déterminer quelles sont les conditions qui permettent la
concavité du Hamiltonien H en B. En eﬀet, il est important de connaître les conditions
sous lesquelles, B maximise H. Car dans le cas où H n’est pas concave en B alors,
la consommation par tête n’est plus maximisée. Pour ce faire calculons le signe de la
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dérivée seconde de H en B dans le but de déterminer ces conditions. Nous calculons la
dérivée seconde de l’équation 3.26 dans le but de déterminer son signe.
δ2H
δB2
= γ exp(h−ρ)t+B(A+ 1){f 0[ 1
A+ 1
− ε]x0 + f [ 1
A+ 1
− ε]− fε0x0} (3.27)
Or on déduit de l’équation 3.22 la dérivée de x qui est : x0 = −(A+ 1)x . On obtient
donc :
δ2H
δB2 = γ exp
(h−ρ)t+B(A+ 1){−f 0[ 1A+1 − ε]x(A+ 1) + f [ 1A+1 − ε] + (A+ 1)fε0x}
⇔ δ2HδB2 = γ exp(h−ρ)t+B(A+ 1){[ 1A+1 − ε](−f 0x(A+ 1) + f) + (A+ 1)fε0x}
Il est donc nécessaire de déterminer la valeur de ε0pour connaître le signe de l’équation
3.27.
On sait que l’élasticité de substitution entre l’agrégat capital-énergie et le travail se
définit comme :























(ff 0 + xff 00 − xf 02)
Du coup, on peut réécrire σ3:
1− σ = 1 + f
0
xff 00
(f − xf 0)
=






On en déduit la valeur de ε0.
ε0 = (1− σ) xf
00
f
3En retirant les (x) pour simplifier l’écriture.
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Nous savons que x est positif, f l’est aussi et f 00 est négatif.
Donc si (1− σ) > 0 alors ε0 est négatif nécessairement et δ2HδB2 < 0.
Mais si (1− σ) < 0 alors ε0 est positif nécessairement et δ2HδB2 > 0.
On voit ici que la valeur de σ sera essentielle dans l’analyse, pour déterminer si H,
le Hamiltonien est concave en B.
En réintroduisant la valeur de ε0 dans l’équation 3.27 :
δ2H
δB2
= γ exp(h−ρ)t+B(A+ 1)f{[ 1
A+ 1




Nous obtenons, avec ε(x) = 1A+1 :
δ2H
δB2




Discussion Par Rapport aux Valeurs de Sigma
Il est évident d’après cette équation que le signe de 3.28 dépend de la valeur de
σ par rapport à 1. En eﬀet, toutes les valeurs dans cette équation sont positives sauf
f 00 < 0. On peut définir trois cas :
— Si σ < 1⇒ δ2HδB2 < 0 ce qui nous permet de conclure que B est concave en H c’est
à dire que B maximise H en tous points.
— Si σ > 1⇒ δ2HδB2 > 0 ce qui nous permet de conclure que B est convexe en H c’est
à dire que B minimise H en tous points
— Si σ = 1⇒ δ2HδB2 = 0 on ne peut rien conclure sur la convexité ou la concavité de
B en H.
On se restreindra aux deux premiers cas : σ < 1 et σ > 1.
Nous avons linéarisé le système au point β = h ce qui est la direction optimale maxi-
male du progrès technique neutre au sens de Harrod dans le modèle original. Nous nous
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se situons initialement au point z∗ = (x∗, λ∗, µ∗, k∗, β∗, e∗, s∗) que l’on définit comme le
système sur le sentier de long terme dont les valeurs ont été déterminées dans l’exercice
précédent. Nous allons démontrer que dans le cas où l’économie est initialement en z∗
alors, si σ < 1 il est optimal de rester sur ce sentier de long terme, tandis que si σ > 1,
il n’est pas optimal de rester sur ce sentier.
L’économie est donc initialement en z∗ avec z∗ = (x∗, λ∗, µ∗, k∗, β∗, e∗, s∗) et σ < 1.
Ceci a pour conséquence que qt = 1, B(t) = 0, et s(t) = s∗ (le taux d’épargne qui est
déterminable sur le sentier de long terme). Dans ce cas, toutes les dérivées premières
du modèles s’annulent et conduisent à un maximum. En eﬀet, H est concave en k, en
e, mais aussi en B (δ
2H
δB2 < 0). On en conclut que dans le système linéarisé, quand σ < 1
alors z∗ est le sentier optimal. Mais il est nécessaire de montrer que si z∗est le sentier
optimal dans le système linéarisé alors, il l’est aussi dans le système original.





Ψ(e, s, β, t)dt







k˙ = sµf(xt)− (δ + η)kt









Ψ(e, s, h, t)dt
Sous les mêmes contraintes notées ci dessus.
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k˙ = sµf(xt)− (δ + η)kt
Avec g˜(β), l’équation linéarisée de g(β) en h.
De même, sur le sentier de long terme, on peut écrire la relation suivante sous les









Ψ(e, s, h, t)dt
Or nous avons linéarisé g(β) au point β = h ce qui nous permet d’écrire que g˜(β) =
g(β) en ce point. On peut donc conclure que le sentier optimal dans le système modifié
est le même dans le problème original.
Dans le cas où σ < 1, alors si on est initialement au point z∗ = (x∗, λ∗, µ∗, k∗, β∗, e∗, s∗),
il est optimal de rester à cet équilibre. Ceci implique que dans le cas où l’élasticité
de substitution entre le travail et l’agrégat capital-énergie est faible, c’est le taux de
croissance du travail qui contraint la croissance. Il est donc optimal de faire du progrès
technique uniquement sur le travail afin de relâcher le plus cette contrainte.
Dans le cas où σ > 1 nous voyons que H est convexe en B. Ceci nous conduit à
noter que l’équilibre z∗ = (x∗, λ∗, µ∗, k∗, β∗, e∗, s∗) est un minimum par rapport à B
dans le système modifié. On peut montrer de la même manière que précédemment
que si H est un minimum en B dans le système modifié, alors il l’est également dans
le système original. Nous pouvons en déduire que dans le cas où σ > 1 il existe un
autre sentier qui domine celui de z∗. Si σ > 1 alors l’agrégat capital-énergie est très
substituable au travail, on peut donc en déduire que si l’on met en oeuvre du progrès
technique portant uniquement sur l’agrégat alors la consommation et la production
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ne seront plus contraints. L’intuition économique est telle qu’il est optimal de faire
reposer tout le progrès technique sur l’agrégat capital-énergie, car il permettra une très
forte croissance. Comme la substitution est forte (σ > 1) les entreprises auront intérêt
à utiliser plus d’agrégat que de travail, et de faire reposer le progrès technique sur
l’agrégat de façon à ce que la croissance soit sans limite.
Proposition 5 Sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, le progrès technique neu-
tre au sens de Harrod est un sentier optimal dans le cas seulement où l’élasticité de
substitution entre le travail et l’agrégat est faible (σ < 1). Dans la cas contraire, il est
optimal que le progrès technique devienne neutre au sens de Hicks.
3.3 Cas d’une Politique de Limitation des Emis-
sions : Quelques Conjectures sur les Formes du
Progrès Technique
Nous nous posons dans cette section la question de l’impact sur la direction du
progrès technique d’une politique de contrainte des émissions. Nous avons montré dans
la section précédente que toutes les variables croissaient sur le sentier de croissance de
long terme, au taux h, le taux de progrès technique neutre Harrodien. Or l’énergie,
qui est un facteur de production dans notre fonction, croît aussi à ce taux, ce qui de
point de vue des émissions est nocif pour l’environnemnent. De plus, cette économie
ne représente pas les contraintes de la société qui cherche des méthodes pour réduire
ses émissions sans que la production ne doive être contrainte. En eﬀet, nous avons vu
dans la revue de la littérature, sur les méthodes de modélisation du progrès technique
dans les modèles économie-énergie, qu’il est possible de réduire les émissions de gaz à
eﬀet de serre, sans avoir à contraindre la production, et ceci grâce au progrès technique
qui permet un découplage entre production et emissions. Cherchons à voir dans ce
petit modèle théorique, si la direction du progrès technique sera modifée de facon à
contrebalancer les contraintes énergetiques.
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La politique de limitation des émissions de CO2 va être appréhendée sous la forme
d’une contrainte imposée par le planificateur : les émissions par tête, c’est à dire en fait
dans ce modèle macroéconomique, la consommation par tête en énergie e4, devra être
inférieure à un certain niveau e¯ (taux maximum d’énergie par tête). En eﬀet, dans le
cas précédent nous avions montré que la consommation d’énergie par tête croissait au
taux h, taux maximum du progrès technique neutre Harrodien.
Imposer une telle contrainte va nécessairement influencer le sentier de long terme.
La prise en compte d’un niveau d’émissions maximum va modifier le programme en
ajoutant dans le domaine de commande une limitation de l’utilisation d’énergie. On
aura ainsi, pour tout temps t :
e¯− et ≥ 0
Réécrivons le Hamiltonien dans le cas de cette contrainte sur l’utilisation d’énergie :
H = exp−ρt
©
(µf(xt)− it − et) + p1(it − (δ + n)kt) + p2 expht g(β)λ+ p3µβ + pe(e¯− et)
ª
On désigne par pe la variable duale associée à la contrainte de limitation des énergie.
Elle représente en fait le coût associé à cette contrainte pour la fonction objectif et
donc elle peut être assimilée à un prix. Dans un système décentralisé, ce prix implicite
permet de calculer la taxe optimale pour atteindre les objectifs environnementaux.
3.3.1 Les Conditions d’Optimalité
Les conditions d’optimalité du Hamiltonien sont identiques au cas original précé-
dent. Une seule condition d’opitmalité est modifiée, c’est celle associée aux émissions
par tête. Réécrivons la dérivée du Hamiltonien par rapport à e.
δH






⇔ λ(1− α)(ke )αf 0(x) = 1 + pe
(3.29)
4On suppose dans ce modèle que les émissions sont reliées à la consommation d’énergie, par une
fonction linéaire.
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Cette équation exprime qu’à tout moment la productivité marginale de l’énergie est
égale à son coût social (1 + pe), dans un univers décentralisé pe serait le taux de taxe
sur l’énergie.
3.3.2 Caractérisation de l’Etat Stable et du Progrès Technique
Associé
L’état stable est ici diﬀérent du cas précédent dans la mesure où la consommation
d’énergie est nécessairement bridée dans la plupart des solutions, du moins à long
terme.
Recherchons une solution où p˙1 = 0 sur le sentier de croissance de long terme.
Reprenons l’équation 3.8 :









En diﬀérentiant cette relation par rapport au temps et en notant rt = kα−1t e
1−α
t , on



















λrt + r˙t = 0



























⇔ x˙x = ((1− α)
e˙





avec σ = −f
0
(x)[f(x)−xf 0(x)]
xf(x)f 00(x) qui est l’élasticité de substitution entre l’agrégat (k, e) et le
travail, et ε(x) = f
0
(x)x
f(x) , qui est la part de l’agrégat (k, e) dans la production.
Nous avons donc la relation 3.30 :
x˙
x
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Quand la contrainte sur les émissions est saturée, alors e = e¯, ce qui implique que à
terme, e˙e = 0. Ceci signifie qu’à long terme, l’économie utilisera la quantité d’énergie
maximale qu’elle est autorisée à utiliser. On peut vraisemblablement croire dans la
réalité, qu’à terme, la demande d’énergie ne croitra plus sur le sentier de long terme5.
Ainsi, si e˙e = 0 on peut réécrire l’équation 3.30 de la façon suivante :
x˙
x





Recherchons le sentier de long terme tel que k˙k = cste, c’est à dire que
x˙
x = cste. Pour
ce faire, posons g(β) = 0. L’objetif est de montrer que dans le cas où il existe une con-
trainte sur l’énergie, le progrès technique ne pourra plus être neutre au sens de Harrod.
Nous allons donc chercher à montrer que dans dans le cas d’une contrainte sur l’utili-
sation d’énergie, sur le sentier de croissance de long terme g(β) 6= 0 nécessairement.
Nous ferons un raisonnement par l’absurde, pour montrer que nécessairement g(β) 6=












Nous étudierons trois cas :
— Cas A : k˙k > 0 alors, d’après l’équation 3.32 ceci conduit à
x˙
x < 0.Admettons donc
que x˙x < 0 et que l’on se situe dans le cas où σ < 1 (nous avons démontré dans
le cas précédent que dans le cas où σ < 1 il y a un équilibre stationaire unique
satisfaisant les conditions nécessaires du Hamiltonien). Nous avions déterminé
x comme dans l’équation 3.33 et f(x) sera de la forme :
f(x) = (bx1−
1
σ + (1− b))
1
1− 1σ
5Cette hypothèse est tout à fait plausible. En Allemagne, la demande d’énergie baisse de manière
relativement stable. Ceci est dû notammenent à des mesures d´eﬃcience énergetiques imposées poli-
tiquement.
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Or, comme σ < 1 alors 1− 1σ < 0.
Ceci signifie que, si x˙x < 0 , alors à l’infini x tendera nécessairement vers 0,
t→ +∞ alors x→ 0




Par ailleurs, (1 − b) est négligeable devant −∞ , donc au voisinage de 0, f(x) se
comportera comme x.C’est à dire :
f(x) ∼ x quand x→ 0




(x) = 1 (3.34)





)1−αf 0(x) = (δ + n+ ρ)
Ainsi, si k˙k = cste et f
0
(x) = 1, alors il y une incompatibilité car le membre de gauche
décroîtrait au taux (α − 1)( k˙k) et le membre de droite est constant. Nous avons donc
démontré par un raisonnement par l’absurde que l’on ne peut pas avoir simulanément
g(β) = 0 et x˙x < 0.
— Cas B : k˙k < 0 ce qui implique
x˙




µ . Pour que cette fraction croisse à un taux positif, sachant que le capital
décroît et que l’énergie par tête est constante, il est nécessaire que λ˙λ >
µ˙
µ . Ceci
signifie que sur ce sentier de croissance de long terme, le progrès technique portant
sur l’agrégat capital-énergie est supérieur à celui portant sur le travail. Ce qui
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est impossible car nous avons posé comme hypothèse de base que g(β) = λ˙λ = 0
ce qui est en contradiction avec λ˙λ >
µ˙
µ , car le taux de croissance du progrès
technique reposant sur le travail ne peut pas être négatif, cela n’a aucun sens
économique. Le cas B est donc impossible.




Or, d’après l’équation 3.33 pour que le taux de croissance de x soit nul, avec
k˙
k = 0 et
e˙




µ ce qui est un cas possible. Or
il faut que g(β) = 0 nécessairement du coup, il faut que λ˙λ =
µ˙
µ = 0 et ceci est
impossible par rapport aux frontières des possibilités d’innovation.
Dans le Cas d’une Contrainte sur l’Energie g(β) 6= 0, Nécessairement
Nous avons donc montré que sur le sentier de long terme, et quand g(β) = 0 , alors
— Cas A est impossible : x ne peut pas décroître à un taux constant
— Cas B est impossible : x ne peut pas croître de manière constante
— Cas C est impossible : x ne peut pas être constant
Nous venons d’écarter la solution g(β) = 0 sur le sentier de croissance de long terme
dans le cas où il existe une contrainte sur l’utilisation d’énergie. Ainsi, sur le sentier de
long terme, on aura nécessairement g(β) > 0.
Proposition 6 Dans le cas où à long terme, les émissions par tête sont contraintes,
le progrès technique ne peut plus être neutre au sens de Harrod.
Caractérisation du Progrès Technique Dans le Cas d’une Contrainte En-
ergétique
Sur le sentier d’état stable, nous savons que la croissance de x est nécessairement
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Nous allons donc continuer notre discussion dans le cas où g(β) > 0 et x˙x = 0 sur le
sentier de long terme.
On rappelle l’équation 3.29
λ(1− α)(k
e
)αf 0(x) = 1 + pe
Sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, on aura donc la relation suivante :








La direction du progrès technique β∗ est donnée par la résolution suivante, avec τ
le taux de croissance du capital sur le sentier de croissance à long terme et e˙e = 0 :
λ0 expg(β)t expατ = µ0 expβt+const (3.36)
Avec const une constante.
Du coup d’après l’équation 3.36, la condition nécessaire pour que x˙x = 0 est que :
g(β) + ατ = β (3.37)
Ainsi, avec l’équation 3.29 et l’équation 3.37, on a la relation suivante entre le taux
de taxe pe nécessaire pour que les émissions par tête soient nulles sur le sentier de




Comme β est nécessairement positif, ceci signifie que sur le sentier de croissance de
long terme, le taux de taxe croit de façon à ce que la contrainte sur les émissions soit
saturée.
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)1−αf 0(x) = (δ + n+ ρ)
On déduit que :
g(β) = (1− α) k˙
k
= (1− α)τ




Or en tenant compte de l’équation 3.37 on peut réintroduire la valeur de τ :
g(β) + α
g(β)
1− α = β
D’où :
g(β) = (1− α)β (3.38)
Graphiquement, on peut représenter ce résultat sur la frontière des possibilités
d’innovation dans le graphique 3.2 :
Le graphique nous donne une relation entre le taux de croissance du progrès tech-
nique portant sur le facteur composite capital-énergie g(β), et le taux de croissance du
progrès technique portant sur le travail β.
On voit donc que le progrès technique est d’autant moins neutre Harrodien que la
part du capital dans l’agrégat capital-énergie est élevée. Si la part du capital dans cet
agrégat tend vers l’unité, c’est à dire qu’il n’y a pratiquement pas d’énergie utilisée
dans la fonction de production, alors le progrès technique tendra vers la neutralité au
sens de Harrod. En eﬀet, on se retrouve presque dans le cas canonique de Nordhaus
(cas de deux facteurs de production, le capital et le travail) et la contrainte qui existe
sur l’énergie n’aﬀecte pratiquement plus la fonction de production6.
6Mais on ne retrouvera jamais les résultats canoniques de Nordhaus, car nous avons montré que
g(β) 6= 0 nécessairement.




Fig. 3.2 — Taux de croissance du progrès technique sur le sentier de croissance de long
terme en fonction de la part du capital dans l’agrégat capital-energie.
En revanche, dans le cas où la part du capital dans l’agrégat capital-énergie est
faible ou tend vers 0, dans ce cas le progrès technique tendra vers la neutralité au
sens de Hicks. En eﬀet, dans ce cas, le capital accumulable ne peut plus compenser la
contrainte qui repose sur l’énergie, et le modèle est contraint par la non-reproductibilité
du travail ainsi que par la contrainte énergétique. Le progrès technique tendra donc
vers la neutralité au sens de Hicks. Notons tout de même ici, que si l’on se trouve dans
le cas où on prend en compte les trois facteurs de production, (α ∈]0, 1[) le progrès
technique ne sera ni neutre au sens de Harrod ou ni neutre au sens de Hicks. Ces
neutralités ne seront atteintes que dans le cas où la part du capital est égale à 1, c’est
à dire qu’il n’y a pas d’énergie dans la fonction de production, ou la part du capital
tend vers 0 c’est à dire qu’il n’y a pas de capital dans la fonction de production.
Remarquons, que la contrainte de non reproductibilité du travail est prépondérante,
dans le sens où, au maximum, le progrès technique tendra vers la neutralité au sens de
Hicks (mais ne l’atteindra pas), et ne sera jamais plus forte en faveur de l’agrégat, et
ce, quel que soit le degré de la contrainte énergétique7. Le progrès technique portant
7Nous n’avions pas donné de valeur à la contrainte énergétique.
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sur le travail sera toujours plus fort que celui portant sur l’agrégat capital-énergie, si
α ∈]0, 1[.
De plus, il est important de noter que dans l’équation 3.38 la valeur de la contrainte
énergétique e¯ n’apparait pas. La direction du progrès technique ne dépend pas de la
valeur de la contrainte énergétique.
Proposition 7 La direction du progrès technique n’est pas dirigée par la valeur de
la contrainte énergétique mais seulement par la part du capital dans l’agrégat capital-
énergie.
Proposition 8 Sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, dans le cas où il existe
une contrainte sur l’énergie, le progrès technique ne peut plus être neutre au sens de
Harrod. Il repose d’autant plus sur l’agrégat capital-énergie que la part du capital dans
cet agrégat est grand dans la fonction de production. Dans le cas où cette part est très
proche de l’unité, le taux de progrès technique tend vers la neutralité au sens de Hicks.
Proposition 9 Sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, quelle que soit la valeur de
la contrainte sur l’utilisation d’énergie, le progrès technique sera toujours plus fort sur
le facteur non reproductible que sur l’agrégat capital-énergie.
3.4 Conclusion
Nous avons, dans ce chapitre cherché à étendre le modèle de Nordhaus, pour pren-
dre en compte dans un premier temps un troisième facteur de production, l’énergie.
Nous montrons que dans le cas où il n’existe pas de contrainte sur l’utilisation d’én-
ergie, l’économie croît sur le sentier de croissance de long terme au taux de croissance
h, qui est le taux de croissance du progrès technique. De plus le progrès technique
repose uniquement sur le facteur non reproductible, le travail. Ainsi, nous confirmons
le résultat canonique de Nordhaus dans le cas d’une fonction de production à trois
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facteurs incluant l’énergie. Nous montrons de plus, que dans le cas, où l’élasticité de
substitution entre l’agrégat capital-travail et le travail est inférieure à 1, il existe un
unique équilibre stationaire qui satisfait les conditions nécessaires d’optimisation.
Nous cherchons ensuite à déterminer comment la direction du progrès technique
peut être aﬀectée dans le cas où il existe une contrainte sur l’énergie. Nous introduisons,
dans le modèle de référence, une contrainte sur l’utilisation d’énergie et montrons que
dans ce cas, le progrès technique ne peut plus être neutre au sens de Harrod, mais il
dépend de la part du capital dans l’agrégat capital-énergie de la fonction de production.
Plus cette part tend vers l’unité, c’est à dire, plus le capital dans l’agrégat capital-
énergie est fortement utilisé dans la production, plus le progrès technique tend vers
la neutralité au sens de Harrod. En eﬀet, nous retrouvons les résultats du modèle
canonique de Nordhaus et le travail, non reproductible, contraint l’économie. Dans le
cas où α tend vers 0, c’est à dire que le capital n’est pratiquement pas utilisé dans la
fonction de production, alors le progrès technique tendra vers la neutralité au sens de
Hicks. En eﬀet, le capital accumulable ne pourra compenser que de manière minime les
contraintes reposant sur l’énergie, et la fonction de production est donc contrainte par
le travail et l’énergie. Nous montrons de plus que la valeur de la contrainte énergétique
ne joue aucun rôle sur la direction du progrès technique. Enfin, nous montrons que le
progrès technique sera toujours plus fort sur le travail que sur l’agrégat quelle que soit
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4.1 Introduction
In the first three chapters of this thesis, we discussed the eﬀects of including tech-
nological change in energy-economy models. In the first chapter, we made an overview
of the diﬀerent methods for modeling technological change in energy-economy models,
noting that technological change can be modeled as an exogenous or an endogenous
process. In the second chapter, we constructed a CGE model for the French economy,
where technological change is modeled as an exogenous process and we introduced
an environmental constraint, the French National Allocation Plan. We showed that in
this framework firms may react to energy constraints through input substitutions only,
and we detailed these substitution eﬀects. In the third chapter, we showed, however,
through a simple theoretical model that it is incorrect to assume that an environmental
constraint has no impact on technological change.
Technological change can be defined as the process through which a same quantity
of inputs in a production function, can yield an increased quantity of output. Similarly,
technological change allows a level of output to be unchanged following a reduction in
the use of inputs. "Induced" technological change, is the process by which technological
change responds to a constraint in the model, i.e. it is therefore "induced" or determined
by the constraint, and not exogenously determined.
Our goal in this chapter is to describe a method by which we model induced techno-
logical change, in a forward looking general equilibrium framework, where technological
change can be a process influenced by an energy constraint. We base this last chapter
on the conclusions of the three previous chapters. We take note of the shortcomings of
modeling technological change as an exogenous process and we allow the firms to react
to emission constraints through the process of technological change (which was not
possible in the model of the second chapter)1. We show how taking ITC into account
1We do not specifically assess the direction of technical change in this framework. Indeed, in this
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in projections, influences the model’s results.
Introducing endogenous technological change in GEMs has been the aim of many
previous papers (see for example Goulder and Mathai (2000), Goulder and Schnei-
der (1999), Nordhaus (2002), Sue Wing (2001), Fougeyrollas et al (2001) and for an
overview on the diﬀerent modeling methods of technological change in diﬀerent model
types see Löschel (2001). The first to model induced technological change through the
stock of knowledge approach, were Goulder and Schneider (1999). In their specification,
knowledge as well as knowledge services are firm specific.
In this chapter, we modify some of Goulder and Schneider’s fundamental hypotheses
and we introduce induced technological change as the consequence of the accumulation
of a "generic" knowledge factor, accessible to the economy as a whole, not firm specific,
the services of which will be demanded by firms, in the same way that they do for any
input to production. The main innovation here therefore lies in the fact that we describe
a method to calibrate a forward looking model on a modified SAM where Research and
Development (R&D) is explicitly described in the demand matrix, and Human Capital
is accumulated each year due to R&D eﬀorts (see Sue Wing (2001)) the services of
which are detailed in the factor matrix2. We follow the theory of endogenous growth
and build a forward looking CGEmodel, where two stocks of capital (human capital and
physical capital) grow over time on the balanced growth path at the rate of growth of
the economy γ3. Indeed, we suppose that the French economy is on a Balanced Growth
Path (BGP) since 1995, all quantities in the economy therefore growing at the same
growth rate.
In the following section we define the theoretical mechanisms of the "stock of knowl-
chapter, we suppose that technical change is Hicks neutral, in the sense that it aﬀects the productivity
of all factors in the same way. We show however, that the intensity or rate of technical change depends
on the value of the emission constraint.
2This information is not found in a normal SAM.
3We suppose that the growth rate of the French economy, in both versions of the model, with and
without ITC, is 1% per year.
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edge approach", and the specifications of a model on a BGP. We then define a Social
Accounting Matrix and its construction, as well as the necessary changes one needs to
implement in order to induce technological change in the model. We then describe the
data and methods we used for the extraction of an estimation of human capital from
the SAM, as well as how we allowed the model for France to grow on a balanced growth
path. Finally, we implement the National Allocation Plan, and study the impacts of
this constraint on the model with Induced Technological Change.
4.2 Technological Change in Energy-EconomyMod-
els
As our paper seeks to define the method we used for inducing technological change
in a CGE framework, we will note briefly once more the diﬀerent methods of modeling
technological change in this framework alone. Indeed, there are diﬀerent methods for
modeling technological change in applied models and we give an overview of these
diﬀerent techniques whether exogenous or endogenous, and for all types of models in
the first chapter of this thesis.
As seen in chapter 1, according to the modeler’s choice, technological change can be
modeled as "exogenous", or "endogenous". Modeling technological improvement as an
"exogenous" process, suggests that technological change does not respond to any price
changes, or any constraints, whether economic, or environmental, and is not aﬀected
in any way by any sort of policy. It in fact simply leads the industries, sectors, and
the economy to follow a prespecified (constant or sometimes linear time) trend, where
inputs to production can become more and more eﬃcient over time.
On the contrary, technological change can be aﬀected by policy constraints, or may
react to price changes, when it is modeled as an "endogenous" process. Its rate and
direction, however, depend on the way it has been modeled, and is often linked to
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the decision of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) in response to new
constraints.
The methods we cite briefly here fall into one or the other of these two categories.
The most common method to modeling technological change as an exogenous pro-
cess, is through the use of an "Autonomous Energy Eﬃciency Improvement" parameter
(AEEI). Backstop technologies, however, are also widely used, but more often in partial
equilibrium models. Modeling technological change as an exogenous process supposes
that it is not responsive to any policy or price constraints, and just kicks in, at a
predetermined time.
Technological change may also be modeled as an endogenous process, through
"learning by doing", or the "stock of knowledge approach", both of which we have
had a close look at, in the first chapter of our thesis. In this case, endogenous techno-
logical change will allow the model to react to an environmental or economic constraint,
with a goal to lessen the constraint’s grip, and reduce the costs of compliance to an
emission constraint. The stock of knowledge approach allows for technological change
to be induced following the introduction of an emission constraint.
It is often expected, that when technological change is modeled as an induced pro-
cess, then an environmental constraint in itself is the solution to the negative economic
eﬀects it might bring. In this paper, we will seek to show that such a statement is not
necessarily true.
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4.3 Induced Technological Change and the Stock of
Knowledge Approach
4.3.1 The Inducement Process : a Description of the Dynam-
ics of the Stock of Knowledge Approach in our Frame-
work
To model the process of induced technological change in a CGE model, we modify
a version of a CGE model for France, calibrated on the year 1995 the description of
which is found in the second chapter of this thesis4. We create a forward looking version
of this model, with two stocks of capital, human capital and physical capital that grow
on a balanced growth path at the rate of growth of the whole economy γ (see Barro et
Sala-i-Martin (1995) for the basics of endogenous growth theory).
To our knowledge, Goulder and Schneider (1999) is the first published work where
induced technological change is modeled in a CGE model, using this concept of a
stock of knowledge approach. In their paper, two sorts of knowledge are specified. One
is appropriable knowledge, that is to say, each firm owns their own stock of knowl-
edge, that is increased by investments in research and development. The other one,
is spillover knowledge, which is the result on the stock of knowledge of other firms,
of the investment in R&D of one specific firm. In this specification firms can react to
a new environmental constraint by increasing their investments in R&D, leading to
an increase in their stock of knowledge the following year, the services of which they
allocate so as to minimize their net present cost of production. Therefore, the way in
which firms allocate their knowledge services depends on the diﬀerent price variations
deriving from the constraints, and therefore leads to sectoral productivity diﬀerentials.
While detaching our work from Goulder and Schneider (1999), we propose a new
4As a means of simplicity, and in order to not create interferences in the model’s results we here
do not address the question unemployment, and suppose that the labor market is at the equilibrium.
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method to account for the inducement mechanism of technological change, considering
an approach where human capital is a general economy-wide stock from which flow
knowledge services that are allocated over firms according to their demand for it, and
according to its price.
In the induced technological change version of our model for the French economy,
we suppose that, similarly to the generalized stock of physical capital, the economy
also possesses a generalized stock of knowledge or human capital, which, as opposed
to Goulder and Schneider’s model, is not firm specific. Our model therefore has two
stocks of capital, physical capital and knowledge capital, that grow over time with
investments. Investments in physical capital, increase the stock of physical capital,
while the stock of knowledge is increased by investments in research and development.
These two stocks of capital, are both subject to depreciation rates, δh for human capital
and δk for physical capital. In the same way that capital services flow from the stock
of physical capital according to a rate of return, knowledge services flow from the
total stock of knowledge, and are allocated to the diﬀerent sectors according to the
market clearance condition. These knowledge services and capital services enter the
production function of the diﬀerent sectors as inputs, in the same way that the other
tangible inputs do.
Therefore, when firms are confronted with an economic or environmental constraint,
technological change in our specification will be induced. Technological progress derives
from the knowledge services or human capital servicesHSt, that flow from the accumu-
lated stock of knowledge in the economy Ht, in the same way that capital services flow
from a generalized stock of capital. These services are used as inputs in the production
function of all sectors. Knowledge services may simply be seen as an "intangible" asset
that enters the production function, in the same way that "tangible" inputs such as
capital, labor, materials or energy do. In this case, the intangible knowledge services
will increase the eﬃciency of the tangible inputs, as the increase in the use of knowl-
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edge services leads to an increase in total output, while total tangible inputs remain
unchanged. This is precisely the definition of technological change.
Indeed, on the demand side of the economy, firms facing an environmental con-
straint will react through two diﬀerent channels. They can choose either to engage in
a substitution process between diﬀerent tangible inputs of production (capital, labor,
materials and energy), or choose to "innovate". The process of innovation (or process of
technological change) is simply determined by an increase in firms’ demand for knowl-
edge services (the intangible input) relative to the demand for all the usual tangible
inputs such as labor, capital, materials and energy, thus leading to a reallocation of
the tangible inputs to production and aﬀecting the total output. These knowledge ser-
vices, that firms compete for as inputs to their production, derive from the stock of
human capital which is increased each year through investments in research and devel-
opment. Usually, however, firms will choose to engage simultaneously in both types of
substitutions5.
Within the realms of our fully dynamic model, we show how Hicks’ (1932) innova-
tion theory whereby changes in the relative prices of factors, will lead to innovations,
functions when technological change is modeled through the stock of knowledge ap-
proach.
4.3.2 A Dynamic CGE Model for the French Economy
In this section, we define the key equations of the model, such that human capital
services, as inputs to production, and investments in R&D are accounted for.
5As these two types of types of substitutions are the fundamental mechanisms of the model, model-
ing the French economy with technical change defined as an exogenous process allowed us to pinpoint
the specific mechanisms that determine the substitution process between the tangible inputs. In this
chapter, we will now focus on the induced technical change process, namely the substitution process
that takes place between tangible goods and the intangible good (knowledge services) in the face of
an environmental constraint.
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The Production Function
As defined earlier, technological change in this model, is based on the notion of
substitution between tangible inputs and the intangible input. Formally, the intangible
knowledge services may enter the production function as a substitute to the tangi-
ble inputs (see equation 4.1). Human capital services are introduced into the firm i’s
production function as inputs related to all other tangible inputs through a Constant
Elasticity of Substitution relation. In our specification, in order to account for the two
possible reactions of firms to an economic or environmental constraint, namely substi-
tutions between tangible inputs or innovation (substitution of human capital services
to tangible inputs) we determine the production function similarly to Goulder and













αKLEM,i + αHS,i = 1
(4.1)
HSi is defined as the inputs of human capital services that are related to the capital-
labor-energy-materials bundle through a constant elasticity of substitution σY 6.In this
case, when human capital services increase over time, all else being equal, then the pro-
duction of good i will increase. Such an increase can be assimilated to a Hicks-neutral
technological progress simply because the eﬃciency of all tangible factors increase over
time, through the increase of human capital services - the intangible input. KLEM is
a CES function of the bundle of tangible inputs namely capital services, labor, energy
and materials. This specification is defined in more detail in the second chapter of this













¢1− 1σklem´ 11− 1σklem
αME,i + αKL,i = 1
(4.2)
We here note yi as the production of the good i. In the KLEM bundle, we define aME,i
6The elasticity of substitution between tangible inputs and the intangible input, is the same for all
sector i.
Modeling Induced Technical Change 178
as the share ofMEi (the materials-energy bundle), and αkl,i as the share of the capital-
labor bundle in the production function of the i sector. KSi and Li, are respectively
the quantity of capital services and labor used in the production of the good i. We
suppose that capital services and labor are linked together through a Cobb Douglas
specification, k being the share of capital services in the Cobb Douglas function. We
define MEi as the quantity of the materials-energy bundle used in the production of
the good i. In our specification the materials bundleMi is a bundle of the output of all
goods produced by all the firms of the economy and by the rest of the world. Indeed,
we suppose that firms use the production of other firms as inputs to their production.
Finally σklem is the elasticity of substitution between the capital services-labor bundle
and the energy-materials bundle7.
We suppose the sum of the shares of inputs to production to be equal to one in
order to render constant returns to scale.
In this general equilibrium model, producers maximize their profits subject to the pro-
duction function, and therefore determine their demands for each intermediate input.














We define pi as the price of the output i, and TC, the total cost of the inputs to
production. Through this maximization program, each producer seeks to determine the
quantity of inputs of material goods, energy goods, capital services, labor and human
capital services that allow for profit maximization. There should be exact equivalence
between supply and demand on the market for each good. This allows for the necessary
market clearance fundamental to all general equilibrium models.
7The values of the elasticities of substitution are found in the Annex A of this chapter.
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A Dynamic Model on a Balanced Growth Path
Fully-dynamic models are particularly useful in order to assess the dynamics of
policy reforms, and in our case of an emission constraint. In order to be able to calibrate
the dynamic model, we suppose that the French economy, is on a balanced growth path
since 19958, where all activities and assets increase at the rate of growth γ (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 1995), which is the rate of growth of the economy. Specifically, both
stocks of capital increase at the same rate of growth γ on the balanced growth path.
We can therefore derive the following equations 4.4 :
Kt+1 = (1 + γ)Kt (4.4)
Ht+1 = (1 + γ)Ht
With Kt the stock of physical capital and Ht the stock of human capital in the
economy.
Kt+1 = It + (1− δk)Kt
Ht+1 = Rt + (1− δh)Ht
(4.5)
The stock of physical capitalKt grows each year with investment in physical capital
It, and is discounted by the physical capital’s rate of depreciation, δk. Similarly, the
stock of human capital Ht grows each year with investments in research and develop-
ment Rt, and is discounted by the human capital’s rate of depreciation9, δh 10. Taking
81995, is the year on which the model is calibrated.
9Although the stock of knowledge cannot "vanish" in the same way as physical capital can (through
the process of "wear and tear" or the simple obsolescence of older physical capital due to the intro-
duction of new and more eﬃcient capital), human capital stocks also depreciates over time. It can
be the result of the further introduction of new and more accurate knowledge, such that the older
knowledge becomes obsolete, or, when no new human capital is introduced, a continuous alteration of
the productive environment can be the cause of a lesser need of the older knowledge.
More precisely, in the case of patents, the depreciation rate of human capital can be the consequence
of the firms’ continuous eﬀorts in terms of R&D and therefore the introduction of new patents will
make a previous patent obsolete. Another justification lies in the forced closure of a patent after some
years, when it must be open to the public knowledge.
Postulating a depreciation rate for human capital, is contrary to what Goulder and Schneider pose
as a hypothesis. Indeed, they suppose that human capital does not depreciate over time, but note that
this hypothesis is an arbitrary decision of theirs.
10There is no theoretical reason why the two depreciation rates of physical capital and human capital
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into account the two equations 4.4 and 4.5, we determine the investment in physical
capital at time t, It, and the investment in research and development at time t, Rt, on
the balanced growth path as growing according to the following equations :
It = (γ + δk)Kt
Rt = (γ + δh)Ht
(4.6)
Moreover, the production of each sector in our model, also grows on the steady-state
at the rate of growth γ. Formally,
Yt+1 = Yt(1 + γ)
Physical Capital Services or Returns to Capital The physical capital stock can





According to OECD Statistics Working Paper 2003/6, as physical capital is an asset
of an economy, the cumulative stock of all the past investments in physical capital, will
generate a flow of productive services, which are called "capital services". In our case
investments It increase the stock of physical capital Kt, from which flow "physical
capital services". These capital services, are considered the only measurable capital
input to production and productivity analysis, and derive from the stock of physical
capital. They are the value that we find in a Social Accounting Matrix. The OECD
Statistics Working Paper 2003/6 provide a good explanation of what capital services
are :
"Take the example of an oﬃce building. Service flows of an oﬃce building
are the protection against rain, the comfort and storage services that the
building provides to personnel during a given period" (OECD Statistics
Working Paper 2003/6).
should be the same. Therefore, we assume their values to be diﬀerent.
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As we are initially on a steady-state, it is important to note that there are two
prices for capital as capital may be bought or rented. There is a purchase price of
capital at a time t, pKt , which is the price at which new capital is bought, and a rental
price of capital rKt . Indeed the capital stock in an economy is determined by the total
value of the capital services (or total capital returns) and the rental rate (or rate of
return) of capital stocks, which is the sum of the interest rate of the economy and the
rate of depreciation of the capital stock (for a detailed discussion of the definition and
determination of the rate of return of capital, see Paltsev (2004) and Rutherford et al.
(2002)11). With KSt the total value of capital services or the total capital returns for
a given period used each year as inputs into production, one can derive the following
equation, with rk the interest rate :
KSt = rKt Kt = (rk + δk)Kt (4.8)
Equalizing the equations 4.7 and 4.8 allows us to derive the value of the interest














The interest rate rk necessary to allow physical capital to grow on the balanced
growth path, is therefore a function of the growth rate of the economy γ, the deprecia-
tion rate of physical capital δk, the physical capital services KSt and of the investment
in physical capital It.
Knowledge Services Similarly, one can derive from equation 4.6 that human capital
in time t can be rewritten :
11As this equality has already been determined in Paltsev (2004) and Rutherford (2002) we do not
derive the equations once more.





Similarly to physical capital services, human capital services HSt flow from a stock
of general knowledge Ht, and are introduced in the production functions as inputs to
production. We note here again, the rate of return of human capital rHt , as the sum of
the human capital depreciation rate δh and the interest rate rh :
HSt = r
H
t Ht = (rh + δh)Ht (4.12)
Equalizing equations 4.11 and 4.12 allows us to derive the value of the interest rate














The interest rate necessary to allow human capital to be on the balanced growth
path, is therefore a function of the growth rate of the economy γ, the depreciation rate
of human capital δh, the human capital services HSt, and the investment in R&D Rt.
The Interest Rate The key-point of this issue is that we must suppose the unique-
ness of the interest rate, r for the economy to be on a balanced growth path. Assuming
this uniqueness of interest rate, all the future prices of the model, in terms of present





12On the balanced growth path, the discounted value of all future prices fall at the rate of the
interest rate if this rate is constant. On the steady state growth path, all quantities (capital, labor,
human capital, materials, output, etc...) grow at the rate of growth of the economy.
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However, we have just determined the values of rk and rh allowing for physical capital
and human capital to grow on the balanced growth path. Nothing ensures equality of
these two interest rates. And, quite the contrary so, given the lack of accurateness of
data, and in particular the diﬀerent values of the depreciation rates. Therefore, for the
economy to be on a balanced growth path (where physical capital and human capital
increase at the same rate γ), one must assure the following equality to ensure the
uniqueness of the interest rate.











Approximating an Infinite Horizon Finally, in order to approximate an infinite
horizon in our model , we follow the method proposed by Lau et al (2002) and followed
specifically by Rutherford et al (2002). We first choose a final period that we note T+1,
where we suppose that the value of physical capital and human capital assets satisfy
the balanced growth constraints. With such a specification, the model is therefore
decomposed into two periods, the first one going from t : 0 −→ T and the next period
going from t : T + 1 → +∞. In the second period we suggest that the economy is
necessarily on a balanced growth path. Therefore, to solve the model in T + 1 we
assume that the increase in the investment in the terminal period in both human









= (1 + γ)
This equation is the called the primal termination condition.
In the following section we define what a social accounting matrix is and the meth-
ods we used to create a model for the French economy, on a balanced growth path, with
two stocks of capital. Then, we define how we allowed for the uniqueness of the inter-
est rate, through the modifying of the SAM, and the method of extraction of human
capital considering the constraint of uniqueness of interest rate.
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4.4 A Social Accounting Matrix
The model being a Computable General Equilibrium Model, it is calibrated on a
Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). In order to present the changes we have undertaken,
we here introduce the reader to a simplified SAM, and our naming of its diﬀerent
components. The specificities of a SAM rely in the fact that it is a snapshot of the
economy in its balanced state. That is to say, for one given year, there is a ”sink” for
all ”source”, there is a demand for all supply. Formally this can be summed up in the
very well known aggregate income accounting definition which follows :
Y = C + I +G+X −M
Where Y is the total production of the economy, C the final private demand, I
investments in physical capital, G final public demand, X exports and M imports.
Graphically, a very simplified SAM is represented as in table 4.1.
The first matrix, (upper left) is the ”intermediary consumption matrix”. We shall
call this matrix X¯. In this matrix we find the diﬀerent values of all the goods that have
been exchanged between industries during one given year. The intermediate consump-
tion matrix is square, because we suppose that each industry (of which there are n)
produces one unique good j and uses, as inputs to its production, a share of all other
produced goods i = 1..j...n (of which there are n). Each small square x¯ij in this matrix
therefore represents the value of interindustry transactions, i.e. the value of the goods
produced by industry i, and sold to industry j as an input to j’s production. Since, the
SAM is balanced, the sum over j of all the values in the row i, equals the sum over i
of all the values in industry j (when j equals i), that is to say, all that is produced by
the industry i (column i) will necessarily be used in the other sectors as intermediate
inputs (row i).
The second matrix, (upper right), is the ”final consumption matrix”. We shall
call this matrix G¯. This matrix represents the demand sectors of the economy. In
















Tab. 4.1 — A simple Social Accounting Matrix
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this simplified SAM, all goods that are produced are either consumed (column C), or
invested (column I)13. SAMs may diﬀer in their precision, and some have more or less
columns and/or rows according to the chosen disaggregation in the demand matrix.
For example, instead of having one unique column C, for total consumption in the
economy, some may have two columns : private consumption and public consumption.
In this SAM, g¯Ci and g¯Ii are the value of the good i respectively consumed and invested
during one given year.
The third and last matrix (lower left), is the ”factor matrix”. We shall call it V¯ . In
this simplified SAM, there are only two factors of production, which are capital and
labor. This matrix shows in what proportions the production factors are used in the
economy, for the production of each industry. Therefore, v¯kj and v¯lj are the value of
respectively capital and labor each industry j uses during a given year as inputs to
production.
4.5 Extracting Human Capital Services and R&D
from the SAM
4.5.1 The Extraction
In order to determine the eﬀects of introducing technological change through the
stock of knowledge approach in our CGE model for the French economy, we must
determine the values of human capital services that are used in a given year, as inputs
into the production of each sector i. Such values are not in fact found in a SAM, nor
easily found in country statistics, as human capital services are indeed an intangible
input. Direct measures of human capital services are available for very few countries,
and there are many diﬀerent methods to account for it in an economy. The measurement
of human capital services is thus a complex task. Taking this into account, we determine
13In this matrix you would also find the Export and Import columns.
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an estimation of the value of human capital services from the SAM by using relevant
information concerning investments in research and development and patent data for
each sector. We then extract this estimated value of human capital services, that is
embodied in the diﬀerent cells of the interindustry transaction matrix, and thus modify
the SAM.
Extracting Human Capital Services from the Interindustry Transaction Ma-
trix
In this section, we choose to consider initially the matrix of interindustry transac-
tions, X¯. We base our work on the assumption that, part of the value of any given
interindustry transaction, is in fact the value of embodied R&D. Indeed, according to
the United Nations’ System of National Accounts (UN (1993)), research and devel-
opment is defined as an expense or a current cost of production, and, in any case, is
treated as an intermediate input to production. More precisely, specific work by André
van den Berg, (Berg, van den, (2000)), seeks to assess the types of activities with which
knowledge tends to be associated. Therefore, in terms closer to those that we have been
using in this paper, van den Berg, identifies which cells in X¯ij, R&D is some share of.
Following these views our primary goal resides in defining what portions wij of the
cells in X¯, could represent human capital. With R, total known R&D expenditures in
the economy, we therefore seek to determine wij such that :
R = wij ∗ X¯ij (4.16)
Let us consider a good x¯i,j that is sold from industry i to industry j. We simply
derive the value of the good x¯i,j from the SAM. In our specification we assume that
some share of the value of the good x¯i,j is in fact knowledge that is embodied in the good
(see Griliches (1992) and his definition of "embodied spillovers"). We must therefore
extract an estimation of the R&D embodied in this good x¯i,j, that is to say, we must
determine the share of the value of this good that represents embodied R&D.
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However, taking into account the fact that a SAM must at all times be balanced,
as required by the law of supply and demand, all that is produced in the economy
must be consumed / demanded, therefore the simple extraction of an estimation of
R&D, must therefore be rebalanced by a reintegration of these values within the SAM
through the creation of an additional column as well as an additional row (Sue Wing
(2001)). Therefore, once the shares of R&D are extracted from the X¯ matrix, they
are reintegrated in the SAM through the creation of an extra column in the G¯ matrix,
g¯Ri, representing the demand for research and development in the economy, as well as
through an extra row in the factor matrix, v¯hi, representing the value of human capital
services used as inputs into the production of the diﬀerent goods.
Extracting Human Capital Services from the Factor Matrix
Human capital services are however not only found in the interindustry consumption
matrix, X¯, but can also be embodied in labor. Indeed, the SAM gives us the total
value of all labor used in the french economy in 1995, with no information on the
skills of the labor used. Using data on labor skills, we extract an estimation of human
capital services embodied in labor, and by doing so, we will add the values of human
capital services embodied in labor to the new row v¯hj, that has been compiled with the
estimation of human capital services embodied in the interindustry transaction matrix.
We therefore compile all human capital services that may be embodied in the SAM.
The new SAM once we have extracted estimates of human capital from the X¯ matrix
and the V¯ matrix, would then look like the figure 4.2. Note however that the new values,
x˜ij, in the X¯ matrix are now necessarily smaller than those before extraction of R&D,
and the values of v˜L,j are smaller than those before the extraction14.
In this case, the aggregate income accounting definition is now modified as R, the
investment in research and development, is new a demand in the final consumption
14Note that after modifying the SAM according to this method, the sum of column j is still equal
to the sum of row j, as the SAM is still balanced.




















Tab. 4.2 — A Social Accounting Matrix with Extraction of Human Capital
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matrix :
Y = C + I +R+G+X −M (4.17)
4.5.2 Data and Sources for Extraction
In the previous section, we theoretically described how we meant to proceed to
extract human capital services from a social accounting matrix. In this section, we
describe the practical methods which we undertook in order to extract these estimated
values.
First, we explain the methods of estimation and extraction of interindustry R&D
spillovers embodied in the interindustry transaction matrix. Then, we determine how
we approximate the value of human capital services that is embodied in labor, and
extract it from the value of labor given in the factor matrix.
Extracting Human Capital from the Interindustry Transaction Matrix
The first goal of our work was to seek to capture some mix of the two major R&D
spillovers, namely ”rent” and ”knowledge” spillovers. Indeed, rent spillovers are directly
related to economic transactions, meaning they occur when the prices of intermediate
inputs do not reflect the quality improvements that follow from R&D investments. On
the other hand, knowledge spillovers occur when the knowledge that is embodied in an
industry’s innovation contributes to other industries’ innovation processes. Knowledge
spillovers are not necessarily linked to interindustry transactions, as they can occur due
to simple imitation (for a more detailed analysis of rent and knowledge spillovers see
Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1997)). However, Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
suggests that :
"The ambiguity (in conceptually distinguishing between rent and knowl-
edge spillovers) results from the fact that it is diﬃcult to dissociate empir-
ically rent spillovers from knowledge spillovers (..). First rent spillovers are
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approximated through economic transactions which may also imply some
transfers of knowledge. Second, the two types of R&D spillover might not be
combined, but their respective profiles across industries might be similar".
These diﬃculties taken into account, we seek to capture a "mix" of rent spillovers
(embodied in the value of the goods) and knowledge spillovers (approximated by the
patent flows between industries) by following the method of P. Hanel (2000) for the
creation of an interindustry technological matrix. Indeed, Hanel allocates R&D ex-
penditures among diﬀerent industries proportionally to the number of patents that an
industry is granted and uses. Following his method, we build a matrix for France which
is an estimation of the knowledge embodied in the X¯ of the SAM.
The PatentMatrix We base our calculations on information on international patent-
ing and the Yale Technology Concordance made available by D. Johnson at Wellesely.
We follow Hanel’s method to create an estimation of an interindustry technological
flows matrix. In the Johnson and Evenson Patent Set (JEPS), we use a series of matri-
ces that determine the potential industries of manufacture (IOM) of patents, and the
potential sectors of use (SOU) of these patents, for France which we aggregate15. The
elements in the matrix Pi,jk, are the numbers of patents that were likely to be manu-
factured by the sector i (industry i, being the industry of manufacture), and that are
likely to be used by the sector j (industry j, being the sector of use) and issued to firms
from country k (in our case k is France). This matrix is in fact an estimate of the likely
interindustry patent flows. Following Hanel’s method, we compute a "patent output
coeﬃcient" pi,j,k by dividing each elements of the row j of the matrix Pi,jk by the sum
of all patents manufactured by the industry i. Mathematically, one may describe this





15Because, the dataset did not have data for 1995, we use the data available for France in this
dataset, which dates back to the year 1993.
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This calculation allows us to estimate in what way the R&D expenditures in the
industry i, were "distributed" to the diﬀerent user industries j. Indeed, the data from
the French Ministry of Youth, Education and Research - 2004 (Ministere de la Jeunesse,
de l’Education Nationale et de la Recherche (2004)), gives us precise estimates of
the research and development expenditures per industry i, in 1995 in France, namely
Ri,k.Thanks to this data, we estimate the way in which the research and development of
one industry i ”spills over” to all industries j, by simply creating a matrix of technology
flows Ri,j,k. We define this matrix as in equation 4.19 :
Ri,j,k = Ri,k ∗ pi,j,k (4.19)
This matrix is in fact the result of the ”spreading” of research and development
expenditures according to the patent profile for each sector16. We use this matrix to
extract from the X¯ matrix, an estimation of the R&D that was embodied in the values
of the goods transacted in France in 1995. We proceed to the extraction, using GAMS
(General Algebraic Modeling System - Brooke et al (1996)). In order to complete
the balancing of the SAM following the calibration, one R&D column is added to
the G¯ matrix, and one human capital services row is added to the V¯ matrix. In this
specification, the sum over all industries j, of human capital is necessarily equal to the
sum over i of all R&D in the SAM17.
Accounting for Negative Values in the X˜ Matrix In order for the extraction
of human capital from the X¯ matrix to be meaningful, it is necessary that the values
of research and development, given by the French research ministry, and spread over
the industries through the use of the Johnson-Evenson patent data set, be in all cells
16For the sectors of construction, transport and other market services, we had no data on the patent
flows. We therefore were constrained to have to add a 1 in each of the rows of the patent matrix so as
to spread the value of R&D in this sector. Without such change the model would not have calibrated,
as there were values of R&D that had no patent counterpart.
17This equality follows directly from the way we just modified the SAM. Extracting values of human
capital services from the interindustry transaction matrix and creating an extra column and an extra
row in the SAM, does not unbalance it.
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smaller than the initial values in the X¯ matrix. More precisely, we can only extract
human capital services out of a cell where the value of the goods exchanged is greater
than our estimation of the value of human capital services embodied in the cell18.
If we do not account for that, the result will be the creation of a new matrix of
interindustry transactions, where some cells have negative values19. In order to deal
with this problem, we add a constraint in the GAMS code, that prohibits any extraction
in one cell if the value of the estimated human capital for that cell is greater than the
value of the interindustry transaction. The natural consequence is therefore that the
summing up over i or j of the resulted matrix of human capital now diﬀers slightly from
the initial values of research and development spendings given by the French Research
Ministry.
However, human capital services are not necessarily embodied only in the in-
terindustry transactions. We suppose that it can also be embodied in the value of
labor found in the SAM. Extracting human capital services from the factor matrix
is indeed the second part of our work. In the following section we determine how we
proceed for such an extraction.
Extracting Human Capital Services from the Factor Matrix
The SAM for France in 1995, does not give any information on the decomposition
of labor in the economy, i.e., does not precisely determine the amount of qualified and
non qualified workers in the economy, nor the average wages of both these groups of
workers. Additional statistics are therefore necessary to determine a proxy of human
capital services embodied in labor20. We use data from the Ministere de la Jeunesse, de
18This problem can occur considering the diﬀerent sources of our data.
19In Social Accounting Matrices, all cells necessarily have either positive or null values. A negative
value in a SAM does not have any economic signification (except for the IMPORT column, and the
SUBSIDY row, which is a negative tax).
20While we are aware of the intricacies in the evaluation of human capital, we choose a relatively
simple approach in measuring it, as its evaluation is not the goal of our paper. However, we do
recognize that alternative measures or proxies of human capital have eﬀects on economic growth (see
Hanushek and Kimko (2000). Further research should be undertaken concerning our measurement of
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l’Education Nationale et de la Recherche (2004) to compute the number of researchers
that were involved in research and development activities in 1995 in France. We mul-
tiply the number of researchers involved in R&D activities by the average wage of
qualified workers21, and therefore obtain a "value of researchers" in million euros. We
suppose that the value of these researchers can proxy the human capital services that
are taken into account in the labor value row in the factor matrix, and we extract it
from the labor row. In order to account for all human capital services in the economy,
we add this estimation of human capital services to the value of human capital services
that was extracted from the X¯ matrix22. By so doing we modify the SAM once more
such that the value of labor in the economy represents only that of all workers that are
not researchers engaged in research activities.
Therefore, the sum over j of all human capital services in the SAM is now not equal
to the sum over i of all R&D in the economy.
A Necessary Rebalancing of the SAM
Having extracted an estimation of human capital services from the interindustry
transaction matrix as well as from the factor matrix, we create a new row in the factor
matrix representing human capital services. We simply sum over the diﬀerent sectors
the values of human capital extracted from the X¯ matrix and the estimation of human
capital extracted from the labor row. We also introduce a new column, representing
investments in research and development, in the demand matrix of the SAM. These
extractions and column / row creations however did not aﬀect the balancing of the
SAM, for the extracted estimated values of human capital were reentered into the
human capital, for a more precise and justifiable approach to endogenizing technological change.
21We suppose that workers who have accumulated more human capital over their lifetime, through
learning by doing, education attainment, or a higher than average number of years of school, have
higher wages than those that have accumulated little human capital.
22Human capital services can also be embodied in the value of physical capital services determined in
the SAM. Otto et al. (2005) for instance extract from the physical capital services row a proxy of human
capital services which is the value of investment in information and communication infrastructure
(ICT).
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SAM to preserve the column / row balance.
However, we are seeking to develop a forward looking model for the French economy,
therefore on a steady state. The model must thus be calibrated on a SAM that allows
for the economy to be on a balanced growth path. A rapid computation of the interest
rates that derive from the SAM’s values of human capital services and physical capital
services provides the economy with two diﬀerent interest rates for both physical capital
and human capital to grow on the balanced growth path. In order to solve this problem,
we choose to keep the value of the interest rate that allows physical capital to be on
the balanced growth path, given by the equation 4.10. We choose to do this for two
reasons. First because the values in the SAM relative to physical capital services and
investment in physical capital have not been modified by our extraction of human
capital as they are the SAM’s original ones. Second because the value of the interest
rate we obtain is 6.2%, which is very close to its statistical value in 1995 (see Banque
de France (1996))23. We, therefore, consider that the interest rate that is necessary for
physical capital to be on the steady state is the interest rate of the whole economy.
However, we know that the interest rate necessary for human capital to grow on
the balanced growth path is given by the following equation :











However, the value of investment in R&D that necessary for human capital to grow
on the balanced growth path is given by the relation 4.21, where rk is the value of
the interest rate that is necessary for physical capital services to grow on the balanced
23In our model, the interest rate is that of 6,2% per year, while it was 6,5% a year in 1995 for a 15
year loan to the government.
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We therefore modify the new SAM, by increasing all the values of the cells in the R&D





This ad-hoc modification of the column of research and development then leads the
new SAM to be unbalanced.
To rebalance the SAM, we minimize the square of the deviation between all the
cells in the initial unbalanced SAM and all the cells in the new balanced SAM24. The
new SAM we obtain is now rebalanced. However, in the process of rebalancing, the
values of the human capital services and physical capital services are then very slightly
modified, which leads once more to a very slight diﬀerence in interest rates25. A second
rebalancing of the SAM is necessary, constrained by the equations 4.22, to lay down the
final balanced SAM, that allows the whole economy to grow on a balanced growth path.
We use GAMS and the solver CONOPT26 to rebalance the SAM, as the minimization
of the square of the deviation between all the cells in the initial SAM and all the cells
in the new SAM is a non linear programme.


















The complete model code is in the Annex E of this chapter.
24We are seeking to have a SAM that is the closest possible to the original one.
25The diﬀerence is only noticeable at the 10e-4. However, in the creation of the forward looking
model, even such a slight diﬀerence leads to computational errors.
26CONOPT is a large-scale non linear optimization (NLP) solver developed by ARKI Consulting
and Developent A/S.
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4.6 Induced Technological Change and the NAP
We now have built a fully-dynamic model, with two stocks of capital, physical
and human capital that grow on the balanced growth path at rate of growth of the
economy. Technological change is induced by the stock of knowledge approach, whereby,
industries facing an environmental constraint, may choose to demand more human
capital services, which are intangible inputs, and therefore increase the eﬃciency of
the tangible inputs (capital services, energy, labor and materials). In this section, we
will seek to determine the eﬀects of induced technological change on the results of the
model we just built, in the case of the introduction of an emission constraint similar
to the French National Allocation Plan.
For the sake of our analysis, we construct two forward looking models, one with
Induced Technological Change and one with no ITC27. The goal of our work will be to
compare the behaviors of the two models in the case where they are constrained by the
same constraint. We will therefore seek to address how taking into account Induced
Technological Change in a CGE framework changes the model’s results.
4.6.1 Business as Usual
In this section we present the Business as Usual trends in emissions in the two
versions of the model, one with ITC and the other without ITC. In the following
graph, we see that total emissions will grow and reach in 2025, end of our simulation
period, approximately 132 Mega Tons of Carbon (MtC). The model predicts business as
usual emissions that are very close to those predicted by the Observatoire de l’Énergie
(2004)28 (see Annex A2).
27In the forward looking version of the model without ITC, we simply do not extract any estimation
of human capital services from the SAM, and we calibrate the model on the initial SAM. We suppose
that the economy grows at the same rate of growth as the one chosen for the ITC version of the model.
28The Observatoire de l’Energie (2004) predicts total emissions to reach 129 MtC in 2020, while our
models predict France’s total emissions to reach 126 MtC that year.
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Total emissions for France with
ITC
Total emissions for France with
NO ITC
Fig. 4.1 — Business as Usual emissions for France in the case of ITC and NO ITC
In the business as usual scenario we split the seventeen sectors between covered and
non covered sectors29. Within the covered sectors, we identify energy producing sectors
and energy intensive sectors. The following table shows how energy producing sectors,
energy intensive sectors, and non covered sectors’ emissions grow on the baseline.
In the baseline scenario, the demand for human capital services grows over time, as
the economy grows. In the same way, the demand for physical capital services grows
over the study period. This reflects the fact that the stocks of human capital and
physical capital accumulate over time and are a driving force of the economy. The
two following graphs define the business as usual trends of human capital services (see
figure 4.3) and physical capital services (see figure 4.4) both in the cases of NO ITC
and ITC30.
Physical capital services grow according to the same trend in both models for the
29We consider covered sectors, all sectors that will be constrained by the National Allocation Plan
(NAP), and non covered sectors, all sectors that will not be constrained by the NAP.
30In the case where ITC is not taken into account, the SAM is not modified such that human capital
services are extracted. Therefore, we cannot present how human capital services evolve over time in
the BAU case when there is NO ITC.
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Energy sectors with ITC
Energy sectors NO ITC
Energy intensive sectors ITC
Energy intensive sectors NO ITC
Non covered sectors ITC
 Non covered sectors NO ITC
Fig. 4.2 — Business as usual emissions for covered and non covered sectors with ITC
and with NO ITC

















Human capital services in
the BAU
Fig. 4.3 — Business as usual human capital services
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o Physical capital services in
ITC model
physical capital services in
NO ITC model
Fig. 4.4 — Business as usual physical capital services
French economy (see figure 4.4).
In the same way as physical capital services and human capital services do, total
labor and materials also grow on a balanced growth path. In the following section, we
choose to model the National Allocation Plan for France, in order to see how introducing
induced technological change in a computable general equilibrium framework aﬀects
the model’s results.
4.6.2 The National Allocation Plan : A Very Small Energy
Constraint
In order to understand how the model behaves when ITC is taken into account, and
is constrained by energy limitations, we introduce such limitations in the two versions
of the model, with ITC and without ITC. We then compare the results we obtain to
identify in which way introducing induced technological change influences the results
of our model. We take a close look at the mechanisms that take place in the model
with ITC.
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To undertake such a comparison, the energy constraint that we choose to study
here consists of an emission constraint, whereby energy producing sectors and energy
intensive sectors (namely "covered sectors") together may not emit more than what is
legally permitted in the French National Allocation Plan, i.e. may not emit more than
33.6 MtC each year between 2005 and 2007. The non covered sectors, are all the other
sectors of the economy which are not constrained by the National Allocation Plan. We
extend this constraint on covered sectors, to 2012.
We allow for banking (as described in the second chapter of this thesis), first between
2005 and 2007, then between 2008 and 2012, in order to derive some first eﬀects of
these constraints on the model’s behavior. As we do not know if and how, the National
Allocation Plan will be further constrained between 2008 and 2012, we do not make
any assumptions on the constraining of the NAP and simply constrain both versions
of the model with a "NAP forever" constraint.
The goal of this process, is to initially refrain from complicating the constraints in
order to shed light on the diﬀerent mechanisms in the model with ITC. We compare
the impacts of this emission constraint on the two versions of the same model for the
French economy.
Emissions
Following the introduction of the National Allocation Plan, total emissions for the
French economy decrease in the first period (2005-2007) by approximately 0.75% and in
the second period (2008-2012) by an average of 2.25% (see figure 4.5). In the case where
ITC is modeled, total emission reductions are slightly greater than in the case where
there is no ITC. Induced technological change seems to play a small role in increasing
the impact of emission constraints, and leading to greater emission reductions.
A closer look at the emission reductions in the case of covered sectors and non
covered sectors, shows that both covered and non covered sectors see their emission
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Fig. 4.5 — Emission diﬀerence relative to the BAU in the case of ITC and NO ITC
reductions further accentuated in the case where ITC is modeled in comparison to the
case where there is no ITC, but these diﬀerences are particularly small in our case, as
the National Allocation Plan is clearly a very loose constraint.
Of course, total emission reductions are stronger for covered sectors (both in the
case of ITC and no ITC), as these sectors are constrained by the emission restrictions.
Indeed, when covered sectors’ emissions decline by almost 6% in the second period of
the constraint, non covered sectors’ emissions, who are not concerned by the emission
constraint, only reduce their emissions by an average of 0.4% relative to the BAU.
Finally we note that emission reductions are slightly stronger in the case of ITC for
non covered sectors than for covered sectors. Indeed, we will see in the section on the
demand for human capital services that this is simply due to the fact that the demand
for human capital services is greater in the case of non covered sectors than in the case
of covered sectors.
To understand why emissions are further reduced in the case where ITC is taken
into account, we compare for all sectors, the percentage diﬀerence between the ratio of
Modeling Induced Technical Change 203















Fig. 4.6 — Covered sectors emission diﬀerence relative to the BAU














Fig. 4.7 — Non covered sectors emission diﬀerence relative to the BAU
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production / tangible inputs in the case of the policy and in the case of the BAU both
for the model with ITC and without ITC. It appears that the diﬀerence between the
ratio of production / tangible inputs, in the case of the policy and in the case of the
BAU, is greater in the case of ITC than in the case of NO ITC. Indeed, for all sectors,













Such a result derives from the fact that there is a possibility to substitute between
tangible inputs and the intangible input in the case where ITC is taken into account,
that is inexistent when NO ITC is accounted for. Therefore, a general result appears,
whereby, in the case of ITC, tangible inputs are simply less used as inputs into pro-
duction than in the case of NO ITC. In other terms, tangible goods, are simply more
eﬃcient.
Therefore, this induced technological change eﬀect, whereby the demand for tangible
goods in the case of ITC is smaller than the demand for tangible goods in the case of NO
ITC, also leads to the result on emissions that we are studying here. As less tangible
inputs are needed due to the induced technological change eﬀect, this mechanically
decreases the total amount of emissions. For this reason it appears that in the case of
ITC, emission reductions are greater than in the case of NO ITC.
Production
When the National Allocation Plan is introduced, the total production of the econ-
omy is slightly reduced (see figure 4.8). These reductions are minimal due to the fact
that the NAP is hardly constraining.
Indeed, both the productions of covered and non covered sectors are aﬀected by the
restriction in emissions. However, the covered and non covered sectors are not aﬀected
in the same way. It appears that the covered sectors’ production is indeed constrained
by the emission reduction, while the production of the non covered sectors is greater
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Fig. 4.8 — Production diﬀerence relative to the BAU in the case of ITC and NO ITC
than the BAU. And this is the case for both versions of the model, whether ITC and
NO ITC31. The production of covered sectors, decreases between 2005 and 2007 and
then further as the constraint is introduced once more in 2008 until 2012 (see figure
4.9). This is due to the fact that the demand for these goods by both non covered
sectors and covered sectors is reduced32 as they are associated with the constraint.
On the contrary, non covered sectors’ production increases with the introduction of
the NAP, relative to the baseline value (see figure 4.10).
Such an increase in the production of non covered sectors is due to the fact that,
as covered sectors’ production is less demanded as inputs to production, both types
31It would be diﬃcult to clearly see on the graphs representing the production diﬀerences relatively
to the baseline, how the model reacts with ITC and no ITC, for both covered and non covered sectors.
Such graphs would be practically unreadable. Therefore, we choose here to simply not diﬀerenciate
between the two versions, as the diﬀerences between the two versions would be almost impossible to
see in any case on the chosen scale. We show in the following graphs that the diﬀerences are very
small in the case where ITC and no ITC are taken into account, but are however significant.
32Both covered and non covered sectors use the goods produced by both these types of sectors as
inputs to their production (see production function). If the price of goods produced by covered sectors
increases, then necessarily both covered and non covered sectors reduce their demand for the goods
produced by covered sectors. Therefore, because supply must equal demand in a general equilibrium
framework, covered sectors’ production decreases following the environmental constraint.
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Fig. 4.9 — Covered sectors’ production diﬀerence relative to the BAU























Fig. 4.10 — Non covered sectors production diﬀerence relative to the BAU
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of sectors demand non covered sectors’s goods as inputs to production. Indeed, non
covered sectors’ goods are not constrained by the policy. Therefore, as the demand
for these goods increases, and as, in the general equilibrium framework supply must
necessarily equal demand, the non covered sectors’ production also increases.
However, an interesting result emerges as we compare the production diﬀerences
both in the case of ITC and in the case where there is NO ITC. In the case of non
covered sectors, it appears that when technological change is induced in the model,
this limits their production increase following the introduction of the constraint on the
covered sectors (see figure 4.11). Their production increase is smaller in the case of
ITC, then in the case of NO ITC. Indeed, as both covered and non covered sectors now
have made substitutions in favor of more human capital services, their demand for non
covered sectors goods in the case of ITC, is not as great as their demand was for these
goods in the case where there is no ITC. As we are in a general equilibrium framework,
if the demand for the goods produced by non covered sectors is not as strong in the
case of ITC, then the production of non covered sectors’ is necessarily not as strong as
in the case where technological change is impossible.
Proposition 10 The introduction of ITC in the model, constrains the production in-
crease of the non covered sectors in comparison to the case of NO ITC.
A similar result appears in the case of the covered sectors. As we compare the
covered sectors’ production in the case of ITC and in the case where technological
change is not induced, it appears that when ITC is taken into account, the covered
sectors’ production is less reduced in the case of ITC, compared to the case of NO ITC
(see figure 4.12). Induced technological change therefore reduces the negative impact it
has on the production of sectors that are constrained by an environmental constraint.
Indeed, as the covered sectors are constrained in their emissions, they increase
their demand for human capital services as inputs to production. They substitute
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Fig. 4.11 — Non covered sectors production diﬀerence relative to the BAU in the case
of ITC and NO ITC
between the tangible and intangible goods, and use less fossil fuels for their production
as in the case where there is NO ITC. Therefore, the constraints that are on the
covered sectors are lessened, as this additional substitution process is introduced and
the covered sectors are less energy intensive, and emit less (as seen in the section on
emissions). For this reason, non covered sectors, do not reduce their demand for covered
sectors goods as much as in the case where technological change is induced compared to
the case where there is NO ITC. Therefore, covered sectors’ production is less reduced
than in the case of NO ITC.
Proposition 11 The introduction of ITC in the model reduces the negative impact on
the production of covered sectors in comparison to the case of NO ITC.
Capitals
Now that we have shed light on the fact that emissions are more reduced in the
case where ITC is modeled, both for covered sectors and for non covered sectors, it
is important to understand how the demand for human capital services and physical
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Fig. 4.12 — Covered sectors production diﬀerence relative to the BAU with ITC and
NO ITC
capital services vary in both these types of sectors following the introduction of the
National Allocation Plan33.
Human Capital Services : the Basis for Induced Technological Change In
our specification, induced technological change is modeled through the "Stock of Knowl-
edge Approach". Firms, facing an energy constraint, may choose to substitute between
their tangible inputs (capital. labor, energy, materials34), and also demand an intangi-
ble input (human capital) as a substitute to all tangible ones. This second substitution
process is the process of induced technological change. In this case, in order to identify
how ITC functions in this model, it is important to understand the variations in the
demand for human capital services following the introduction of an energy constraint.
Of course, we can study these variations only with the model with ITC, and not with
33In the case where there is no ITC, the model is calibrated on a social accounting matrix where
human capital services have not been extracted. Therefore, we can only show how human capital
services are aﬀected in the case of ITC, when a policy is introduced.
34The "Materials" input being a bundle of the production goods of both covered and non covered
sectors as defined in the second chapter of the thesis.
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the model without ITC, because in that case the human capital row is not specified,
and no human capital has been extracted from the social accounting matrix.
In this general equilibrium framework with ITC, four eﬀects will influence the de-
mand for human capital services : a substitution eﬀect, an induced technological change
eﬀect, a revenue eﬀect, and an investment eﬀect. The total impact on the demand for
human capital services will be the result of the sum of all these eﬀects.
Four Eﬀects
— Substitution Eﬀect
When facing an emission constraint, both covered and non covered sectors substitute
between their tangible goods used as inputs into production (capital, labor, energy,
materials). This substitution eﬀect is by definition neutral on the demand for human
capital services, as the demand for human capital services is not aﬀected directly by
these inter-tangible input substitutions. The covered sectors engage in substitutions
because their emissions are constrained, and non covered sectors engage in substitutions
because they demand less goods produced by the covered sectors the prices of which
have gone up.
— Induced technological Change Eﬀect
As the emission constraint is introduced, both covered and non covered sectors
increase their demand for human capital services, according to the elasticity of substi-
tution between tangible goods and the intangible good. Covered sectors increase their
demand for the intangible good because of the constraint on their use of fossil fuels,
and non covered sectors increase their demand for the intangible good because of the
price increase of the goods produced by the tangible goods and also because their own
production increases following the introduction of the constraint. This increase in the
demand for human capital services is the induced technological change eﬀect. However,
the general equilibrium framework of our work supposes that an increase in the total
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demand for human capital services in year t must be satisfied by an increase in the
supply for human capital services that same year. In order for there to be an increase
in the supply for human capital services in year t, there must be an increase in the
investment in research and development in year t− 1 that will lead to a greater than
baseline level of stock of human capital in year t. An increased supply in human capital
services to satisfy an increased demand in human capital services is thus necessarily
linked to an increase in the investment in R&D the previous year.
Ht+1 = Rt + (1− δh)Ht
Therefore, the induced technological change eﬀect in year t relies on the investment
eﬀort in year t− 1.
— Revenue Eﬀect
The revenue eﬀect, is the eﬀect that derives from the variation in the sectors’ pro-
duction. In the case of the covered sectors, following the introduction of an emission
constraint, their production decreases as the demand for the goods that they produce,
decreases. This revenue eﬀect, has a negative impact on the covered sectors’ demand for
all inputs. It will therefore lead covered sectors to demand less human capital services.
In the case of the non covered sectors, however, the revenue eﬀect has a positive impact
on their demand for inputs as their production increases following the introduction of
the constraint on the covered sectors. The production increase that they enjoy leads
them to increase their demand for human capital services as inputs to production.
— Investment eﬀect
The investment eﬀect is linked to the aggregate income accounting definition (see
equation 4.23), and derives from the value of production relative to its baseline value.
Yt = Ct + It +Rt +Gt +Xt −Mt (4.23)
If in the year t, an emission constraint is introduced on the covered sectors, the total
production of both covered and non covered sectors decrease that same year t. It follows,
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that the investment in research and development in year t mechanically decreases (see
equation 4.23). This allows for a smaller than baseline increase in the stock of human
capital as seen in equation 4.24.
Ht+1 = Rt + (1− δh)Ht (4.24)
A lower than baseline level of investment in R&D in year t , following the contraction
of production in year t, leads to a stock of human capital in year t + 1 that will be
smaller than the baseline level. However, human capital services in year t + 1 derive
from the stock of human capital in year t+1. Therefore, the amount of human capital
services that will be available on the market in year t + 1 will be smaller than in the
baseline value. If a policy is introduced in year t, then the investment eﬀect in year
t+ 1 has a negative impact on the supply for human capital services.
It follows that the investment eﬀect in year t will be neutral on the supply for
human capital services in year t. Indeed, if in year t a constraint is introduced. Then
total production in year t − 1 will not be reduced, as the constraint is introduced
only the year after. Therefore, as the investment in R&D in year t − 1 will not fall
under the baseline level, then the value of the total stock of human capital will be
the same as its baseline value. It follows that in year t, date of the introduction of
the emission constraint, the supply for human capital services will not be aﬀected by
the investment eﬀect. However, the investment eﬀect will have a negative eﬀect on the
supply for human capital services in year t+1, as total production falls in year t under
the baseline level following the introduction of the constraint.
It is worthwhile noting that both the induced technological change eﬀect and the
investment eﬀect are subject to a time lag, while the substitution eﬀect and the rev-
enue eﬀect have both immediate consequences. These time diﬀerences will be clearly
observable in the model results on human capital services.
Modeling Induced Technical Change 213









2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
years
Total Human Capital Services
percent
Fig. 4.13 — Diﬀerence in total human capital services relative to the BAU
The Case of all Sectors : Peaks of Demand for Human Capital Services
To understand how these four eﬀects influence both covered and non covered sectors,
it is necessary to first look at the total variations in the demand for human capital
services. It appears, that the first years of the introduction of the NAP, both in 2005
and in 2008 (when the second banking period begins), there are peaks in the total
demand for human capital services. The following years, the demand for human capital
services falls back to the baseline level, although the constraint is still active. In 2013,
first unconstrained date after the NAP, there is a 2% reduction in the demand for
human capital services relative to the baseline scenario.
What appears here is that the industries’ response in terms of technological change
to the energy constraints is very rapid and disappears after the first year of the con-
straint. In 2005, the NAP is introduced, and banking is allowed until 2007. We here
note that the first peak in the demand for human capital services is the first year of the
introduction of the emission constraint. Although the constraint still remains in 2006
and 2007, the demand for human capital services returns to its value in the benchmark.
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Next, between 2008 and 2012, banking is also allowed over the period. Therefore, in
2008, there is a second peak in demand for human capital services. However, between
2009 and 2012, the demand for human capital services return to its value in the baseline.
Finally, while 2012 is still constrained by the NAP, 2013 is a completely unconstrained
year, and the demand for human capital services therefore drops by close to 2%.
While our work is inscribed in a diﬀerent setting, these findings are consistent with
D. Popp (2002), who also sheds light on the existence of peaks of induced technological
change, which disappear the following year. Indeed, in his paper, Popp suggests that, as
his model captures diminishing returns to research, it becomes more diﬃcult for firms
who have already invested largely in R&D to produce even more new innovations,
as increased R&D spending becomes necessary for these new innovations to occur.
Therefore, because of diminishing returns, after the introduction of a policy, there is a
burst in knowledge that will quickly disappear due to the "shifting" in research eﬀorts
towards areas that will be more productive.
In our case the reason for these peaks depend mainly on the investment eﬀect
described earlier, whereby investment in research and development in year t, influences
the stock of human capital in year t+1, and therefore the total supply of human capital
services in year t+1. The model we have built is a forward-looking model, whereby the
economy knows that emission restrictions will be introduced in 2005 for a first banking
period, and then again in 2008 for a second banking period, and entirely relaxed in
2013. One of the main features of forward-looking models rests in the fact that as the
economy can anticipate these policies, and it may choose to modify its behavior even
before the introduction of the policy. With this in mind, firms will foresee in 2004 and
in 2007, that an emission constraint will be introduced in 2005 and 2008, and will know
in 2012 that it will be entirely relaxed in 2013.
To understand the mechanisms that lie behind the variations in the demand for
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human capital services, it is important to have a closer look at the diﬀerent years.
Year 2005 and 2008 : First years of introduction of the constraints
In 2005, as the covered sectors face the emission constraint, both covered and non
covered sectors demand more human capital services as they engage in the induced
technological change process described above. In order to be able to demand more
human capital services that year, the investment in R&D in 2004 will necessarily have
to increase relative to the its baseline value so as to increase the total stock of knowledge
in 2005 from which knowledge services will derive35. By increasing the investment in
R&D, the supply in human capital services to both covered and non covered sectors
becomes much higher than in the baseline level. This satisfies the demand of both
covered and non covered sectors for these services (see equations 4.25 and 4.26). This
is the induced technological change eﬀect. While investment in R&D is not firm-specific,
the total stock of human capital is also not firm specific. The total knowledge services
that will derive from the total stock of human capital services will enter the market
for inputs, and will be demanded by both covered and non covered sectors. For this
reason, we see the total supply of human capital services increase in 2005 (and also in
2008) relative to the baseline.
H2005 = R2004 + (1− δh)H2004 (4.25)
HS2005 = (rh + δh)H2005 (4.26)
In 2005, moreover, the investment eﬀect is neutral on the demand for human cap-
ital services because total production in 2004 is unaﬀected by the constraint. On the
contrary, the revenue eﬀect has a negative impact on the demand for human capital
services, as total production decreases in 2005. The substitution eﬀect keeps a neutral
role on the demand for human capital services.
35The fact that the investment in R&D in 2004 increases relatively to the baseline level is due to the
induced technical change eﬀect, which is independant from the investment eﬀect simple consequence
of production variations.
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Fig. 4.14 — Price diﬀerence for human capital services and physical capital services
relative to the BAU
The demand for human capital services is therefore the result of all the four eﬀects :
- The substitution eﬀect has a neutral impact on human capital services
- The investment eﬀect has a neutral impact on human capital services
- The revenue eﬀect has a negative impact on human capital services
- The induced technological change eﬀect has a positive impact on human cap-
ital services
In 2005, the result on total human capital services suggests that the induced tech-
nological change eﬀect is greater than the revenue eﬀect in the year 2005, first year of
the introduction of the constraint.
The immediate consequence of an increase in the total supply of human capital
services in 2005, relative to the baseline is the reduction in the price of these services, as
seen in the following graph whereby it appears that the price of human capital services
decreases sharply in 2005 (as well as in 2008, first year of the second constraint).
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Proposition 12 The first years of the introduction of the constraints, there are peaks
in the demand for human capital services because of the induced technological change
eﬀect.
Year 2006 and following (except 2013) :
In 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, it appears that the demand for human
capital services returns to its baseline level. In 2006, as the constraint still binds the
emissions of covered sectors, total production values are still under their baseline values.
The revenue eﬀect that year has a negative impact on the demand for human capital
services.
The investment eﬀect also has a negative impact on the demand for human capital
services in 2006. Let’s retrieve the aggregate income accounting definition :
Y2005 = C2005 + I2005 +R2005 +G2005 +X2005 −M2005
In 2005, total production decreases due to the introduction of the emission con-
straint, and its level falls below the baseline level as seen on the graph representing
production variations. This decrease in production leads to a necessary decrease in the
investment in research and development in 2005, R2005, the value of which also neces-
sarily falls under the baseline level. However, while in 2005, in the policy case, the stock
of human capital is greater than the stock of human capital in the baseline scenario,
the stock of human capital in 2006 will necessarily fall back to the baseline level due to
the underinvestment in research and development in 2005 consequence of the drop in
total production. Therefore, the drop in human capital services in 2006, is due to the
underinvestment in R&D in 2005, consequence of the total production drop following
the introduction of the constraint. This is the investment eﬀect. The same reasoning
explains the drop in human capital services in 2009.The induced technological change
eﬀect has a positive impact on the demand for human capital services in 2006, while
the substitution eﬀect has no impact on it.
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In 2006 the demand for human capital services is the result of all the four eﬀects :
- The substitution eﬀect has a neutral impact on human capital services
- The investment eﬀect has a negative impact on human capital services
- The revenue eﬀect has a negative impact on human capital services
- The induced technological change eﬀect has a positive impact on human cap-
ital services
The only diﬀerence between 2006 and 2005, is the fact that now, the investment
eﬀect which was neutral in 2005, has a negative impact on human capital services.
Total demand for human capital services in 2006 is the combination of these eﬀects,
whereby the sum of the negative impacts of the revenue and investment eﬀects equal the
positive impact of the induced technological change eﬀect, and leads to a baseline level
of demand for human capital services that year. Therefore the induced technological
change eﬀect equals the sum of the revenue and investment eﬀect.
It is here important to note that, while the emission constraints are still active
in 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011, firms may now not have access to the Induced
technological change eﬀect because of the investment eﬀect that simply counterbalances
it. Therefore, firms may now only face the emission constraints through the substitution
eﬀect that takes place between the tangible inputs, as if ITC was now not an option
anymore.
Proposition 13 In the years following the introduction of the emission constraint, and
while the constraint is still active, firms only have the option of substituting between
tangible inputs, as the induced technological change eﬀect is simply counterbalanced by
the investment eﬀect.
Year 2013 :
What remains to be understood, is the reason why in 2013 once the emission re-
strictions disappear, the demand for human capital services is lower by almost 2% than
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in the baseline.
Now, as we have just seen, while the emission constraints were still constraining
the covered sectors right until 2012, the demand for human capital services stays very
close to its baseline level (except for the years 2005 and 2008 where there is a burst
in demand for these services). Indeed, firms will therefore have to face the emission
constraints by simply substituting between tangible inputs (less goods produced by
covered sectors and more goods produced by non covered sectors are used as inputs to
the production of all sectors).
As the emission constraint is now relaxed, the demand for the goods produced
by covered sectors, will increase dramatically in comparison to when the constraint
was in place, as these inputs become relatively cheaper. Similarly, the demand for
goods produced by non covered sectors will decrease relative to the previous year, as
the incentive to use their production as inputs vanishes with the suppression of the
constraint36. In any case, the suppression of the constraint acts as a sudden burst in
the supply of tangible inputs to production, as the induced technological change eﬀect
simply disappears, with the disappearing of the constraint.
In 2013, the emission constraint is inexistent. However, in 2012, covered sectors
were still constrained in their emissions and total production was under the baseline
level. Therefore, the investment eﬀect has a negative impact on the demand for human
capital services in 2013. As total production is below the baseline level in 2012, the
investment in research and development in 2012 is lower than its baseline level. It
follows that the stock of human capital in 2013 is still lower than the baseline level,
even if there is no emission constraint that year. This is due to the time lags that are
in the model. The supply of human capital services that will derive from this stock of
36A quick look at the graphs representing the production for both covered and non covered sectors
clearly shows that, in 2013 covered sectors’ production jumps to slightly over the baseline value, and
non covered sectors production also fall to slightly under the baseline value.
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capital will therefore drop relative to the baseline. The investment eﬀect will have a
negative impact on the supply of human capital services in 2013.
In 2013 the demand for human capital services is the result of all four eﬀects :
- The substitution eﬀect has a neutral impact on human capital services
- The investment eﬀect has a negative impact on human capital services
- The revenue eﬀect has a neutral impact on human capital services
- The induced technological change eﬀect has a neutral impact on human capital
services
The total demand for human capital services in 2013 is the combination of these
eﬀects, whereby the only eﬀect that impacts human capital services is the investment
eﬀect. The drop in 2013, is therefore the isolated investment eﬀect. Due to the limited
amount in human capital services that will be on the market in 2013, the price for
these services will be higher that year than its baseline level, as seen on the graph
representing the prices.
The Case of Covered Sectors In the case of the covered sectors, we see the
same peaks in the demand for human capital services relative to the baseline the first
years of the introduction and constraining of the emission constraint, namely in 2005
and 2008. Between 2006 and 2007, the demand for HS falls back to the baseline level,
except for gas and coal, where it falls below the baseline level. Between 2009 and 2012,
the demand for human capital services, falls below the baseline level in the case of coal
and in the case of both gas, and ferrous and non ferrous, while for the other covered
sectors, it simply returns to the baseline level.
The variations in the demand for human capital services are also the result of the
four eﬀects described earlier. The only diﬀerence is that it appears that for coal, gas,
ferrous and non ferrous goods the demand for human capital services falls even below
the baseline level. This is due to the revenue eﬀect that has a negative impact on the
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Fig. 4.15 — Covered sectors demand for human capital services relative to the BAU
demand for human capital services, as covered sectors’ production decreases strongly
following the introduction of the constraint37. It comes as no surprise that the revenue
eﬀect is very strong for coal, as its production decrease is remarkable following the
emission constraint.
The Case of Non Covered Sectors In the case of non covered sectors, the pattern
is very much the same as for the whole economy. While covered sectors face an emission
constraint, their produced goods are less demanded by the non covered sectors, who
demand more of the intangible good and more of other inputs to production. The
intangible good is also a more attractive input to production as its price falls in 2005
and 2008 due to the increase in its supply to the whole economy. Moreover, non covered
37The revenue eﬀect that covered sectors are subject to, is stronger than the total revenue eﬀect the
whole economy is subject to. In fact covered sectors’ production decreases following the introduction
of the constraint, while non covered sectors’ production increases. Total production being the sum
of the production of both covered and non covered sectors, its decrease following the introduction of
the constraint is smaller than the covered sectors’ production decrease. For this reason the revenue
eﬀect that covered sectors are subject to, is stronger than the total revenue eﬀect the whole economy
is subject to.
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Fig. 4.16 — Non covered sectors demand for human capital services relative to the BAU
sectors also increase their demand for human capital services simply because their
production increases and their need for inputs increases accordingly. For this reason we
see that, while non covered sectors are not constrained in their emissions they demand
human capital services.
One comment however needs to be made. The investment eﬀect has a negative im-
pact on the non covered sectors’ demand for human capital services, while the produc-
tion of non covered sectors increases rather than decreases following the introduction
of the NAP. This can seem initially as a contradiction, as we had argued that the in-
vestment eﬀect had a negative impact on the demand for human capital services if the
production falls under the baseline level. However, it is not. The reason for the decrease
in the non covered sectors’ demand for human capital services lies in the specificity of
our model, whereby research and development is not firm specific (as opposed to
Goulder and Schneider (1999)), and the total stock of human capital belongs to the
whole economy. The human capital services that derive from the general stock of hu-
man capital are allocated to the diﬀerent sectors according to their demand for them
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and its price. For this reason, the investment eﬀect derives from the value of total
production relative to the BAU, and not solely the value of non covered sectors’ pro-
duction. It is therefore possible, for non covered sectors, whose production increases
following the introduction of the NAP, to be negatively aﬀected by the investment
eﬀect.
Conclusion We shed light on the fact that four eﬀects influence the final vari-
ations of human capital services following the introduction of an emission constraint.
A substitution eﬀect, a revenue eﬀect an induced technological change eﬀect, and an
investment eﬀect. These eﬀects influence the demand for human capital services of both
covered and non covered sectors.
Also, we show that similarly to Popp (2002), there are peaks in the demand for
human capital services the initial years of the introduction of the emission constraints,
which disappear the following years while the constraint is still in place. We here show
that the investment eﬀect, whereby the total production of all sectors decreases fol-
lowing the introduction of the emission constraint, necessarily leads to a reduction in
the investment in research and development and of the use of human capital services
the following year. Induced technological change, therefore, only has a very short time
span for both covered and non covered sectors, as the investment eﬀect neutralizes
the induced technological change eﬀect. The years following the introduction of the
constraint, firms will necessarily then have to face the emission constraints by sim-
ple substitutions between tangible inputs. This supports Nordhaus (2002) suggestion,
whereby substitutions between tangible inputs are more important than the induced
technological change eﬀect.
The variations in human capital services for covered and non covered sectors, sup-
port the initial position Goulder and Schneider (1999) and Sue Wing (2001), whereby
it appears that in the case where technological change is accounted for, non covered
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sectors, i.e. sectors that are not aﬀected by the emission constraint, will increase their
demand for human capital services more than covered sectors will. In fact, in the case
of this emission policy, R&D is stimulated in carbon-competing industries (industries
that produce low-carbon energy). Indeed, in the case of the covered sectors, the induced
technological change eﬀect is constrained by the revenue eﬀect, as their production de-
creases relative to the baseline because of the emissions constraint. In the case of non
covered sectors the revenue eﬀect, on the contrary, has a positive eﬀect on the de-
mand for human capital services. Indeed, less tangibles, and therefore less fossil fuels
are needed for production. This result also supports Otto et al. (2006) who show that
technological change is directed towards non CO2 intensive goods in the case of a CO2
constraint.
Finally, we show how an economy wide stock of knowledge increased by non firm
specific investments in R&D can limit the induced technological change eﬀect of firms
that are not subject to the emission constraint.
Physical Capital Services Now that we have shed light on the diﬀerent eﬀects
leading to diﬀerences in the demand for human capital services relative to the baseline,
it is important to have a look at the eﬀects of an emission constraint on the demand
for physical capital services as inputs into production.
The Case of Both Sectors : The Constraint of the Aggregate Income
Accounting Definition - An Eviction Eﬀect or Crowding—Out Eﬀect In the
following graph, we show the total demand for physical capital services both in the case
of ITC and NO ITC. It appears that in the case where there is NO ITC, the eﬀect on
the demand for physical capital services is relatively smooth. An initial very minimal
decrease appears in the first period and after 2008, the demand for physical capital
services increases slowly. However, in the case where technological change is induced it
appears that the demand for physical capital services decreases sharply in 2005 and in
Modeling Induced Technical Change 225













Fig. 4.17 — Diﬀerence in demand for physical capital services relative to the BAU in
the case of ITC and NO ITC
2008 (in the same way that the demand for human capital services increases sharply
those years). Similarly, in 2013, when the emission constraint is released, a peak of
demand for physical capital services appears (in the same way that there is a sharp
decrease in the demand for human capital services that same year).
It appears that the chart is exactly the opposite of the one representing total varia-
tions in human capital services. This is due to the eviction eﬀect or crowding out eﬀect.
The eviction eﬀect or crowding out eﬀect is the direct consequence of the aggregate
income accounting definition (see equation 4.17). It is important to recall that both
the investment in physical capital and investment in research and development derive
from this equation. Therefore, if in the year t, all else being equal, the investment in
R&D increases to satisfy an increased demand for human capital services the following
year, the investment in physical capital must necessarily be decreased in year t, as total
production is fixed.
Y = C + I +R+G+X −M
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Fig. 4.18 — Covered sectors demand for physical capital services relative to the BAU
with ITC
The eviction eﬀect therefore causes the demand for physical capital services and
the demand for human capital services to vary in opposite directions. According to the
aggregate income accounting definition, if It increases, Rt must decrease, all else being
equal. For this reason, the total demand for physical capital varies in the opposite
direction of the total demand for human capital services.
The Case of Covered Sectors In the case of ITC, the demand for physical
capital services varies according to the sectors. Covered sectors see their demand for
physical capital services generally decrease following the introduction of the NAP.
Following the introduction of the NAP, the revenue eﬀect due to the reduction in
these sectors’ production leads to a decrease in the demand for physical capital services
relative to the baseline. Moreover, the induced technological change eﬀect that takes
place in favor of the demand for human capital services also has a negative impact
on the demand for physical capital services. Only the substitution eﬀect between the
tangible inputs may have a positive eﬀect on their usage, but this is unsure. The
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Fig. 4.19 — Non covered sectors demand for physical capital services relative to the
BAU with ITC
investment eﬀect also leads to a reduction in the demand for physical capital services.
It thus comes as no surprise that the sum of the revenue eﬀect, the induced technological
change eﬀect, and the investment eﬀect is greater in the case of the covered sectors than
the substitution eﬀect (the impact on physical capital services, of which is uncertain).
For this reason, the demand for physical capital services decreases relatively the BAU,
following the introduction of the constraint.
The Case of Non Covered Sectors The demand for physical capital services
increases quite significantly in the case of the non covered sectors.
In the case of the non covered sectors, the revenue eﬀect has a positive impact
on the demand for human capital services, as the production for non covered sectors
increases. Moreover, the induced technological change eﬀect has a negative impact on
the demand for physical capital services because of the increased demand for human
capital services, the intangible input. The investment eﬀect also has a negative eﬀect on
the demand for physical capital services. Finally, the impact of the substitution eﬀect
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on the demand for physical capital services remains unsure. For non covered sectors,
it appears (see graph on demand for physical capital services for non covered sectors),
that the sum of the revenue eﬀect and the substitution eﬀect overrule the induced
technological change eﬀect and the investment eﬀect, as the total demand for physical
capital services increases similarly to the production.
The only diﬀerence between covered sectors and non covered sectors is the direction
of the revenue eﬀect. It directs the total demand for physical capital services directly.
Conclusion The total demand for physical capital services follows the inverse
pattern of the total demand for human capital services, due to the fact that the in-
vestment in research and development and the investment in physical capital both
derive from the aggregate income accounting definition. We here show that there is
a crowding out eﬀect, whereby investment in research and development reduces the
possibilities to invest in physical capital. Therefore, an increase in the investment in
R&D one year, will necessarily lead to a decrease in the demand for physical capital
services the following year.
A close look at the demand for physical capital services both for covered and non
covered sectors, shows that the only diﬀerence between the groups of sectors is the
direction of the revenue eﬀect, which clearly appears to be the main guide to the demand
for physical capital services. The revenue eﬀect is the strongest eﬀect that plays a role
in the demand for physical capital services. This is particularly clear if we compare
the production variations and variations in the demand for physical capital services,
in both groups of sectors after the introduction of the NAP. When the production
increases, the demand for physical capital services also increases in a similar fashion,
and when the production decreases the demand for physical capital services decreases
in a similar fashion.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a new method for modeling technological change in a
CGE framework. We constructed a CGE model for France calibrated on a SAM that
we modified such that a new factor of production, human capital, and a new demand,
investment in research and development, may be accounted for. We then created a
forward looking model with two capital stocks, physical capital and human capital,
that grow with the same rate of growth γ which is the growth rate of the economy. We
thus suppose that the French economy is on a balanced growth path since 1995.
In this setting, firms may now react to any constraint on the economy, by either
substituting between tangible inputs or by substituting human capital, the intangible
input, for the other tangible inputs (physical capital services, labor, energy, materials).
This last substitution possibility is the induced technological change eﬀect.
While the diﬀerences between the case with ITC and the case without ITC are
indeed minimal, we show that in the case where ITC is taken into account, emissions
are more reduced following the introduction of an emission constraint, comparatively to
the case where there is NO ITC. Indeed, the induced technological change eﬀect, leads
to a reduced demand for tangible goods (including a reduced demand for the goods
produced by all sectors, which create emissions), comparatively to the case where there
is NO ITC. It follows that emissions reductions are accentuated through the induced
technological change eﬀect, as it builds on the substitution eﬀect between the tangible
goods (only possible reaction of firms in the case where there is NO ITC).
We show that in the case where ITC is taken into account, the production variations
are limited both in the cases of the covered sectors and the non covered sectors, relative
to the case where ITC is not taken into account. Indeed, we show that following the
introduction of an emission constraint, because of the induced technological change
eﬀect, whereby firms may now demand intangible goods facing an environmental con-
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straint, the stringiness of the constraint is automatically reduced, because generally
less tangible goods are necessary for production (the constraint becomes therefore less
restrictive). This leads to a reduced drop in the demand for the covered sectors’ pro-
duction. As the drop in the demand for the production of covered sectors is not so big,
the increase in the demand for non covered sectors’ production is also therefore limited
in the case where there technological change is taken into account.
Moreover, similarly to Sue Wing (2001), we show that non covered sectors (sectors
that are not constrained in any way by an emission constraint) will increase their de-
mand for human capital services more than covered sectors will, because the revenue
eﬀect, whereby covered sectors’ production decreases and non covered sectors’ produc-
tion increases, limits the induced technological change eﬀect for covered sectors, and
enhances it for non covered sectors.
Similarly to Popp (2002), we show that peaks in the demand for human capital
services appear the first years of the introduction of the constraint, and disappear
the following years, although the constraint is still active. This is due to the fact
that the model contains a time-lag, whereby investment in research and development
a first year influences the supply of human capital services the following year. We
show that the induced technological change eﬀect is eﬀective only the first years of
the introduction of a policy. After that the investment eﬀect neutralizes the induced
technological change eﬀect. Such a result suggests that the induced technological change
eﬀect responds only to the strengthening of a constraint. In order for a policy to lead to
durable induced technological change, it appears necessary for a policy to be constantly
increased in stringency. Otherwise, firms will choose to engage in substitutions between
their tangible inputs (capital, labor, energy, materials) in order to face an emission
constraint, rather than increase their demand for human capital services. We hereby
show that induced technological change is a very shortly lived process that can only
be induced by a constant increase in a policy’s stringency.
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Our model suggests that the induced technological change eﬀect is small. Similarly
to Nordhaus (2002), it appears that over the time span during which the policy is
implemented, the substitutions between tangible inputs play a greater role in helping
the firms face the emission constraints, than the induced technological change process.
Indeed, after the first year of the implementation, firms will face the environmental
constraint by engaging in substitution processes between their tangible inputs, while
their demand for human capital services returns to the baseline level.
We show that the total demand for physical capital services is ruled by a crowding
out eﬀect consequence of the aggregate income accounting definition. Therefore, an
investment in R&D in year t necessary leads to a decrease in the supply for physical
capital services in year t+1.We also show, that the major eﬀect influencing the demand
for physical capital services in the case of covered and non covered sectors, is the revenue
eﬀect, while both the induced technological change eﬀect, and the investment eﬀect rule
the demand for human capital services.
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ANNEXE A : Rates and Elasticities
To calibrate the model, we use a number of values. We first use a SAM for France
compiled by EUROSTAT and GEM-E3 researchers (see National Technical University
of Athens). This SAM has 17 sectors, three of which are the fossil fuel sectors. Two
factors of production are taken into account, capital and labor.
A1 - Data for Human Capital Estimation
We need to estimate the human capital embodied in the interindustry transaction
matrix and in the factor matrix, to proceed to the extraction of these values from the
SAM.
In the case of the interindustry transaction matrix, we use the Yale Technology
Concordance made available by D. Johnson at Wellesely, and multiply the patent ma-
trix to the values of sectoral R&D in 1995 derived from the Centre de l’Informatique
Statistique et de l’Aide à la Décision of the Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’en-
seignement supérieur et de la recherche. This gives us an estimation of a interindustry
technology matrix.
To estimate human capital in the factor matrix, we determine the number of re-
searchers that were involved in R&D activities in firms in 1995. The only values avail-
able from the same source as for the values of sectors R&D (Centre de l’Informatique
Statistique et de l’Aide à la Décision of the Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’en-
seignement supérieur et de la recherche), being only for the years 1992 and 1998, we
average the two values per sector to make an estimation of their number in 1995. To
obtain a value of human capital, we multiply this estimate by the average wage for
qualified workers, based on the article of Gubian et Ponthieux (2000).
A2 - The Model’s Rates
We construct a forward looking version of the model. Therefore, we suppose that
the model is on a balanced growth path, since 1995, where all sectors grow at the
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2000 2010 2020
DGEM-OE 105,6 119 129
ITC 105,2 114 126
NOITC 103.3 114 126
Fig. 4.20 — CO2 emissions for France
growth rate of the economy. We choose γ, the growth rate of the economy, to be 1%
per year on the balanced growth path.
Physical capital and human capital grow on the balanced growth path at the rate of
growth of the economy, and their stocks depreciate each year at diﬀerent depreciation
rates. The depreciation rate of human capital is often considered to be approximately
15% (Bosworth D. and Jobome G., (2001)). Nadiri et al (1993) estimate that the
depreciation rate for human capital in the manufacturing sector in the US is 12.9%,
and the depreciation rate for physical capital is 5.9%38.
The model predicts business as usual emissions that are very close to those predicted
by the French General Directorate for Energy and RawMaterials, and the Observatoire
de l’Énergie (2004). In table 4.20 we display the predicted CO2 emissions in the Busi-
ness as Usual scenarios in Mega Tons of Carbon (MtC), for the French economy, for
the DGEM-OE model, and ours with and without the Induced Technological Change
specification.
A3 - The Model’s Elasticities of Substitution
38We are well aware that we are applying these values to all sectors, and in France. However, we do
not expect these values to be too diﬀerent to the French values.
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Elasticity of substitution between human capital services
and KLEM
2
Elasticity of substitution between physical capital services-labor
and materials-energy
0.7
Elasticity of substitution between materials
and energy
0.75
Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 1
Elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels and electricity 0.7
Elasticity of substitution between materials 0.6
Elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels 1
Armington Elasticity 2
Fig. 4.21 — Elasticities of substitution in the model
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ANNEXE B : The Social Accounting Matrix with
Human Capital Services
We here present the new Social Accounting Matrix with human capital services as
an input to production and R&D as a demand factor (Value in Million Euros).
Agric Coal Oil Gas Elect FerNf ChemPro Onrjint Elecg transequ Oequg
Agric 10.034 0.007 0.002 2.52E-04 0.044 0.278 0.01
Coal 0.626 0.42 0.82 0.049 0.096
Oil 1.853 0.03 11.404 0.007 0.073 0.37 2.453 0.919 0.425 0.442 0.458
Gas 0.065 0.033 0.08 0.218 0.604 0.855 0.067 0.178 0.053
Elect 0.294 0.079 0.252 0.027 4.135 1.369 1.274 2.158 0.314 0.768 0.435
FerNf 0.141 0.002 0.011 0.057 11.226 5.962 1.148 5.221 4.09
ChemPro 4.715 0.043 0.831 0.054 0.62 14.097 2.593 0.729 1.16 0.484
Onrjint 0.306 0.274 1.355 0.089 0.979 1.291 4.688 28.909 8.223 12.505 7.58
Elecg 0.011 0.018 0.266 0.013 0.537 0.279 0.188 1.134 6.748 6.696 3.085
transequ 0.112 0.009 0.002 0.018 0.012 0.057 0.293 0.056 20.894 0.083
Oequg 0.967 0.097 0.101 0.017 0.145 0.259 0.513 1.36 0.57 2.285 5.686
Cgoodsind 7.421 0.073 0.118 0.019 0.056 3.815 1.756 4.42 6.392 1.592
Cons 0.094 0.05 0.654 0.295 0.847 0.053 0.129 0.124 0.099 0.205 0.127
TelServ 0.012 0.011 0.061 0.046 0.222 0.198 0.567 1.071 0.502 0.486 0.69
Trans 0.459 0.059 0.767 0.269 0.333 0.908 2.697 6.402 2.112 1.477 1.319
Servcred 0.311 5.32E-04 0.155 0.004 0.124 0.225 0.626 0.728 0.505 0.663 0.535
Oserv 6.92 0.72 4.73 0.909 4.639 3.087 12.058 14.868 11.603 22.086 17.035
SUBSIDY -3.311 -0.93 -0.003 -0.002 -0.063 -0.068 -0.207 -0.805 -0.114 -1.284 -0.86
VA_TAX 0.809 0.069 3.32 0.718 1.65 0.03 1.569 4.225 4.052 7.499 5.973
DUTIES 0.116 0.001 0.175 0.002 0.029 0.072 0.15 0.237 0.115 0.251 0.139
ID_TAX 1.142 0.121 19.282 0.233 3.183 0.653 1.652 2.732 1.615 2.302 1.546
SL 1.658 0.86 2.532 0.608 5.173 4.772 10.162 26.993 16.221 18.027 14.993
UL 2.781 0.021 0.396 0.005 0.056 0.128 1.368 0.512 1.116 1.874 0.995
Human Cap. 0.809 0.014 0.124 0.013 0.094 0.236 0.233 0.213 0.528 0.633 0.316
Physical Cap. 26.179 0.276 0.713 0.257 13.526 4.71 11.518 21.508 13.269 13.953 10.415
Cgoodsind Cons TelServ Trans Servcred Oserv FCONS INV DSTOCK EXPORTS IMPORT R&D
Agric 28.408 2.97E-04 2.808 18.75 0.499 -2.072 12.2 -7.448 0.379
Coal 2.00E-02 3.52E-04 0.003 0.51 0.689 0.035 -0.747
Oil 2.797 1.646 0.259 4.705 0.652 11.897 17.598 -1.139 2.806 -12.678 0.275
Gas 0.38 6.00E-03 4.13E-04 0.001 0.631 4.367 0.073 -4.073 0.008
Elect 1.127 8.20E-02 8.23E-04 0.268 0.009 2.671 18.143 2.912 -0.178 0.192
FerNf 0.475 3.01 0.099 0.37 0.226 -4.314 14.462 -10.657
ChemPro 6.652 1.166 0.041 6.982 21.385 3.403 29.1 -23.995 0.241
Onrjint 6.439 15.714 0.235 0.315 2.007 19.325 18.476 8.304 -11.524 22.302 -23.043 0.376
Elecg 0.081 4.999 0.661 0.118 7.581 10.115 14.857 20.157 18.617 -22.275 0.438
transequ 0.177 0.189 0.082 2.115 12.191 30.821 15.811 32.544 47.34 -38.453 0.358
Oequg 1.493 4.499 0.127 0.018 6.33 3.405 39.412 12.848 27.194 -30.77 0.221
Cgoodsind 32.286 6.773 0.154 0.549 0.044 15.743 117.83 2.198 -1.846 41.811 -46.278 0.226
Cons 0.136 0.064 0.045 0.118 3.976 0.103 6.5 120.661 5.624 11.388
TelServ 0.864 0.594 2.194 0.403 3.423 11.393 10.944 0.113 0.176 -0.303 0.15
Trans 2.328 3.938 0.458 7.968 0.389 17.701 17.204 -4.722 4.975 -4.396
Servcred 1.003 2.295 0.767 30.413 50.704 6.947 -0.71 2.026 -4.849 0.231
Oserv 35.61 32.583 1.508 8.331 34.948 113.901 645.817 22.911 -43.692 43.007 -22.486 0.12
SUBSIDY -4.477 -0.828 -0.001 -3.748 -0.961 -7.896
VA_TAX 6.599 16.544 2.467 1.827 31.427
DUTIES 0.425 49.519
ID_TAX 7.687 3.321 0.459 2.08 3.822
SL 26.458 33.089 5.749 18.38 0.423 382.43
UL 6.005 0.083 5.161 0.566 6.899 23.544
Human Cap. 0.259 0.355 0.22 0.099 0.333 0.247
Physical Cap. 31.922 21.17 14.164 17.521 6.304 200.694
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ANNEXE C : Tables of diﬀerences in the ratios
Production / Tangible inputs in the policy case and
in the BAU case, for both ITC and no ITC
In the first table, we present the values of 100 ∗ (PRODpolTANGpol/
PRODbau
TANGbau
− 1)ITC for all
sectors in the case where ITC is taken into account.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Agric 1,299E-05 -3,434E-06 -5,288E-06 3,7399E-07 4,0617E-06 0,00574735 -0,0005978 -0,0003395 0,01031899 -0,0015933 -0,0016625 -0,0015224 -0,0019937
Coal -2,33E-06 -2,307E-06 -2,284E-06 -2,262E-06 -0,0002403 0,00790085 0,00582608 0,00628935 0,02151206 0,01814322 0,01934937 0,02021099 0,02078547
Oil -7,971E-06 -7,892E-06 -7,814E-06 -5,139E-06 -1,471E-05 0,00281517 0,00137401 0,00155361 0,00700775 0,00439305 0,00460227 0,00492683 0,00504324
Gas 0,00026849 0 0 0,00026059 -5,773E-05 0,00214902 -0,000296 -9,746E-05 0,00443093 -0,0004059 -0,0006175 -0,0002942 -0,0001738
Elect 5,0894E-06 7,5585E-06 -1,571E-05 0 1,6244E-05 0,00151484 0,00011238 0,00019385 0,00303218 0,00038632 0,00044346 0,00051104 0,00045221
FerNf -2,124E-05 -2,008E-05 1,09E-05 7,6286E-06 -1,872E-05 0,00656057 0,00272363 0,00312576 0,01546119 0,00849487 0,00886346 0,00952641 0,00965551
ChemPro 4,1005E-06 5,309E-06 -7,112E-06 1,7144E-05 -2,73E-06 0,00199026 0,00025347 0,00035162 0,00410133 0,00085542 0,0008975 0,00102508 0,00096644
Onrjint 2,3379E-06 4,5747E-06 -7,016E-07 -3,006E-08 -5,577E-06 0,00094752 2,8467E-05 7,0583E-05 0,00183453 0,00014501 0,00015182 0,00018485 0,00014825
Elecg 1,0588E-06 -4,332E-06 4,5642E-06 -8,42E-06 -9,147E-06 0,00350599 -0,0004074 -0,0002624 0,00624928 -0,0010875 -0,0011234 -0,0010287 -0,0012885
transequ -5,547E-07 -2,831E-06 -4,626E-06 -6,462E-06 -1,001E-06 0,00259413 -0,0001861 -8,126E-05 0,00475101 -0,0004508 -0,0004736 -0,0003888 -0,0005569
Oequg 8,74E-07 -1,121E-06 -1,525E-05 -7,969E-06 -1,224E-05 0,00214267 -0,000141 -4,805E-05 0,00392873 -0,0003678 -0,0003816 -0,0003241 -0,0004525
Cgoodsind -4,886E-06 5,3892E-07 -3,723E-06 1,2327E-06 1,9298E-07 0,00062302 -6,907E-05 -5,141E-05 0,00110506 -0,000208 -0,0002141 -0,0001938 -0,0002418
Cons -3,335E-06 2,0038E-06 1,8037E-06 2,3996E-06 3,6032E-06 0,00123239 -0,0001297 -8,194E-05 0,00221587 -0,0003378 -0,000348 -0,0003233 -0,000405
TelServ -2,571E-05 9,6115E-06 1,1895E-05 2,9664E-05 -1,242E-05 0,00308189 -0,0005881 -0,0004547 0,00524363 -0,0016452 -0,00173 -0,0016895 -0,0019548
Trans 8,7518E-06 6,966E-06 5,2147E-06 1,7822E-05 -1,633E-05 0,00072671 -5,139E-05 -4,632E-05 0,00132758 -0,0001582 -0,000173 -0,0001479 -0,0001982
Servcred -1,019E-05 -1,366E-07 -3,38E-07 2,6775E-07 -1,023E-05 0,00160249 -0,0002491 -0,0001828 0,0027895 -0,0006871 -0,0007173 -0,0006786 -0,0008136
Oserv 2,1025E-07 -2,993E-07 -7,747E-07 -1,944E-07 -1,16E-06 0,00011772 -1,998E-05 -1,511E-05 0,00020127 -5,354E-05 -5,617E-05 -5,433E-05 -6,324E-05
Case with ITC




all sectors in the case where ITC is not taken into account.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Agric 2,8287E-05 1,2513E-05 1,1283E-05 1,0075E-05 8,8906E-06 -0,0087864 -0,0089046 -0,0093213 -0,0267563 -0,028032 -0,029515 -0,0307083 -0,031935
Coal -5,678E-05 0,00026121 0,00025863 -0,0004214 -0,0004172 -0,8542367 -0,8638117 -0,9048065 -2,5072011 -2,6212869 -2,7511369 -2,8561183 -2,963711
Oil -4,424E-05 -4,38E-05 5,9294E-05 3,9138E-05 3,8751E-05 -0,4201163 -0,4248455 -0,4455779 -1,2683175 -1,3283463 -1,3973089 -1,4531562 -1,5106696
Gas 0 0 0 0 0 -0,028256 -0,0289084 -0,0306424 -0,0859668 -0,0901913 -0,0949179 -0,0982682 -0,1024359
Elect -3,815E-05 -6,37E-05 -2,345E-05 -7,405E-05 -0,0001488 -0,1169895 -0,118218 -0,1240141 -0,3472772 -0,3632796 -0,3816101 -0,3964282 -0,4117164
FerNf 2,5569E-05 -2,198E-05 -1,802E-05 -4,344E-05 3,0799E-05 -0,1249614 -0,1263186 -0,1324555 -0,372088 -0,3893147 -0,4091022 -0,4250571 -0,4415066
ChemPro 1,2469E-05 -4,162E-06 -4,663E-08 1,7134E-05 -2,066E-06 -0,0618101 -0,0625041 -0,0655613 -0,1870117 -0,1958751 -0,2061063 -0,2143809 -0,2228871
Onrjint -8,571E-06 2,1396E-06 -1,546E-06 -5,884E-06 -2,824E-06 -0,0283474 -0,0286655 -0,030067 -0,0855666 -0,0896229 -0,094276 -0,0980474 -0,1019298
Elecg -2,73E-05 -1,452E-05 -2,709E-05 -2,166E-06 -2,343E-06 -0,0020499 -0,0020517 -0,0021694 -0,0061884 -0,0064861 -0,0068099 -0,007083 -0,0073608
transequ 8,7239E-07 3,5624E-06 -8,771E-06 -9,414E-06 -1,004E-05 -0,0011118 -0,0011222 -0,0011829 -0,0033644 -0,0035401 -0,0037237 -0,0038626 -0,004027
Oequg -1,102E-05 -1,325E-05 6,4645E-06 1,7197E-06 -2,932E-06 -0,0017929 -0,0018207 -0,0019028 -0,0054774 -0,0057303 -0,0060414 -0,0062846 -0,006514
Cgoodsind 1,8538E-06 2,1052E-06 7,1354E-06 2,5926E-06 2,8288E-06 -0,0042298 -0,0042739 -0,0044852 -0,0128115 -0,0134241 -0,0141355 -0,0147121 -0,0152949
Cons -4,192E-06 -5,128E-06 6,2107E-06 -7,017E-06 3,9719E-06 -0,0033574 -0,0033931 -0,0035667 -0,0102166 -0,0107154 -0,011271 -0,0117304 -0,0121904
TelServ -8,439E-05 3,1103E-05 3,2207E-06 -5,141E-05 -0,000105 -0,0077429 -0,007702 -0,0081315 -0,0231588 -0,024438 -0,0256473 -0,026589 -0,0276648
Trans 1,3742E-05 1,3368E-05 -1,887E-06 2,7143E-05 1,205E-05 -0,0305791 -0,0309293 -0,0324646 -0,0928671 -0,0973012 -0,1023873 -0,1065396 -0,110786
Servcred -5,589E-06 1,1567E-05 -4,086E-06 2,7577E-06 9,4668E-06 -0,0015257 -0,0015556 -0,0016135 -0,0046542 -0,0048726 -0,0051307 -0,005348 -0,0055521
Oserv 2,6544E-06 -6,884E-07 -5,886E-07 9,5081E-07 4,8285E-06 -0,0071614 -0,0072425 -0,0075984 -0,0217373 -0,0227754 -0,0239701 -0,0249386 -0,0259331
Case with no ITC
The values of the first table are greater than the values of the second table, which
means that in the case of ITC, simply less tangible inputs are used as inputs to pro-
duction than in the case where there is no ITC. This results from the fact that the
demand for human capital services as an input to production leads to a lesser demand
for the tangible inputs.
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ANNEXE D : The Dual Approach
In this annex we present an algebraic sumary of the forward looking model. This
model is formulated as a MCP or Mixed Complementary Problem.
Three classes of equations or conditions of equilibrium underlie the economic equi-
libirum of the model :
— Zero profit conditions which are dual to the levels of activity of each sector
— Market clearance conditions for factors of production and goods which are dual
to the prices of factors and goods
— Income balance definition for the representative agent which is dual to the ag-
gregate income level
Therefore, in the complementarity format, the series of equations of these three
classes of equilibrium conditions are linked or paired to a dual variable. The symbol ⊥
represents the duality. All prices reported in this annex are in present values.
The economy is here modeled as a representative agent, with n industries (indexed
by j = 1...n). Each industry produces one unique good (indexed by i = 1...n). There are
seventeen sectors in the economy. We define noncov, cov, ener and nener as subsections
of i and as follwing :
noncov non covered sectors
cov covered sectors
ener energy sectors
nener non energy sectors
FF fossil fuel sectors
These four subsections are defined as in the following table :
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Agriculture noncov ne
Coal cov ener FF
Oil cov ener FF
Gas cov ener FF
Electricity cov ener
Ferrous and non ferrous metals cov ne
Chemical Products cov ne
Other Energy Intensive Goods cov ne
Electric Goods noncov ne
Transport Equipment noncov ne
Other Equipment Goods noncov ne
Consumer Goods Industries noncov ne
Construction noncov ne
Telecommunication Services noncov ne
Transport noncov ne
Service and Credit insurances noncov ne
Other Services noncov ne
We use the acronyms CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) and CD (Cobb
Douglas) and LT (Leontieﬀ) to indicate the functional form in some of the equations
for sake of simplicity.
D1 - Definition of Terms
Prices :
pi,t Price of good produced by industry i at time t
Pt Price of total consumption at time t
PKt+1 Dual price of the physical capital stock in t+ 1
PKT Dual price of physical capital stock in final period
PHt+1 Dual price of the human capital stock in t+ 1
PHT Dual price of human capital stock in final period
RKt Rental price of physical capital at time t
rkt Rental rate of physical capital at time t
RHt Rental price of human capital at time t
rht Rental rate of human capital at time t
wt Wage rate at time t
pMEi,t Price of the materials-energy bunde for sector i at time t
pMi,t Price of materials for sector i at time t
pEi,t Price of the energy bundle for sector i at time t
pFFi,t Price of fossil fuel bundle (ﬀ) in sectors i at time t
paci,t Price of ﬀ in covered sectors in sectors i with carbon tax at time t
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pFTt Price of foreign exchange at time t
pmi,t Price of imported good i at time t
pxi,t Price of exported good i at time t
pAi,t Price of armington good i at time t
pU Price of utility
pconst Price of consumption for representative agent
ptclt Price of carbon
Elasticities of substitution and shares
σY elasticity of substitution between tangible and intangible inputs
σxkl elasticity of substitution between the capital-labor bundle
and the materials-energy bundle
ki share of capital in the capital-labor bundle
σI elasticity of substitution in intratemporal investment
σA elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods
σME elasticity of substitution between materials and energy
σFFE elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels and electricity
Variables
Lt Labor at time t
It Investment in physical capital at time t
I˜it Investment in physical capital industry i at time t
Rt Investment in human capital at time t
R˜it Investment in human capital industry i at time t
VKt Value of physical capital services at time t
VHt Value of human capital services at time t
yi,t Good produced by industry i at time t
xi,jt Interindustry transaction good at time t
Const Consumption at time t
mj,t Import of good j at time t
exj,t Export of good j at time t
BOPt Balance of Payment at time t
BOP0 Balance of Payment in the baseline
Ai,t Armington aggregate of good i at time t
EXPt Export of goods at time t
IMPt Import of goods at time t
U Utility of the representative agent
Wt Intratemporal utility
BUDG Budget of the representative agent
Profits
Modeling Induced Technical Change 241
Πi,t Zero profit condition for good i at time t
ΠIi,t Zero profit condition for investment in physical capital
ΠRi,t Zero profit condition for investment in human capital
ΠIMPi,t Zero profit condition for imported good i at time t
ΠEXPi,t Zero profit condition for exported good i at time t
ΠAi,t Zero profit condition for armington good i at time t
ΠU Zero profit condition for intertemporal utility
ΠConst Zero profit condition for intratemporal utility at time t
Parameters
αy Share of tangibles in the production function
β Share of the materials-energy bundle in the tangible goods
k Share of physical capital services (PCS) in the PCS-labor bundle
αM,i Share of materials in the materials-energy bundle for sector i
αFF,i Share of fossil fuels in the fossil fuel-electricity bundle for sector i
bi Share of domestic goods in the armington specification
δk Depreciation rate of physical capital
δh Depreciation rate of human capital
g Growth rate of the economy
ρ Rate of time preference
ccoefFF Carbon emission coeﬃcient on each fossil fuel
D2 - Algebraic Summary of the Model
The summary of the model is determined through the zero profit, market clearance
and income balance conditions.
In our model, there are six zero profit market conditions.





















































pFFi,t = CD(pacCoal,t; pacOil,t; pacGas,t) if i = cov
pFFi,t = CD(pACoal,t ; pAOil,t ; pAGas,t) if i = noncov
With
pacFF,t = LT (pAFF,t ; ptclt; ccoefFF ) if i = cov
— Zero profit condition for t = 1..T − 1 for investment in physical capital ⊥ Ii,t
ΠIi,t = pAi,t − PKt+1 = 0 (4.28)
— Zero profit terminal condition in the post terminal period T for investment in
physical capital ⊥ Ii,T
ΠIi,T = pAi,T − PKT = 0 (4.29)
— Zero profit condition for t = 1..T − 1 for investment in human capital ⊥ Ri,t
ΠRi,t = pi,t − PHt+1 = 0 (4.30)
— Zero profit terminal condition in the post terminal period T for investment in
physical capital ⊥ Ri,T
ΠRi,T = pi,T − PHT = 0 (4.31)
— Zero profit condition for t = 1..T − 1 for physical capital accumulation. ⊥ Ki,t
PKt = RKt + (1− δk)PKt+1 (4.32)
— Zero profit condition in the post terminal period T for physical capital ⊥ Ki,T
PKT = RKT + (1− δk)PKT
— Zero profit condition for t = 1..T − 1 for human capital accumulation ⊥ Hi,t
PHt = RHt + (1− δh)PHt+1 (4.33)
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— Zero profit condition in the post terminal period T for human capital ⊥ Hi,T
PHT = RHT + (1− δh)PHT (4.34)




1− 1σA + (1− bi)pmi,t
1− 1σA
´ 1
1− 1σA − pAi,t ≥ 0 (4.35)
— Zero profit condition for t = 1..T for imported goods ⊥ mi,t
ΠIMPi,t = p
FT
t − pmi,t ≥ 0 (4.36)
— Zero profit condition for t = 1..T for exported goods ⊥ exi,t
ΠEXPi,t = pxi,t − pFTt ≥ 0 (4.37)
— Zero profit condition for t = 1..T for intratemporal utility ⊥ Const
ΠConst = pAj,t − pconst ≥ 0
— Zero profit condition for intertemporal utility ⊥ U
ΠU = CES(pconst; ρ)− pU ≥ 0 (4.38)
Market clearance conditions
— Market clearance condition for t = 1..T for all goods ⊥ pj,t
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— Market clearance condition for t = 1..T − 1 for physical capital stock ⊥ PKt+1
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + It (4.43)
— Terminal market clearance condition in the post terminal period T for physical
capital stock ⊥ PKT
KT = (1− δk)KT + IT (4.44)
— Market clearance condition for t = 1..T − 1 for human capital stock ⊥ PHt+1
Ht+1 = (1− δh)Ht +Rt (4.45)
— Terminal market clearance condition in the post terminal period T for human
captal stock ⊥ PHT
HT = (1− δh)HT +RT (4.46)
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(wtLt +RHtVHt +RHtVHt)− (PKT ∗KT − PK0K0) (4.52)
−(PHT ∗HT − PH0H0) +
TX
t=0
pFTt BOPt = BUDG
Endowments
— Labor for t = 1..T
Lt = (1 + g)
t−1L0 (4.53)
— Balance of Payments for t = 1..T
BOPt = (1 + g)
t−1BOP0 (4.54)
Terminal capital condition
We suppose that on the post terminal time T investment in physical capital and










This is the dual definition of the CGE model.
Modeling Induced Technical Change 246
ANNEXE E : The Model Code
Presentation of the model code in GAMS and MPSGE, for the forward looking
model with Induced Technological Change
$TITLE MODEL_F
table sam(*,*) 1995 social accounting matrix for france — million 1995 ecu
Agric Coal Oil Gas Elect FerNf ChemPro Onrjint
Agric 1.042564577286E+04 6.708274962737E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 1.993198933886E+00 2.511753059850E-01 4.926324313111E+01 2.773035535719E+02
Coal 0.000000000000E+00 6.221639034038E+02 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 4.174518704158E+02 8.181797300197E+02 4.968583969357E+01 9.537380293460E+01
Oil 1.844950328609E+03 3.295108714210E+01 1.147706836183E+04 1.111068982670E+01 7.275130951293E+01 3.863930675792E+02 2.450326066008E+03 9.162150070291E+02
Gas 6.546764316964E+01 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 3.235039476988E+01 7.967286703750E+01 2.196071991529E+02 6.018275604741E+02 8.504059024159E+02
Elect 2.929777401449E+02 7.913037591052E+01 2.508732670133E+02 2.714604061526E+01 4.186150042415E+03 1.368244449867E+03 1.269429635608E+03 2.146970405185E+03
FerNf 1.486411979822E+02 4.240429432550E+00 1.205334837463E+01 0.000000000000E+00 5.869762660178E+01 1.131133285086E+04 0.000000000000E+00 5.925115504124E+03
ChemPro 4.707359199728E+03 4.402148377507E+01 8.320345489943E+02 0.000000000000E+00 5.586555387238E+01 6.289450350552E+02 1.416707798832E+04 2.600753765790E+03
Onrjint 3.287146215786E+02 2.729498545959E+02 1.350128933093E+03 8.838339805561E+01 9.791516247208E+02 1.295157314385E+03 4.689453945888E+03 2.893984486256E+04
Elecg 1.282274996084E+01 1.907597804235E+01 2.646679047835E+02 1.527588517985E+01 5.370895259691E+02 2.873073892438E+02 1.886033676238E+02 1.128839368348E+03
transequ 1.127309890993E+02 0.000000000000E+00 8.660338140420E+00 2.296376970165E+00 1.799580204798E+01 1.256581300470E+01 5.709805740711E+01 2.919558150731E+02
Oequg 9.827565101875E+02 9.911799387011E+01 1.032416304686E+02 2.087384611455E+01 1.458030858416E+02 2.795958419223E+02 5.215482521455E+02 1.360791287743E+03
Cgoodsind 7.401704069117E+03 7.293153108551E+01 1.182440701522E+02 0.000000000000E+00 1.959573828417E+01 5.982590535245E+01 3.802158849083E+03 1.750997408438E+03
Cons 2.191392630286E+02 4.942323804122E+01 6.518959108245E+02 2.936275672524E+02 8.425241276412E+02 5.280731035803E+01 1.279094992933E+02 1.235380042474E+02
TelServ 1.161807225045E+01 1.096068694238E+01 6.067068819840E+01 4.578893688938E+01 2.210247269594E+02 1.975930857961E+02 5.635449525040E+02 1.064803179625E+03
Trans 4.568479478749E+02 5.864426018611E+01 7.637363384710E+02 2.677981023396E+02 3.307632972622E+02 9.049918423628E+02 2.683426928339E+03 6.370862654933E+03
Servcred 3.094035526874E+02 6.718564614030E-01 1.539525744916E+02 3.873432003623E+00 1.235049115356E+02 2.250595043305E+02 6.225946928748E+02 7.240399846578E+02
OMS 7.032701070623E+03 7.161793618190E+02 4.711399458617E+03 9.040719798945E+02 4.614433614195E+03 3.077254352818E+03 1.200068188346E+04 1.479734030473E+04
NMS 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00
K 2.606073328216E+04 2.743283148873E+02 7.107457186525E+02 2.557896181591E+02 1.345754202732E+04 4.695851064496E+03 1.146543551001E+04 2.141138000979E+04
L 4.427448544905E+03 8.787194796940E+02 2.918797048729E+03 6.122923033835E+02 5.204707811913E+03 4.893126166230E+03 1.151646268285E+04 2.738989433235E+04
SUBSIDY -3.295909649557E+03-9.249331930098E+02-2.597032691309E+00-1.558219614786E+00-6.258848786056E+01 -6.789378931307E+01-2.062096107171E+02-8.014899760225E+02
VA_TAX 8.052192549550E+02 6.827361927502E+01 3.308407278879E+03 7.144019732718E+02 1.641364747419E+03 2.981494466186E+01 1.561943238909E+03 4.206315508823E+03
DUTIES 1.159449919036E+02 1.095495940639E+00 1.747697607294E+02 2.104133736627E+00 2.880796164620E+01 7.202499489606E+01 1.493236489579E+02 2.357601457001E+02
ID_TAX 1.137007352176E+03 1.204261241307E+02 1.921216146873E+04 2.313040707452E+02 3.166813345867E+03 6.512662268072E+02 1.644553605921E+03 2.719886614637E+03
Cgoodsind Cons TelServ Trans Servcred OMS NMS FCONS
Agric 2.825410486768E+04 0.000000000000E+00 2.946957154190E-01 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 1.264992763950E+03 1.532673178552E+03 1.862333320239E+04
Coal 2.055724182749E+01 3.499294872790E-01 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 5.064089712352E+02
Oil 2.792656269643E+03 1.654272483602E+03 2.574731495473E+02 4.721215800287E+03 6.769785257081E+02 4.521752522000E+03 7.307555784050E+03 1.749472142630E+04
Gas 3.785817386140E+02 8.052364734887E+00 4.104185509472E-01 0.000000000000E+00 1.485013368962E+00 2.934220266722E+02 3.334912448116E+02 4.336249340243E+03
Elect 1.122932361848E+03 1.221448894648E+02 3.151964011707E+00 2.662239939902E+02 9.373331759368E+00 1.298692631152E+03 1.366949910132E+03 1.801754725629E+04
FerNf 4.975143833326E+02 3.145022064146E+03 0.000000000000E+00 1.063599869198E+02 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 2.239786058420E+02
ChemPro 6.642836770119E+03 1.161907702490E+03 0.000000000000E+00 4.137517554156E+01 0.000000000000E+00 1.184797010606E+03 5.823980808176E+03 2.125486060991E+04
Onrjint 6.441424548441E+03 1.568193577015E+04 2.349038269058E+02 3.241160185251E+02 2.016170455719E+03 1.415365637758E+04 5.080633829580E+03 1.835913962198E+04
Elecg 8.511079902573E+01 4.981323294430E+03 6.768554447922E+02 1.219568313403E+02 0.000000000000E+00 2.157550082354E+03 5.393723072147E+03 1.004917138557E+04
transequ 1.764337476450E+02 1.898971039372E+02 8.127552664936E+01 2.116686272301E+03 0.000000000000E+00 1.594396793098E+03 1.053365047085E+04 3.064507842205E+04
Oequg 1.524012653388E+03 4.486220832330E+03 0.000000000000E+00 1.306915995692E+02 1.777455111763E+01 2.342408528255E+03 3.988440630085E+03 3.384654622982E+03
Cgoodsind 3.226294305313E+04 6.768912708578E+03 1.536522650722E+02 5.490437821478E+02 7.241923273723E+01 7.036919291220E+03 8.674306310172E+03 1.171852566674E+05
Cons 1.349239219918E+02 6.325695508668E+01 4.432015307831E+01 1.169317891437E+02 3.953239335609E+03 1.174895503903E+03 1.014339851821E+04 6.460085286479E+03
TelServ 8.598934369856E+02 5.901856272420E+02 2.350705436574E+03 4.004229016027E+02 3.405693567271E+03 7.419104616404E+03 3.897174873696E+03 1.086682858259E+04
Trans 2.315905196133E+03 3.913550622150E+03 4.552797510501E+02 7.918305081644E+03 3.867223259980E+02 1.426387960988E+04 3.325448056208E+03 1.709316929431E+04
Servcred 1.000061759727E+03 2.281223889283E+03 0.000000000000E+00 7.631725594075E+02 3.046380602222E+04 2.395289136711E+03 4.797671767130E+04 6.900144740689E+03
OMS 3.543460742427E+04 3.238415798840E+04 1.499284250927E+03 8.280198350514E+03 3.474696562063E+04 7.461669217194E+04 3.858705886216E+04 3.469062625967E+05
NMS 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 2.948738243670E+05
K 3.177147352423E+04 2.104520913324E+04 1.408410301399E+04 1.741858183707E+04 6.268669882443E+03 2.066733717862E+05 -7.163522335198E+03
L 3.231395673827E+04 3.297891953273E+04 1.087194990602E+04 1.884296522384E+04 7.289102859724E+03 1.231469128055E+05 2.804365210394E+05
SUBSIDY -4.456073246468E+03 -8.234438778283E+02 -1.387062783638E+00 -3.725656251357E+03 -9.554810929426E+02 -7.849393725649E+03 0.000000000000E+00
VA_TAX 6.568062483819E+03 1.644714350887E+04 2.452706314043E+03 1.816425583436E+03 0.000000000000E+00 3.124163657949E+04 0.000000000000E+00
DUTIES 4.230877870763E+02 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00
ID_TAX 7.650328877582E+03 3.301401056096E+03 4.564334249757E+02 2.068097239101E+03 3.800616561621E+03 3.863242023002E+04 1.059467868727E+04
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INV DSTOCK EXPORTS IMPORT
Agric 4.957410111139E+02 -2.058489963455E+03 1.211775741266E+04 -7.398125715715E+03
Coal 0.000000000000E+00 6.842739378849E+02 3.453485217834E+01 -7.418999224922E+02
Oil 0.000000000000E+00 -1.131969790647E+03 2.789573933757E+03 -1.260366428173E+04
Gas 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 7.293284488104E+01 -4.044484493536E+03
Elect 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00 2.891610996057E+03 -1.767838967380E+02
FerNf 0.000000000000E+00 -4.278069475966E+03 1.434017120867E+04 -1.056756661619E+04
ChemPro 0.000000000000E+00 3.382704403880E+03 2.892279897124E+04 -2.384893241017E+04
Onrjint 8.251995163340E+03 -1.145162576588E+04 2.216068673002E+04 -2.289721069686E+04
Elecg 1.475927871833E+04 2.002533159279E+04 1.849506213775E+04 -2.212904177311E+04
transequ 1.572025891829E+04 3.235823944016E+04 4.706929322252E+04 -3.823313600215E+04
Oequg 3.918085173001E+04 1.277312430019E+04 2.703493152155E+04 -3.058972198871E+04
Cgoodsind 2.185659879334E+03 -1.836274386713E+03 4.158237616872E+04 -4.602442036409E+04
Cons 1.199111728848E+05 5.589266433913E+03 0.000000000000E+00 0.000000000000E+00
TelServ 0.000000000000E+00 1.118613172294E+02 1.747782702548E+02 -3.006253289319E+02
Trans 0.000000000000E+00 -4.691283187357E+03 4.943086177790E+03 -4.367452593555E+03
Servcred 0.000000000000E+00 -7.056495736885E+02 2.012540791908E+03 -4.815954022535E+03
OMS 2.276749169483E+04 -1.824955335634E+05 2.511245363242E+04 -8.602739729366E+03








* Creation of a SAM with seventeen sectors, where Oserv (Other services) is
the sum of OMS (Other market services) and NMS (Non market services).
sets






FerNf Ferrous and non ferrous metals
ChemPro Chemical products
Onrjint Other energy intensive
Elecg Electric goods
transequ Transport equipment
Oequg Other equipment goods




Servcred Service of credit and insurances
OMS Other market services
NMS Non market services
/
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FerNf Ferrous and non ferrous metals
ChemPro Chemical products
Onrjint Other energy intensive
Elecg Electric goods
transequ Transport equipment
Oequg Other equipment goods




Servcred Service of credit and insurances
Oserv Other services
/






FerNf.FerNf Ferrous and non ferrousmetals
ChemPro.ChemPro Chemical products
Onrjint.Onrjint Other energy intensive
Elecg.Elecg Electric goods
transequ.transequ Transport equipment
Oequg.Oequg Other equipment goods




Servcred.Servcred Service of credit and insurances
(OMS,NMS).Oserv Other and Non market services
/ ;
* Extraction of values from the SAM
sets
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f factors /L, K/
d demands /Fcons, Inv, Dstock, Exports, Import/
tou tax type /subsidy, id_tax, duties, va_tax/
e(i) energy /coal, oil, gas, elect/
ec(i) energy without coal /oil, gas, elect/
fe(i) fossil fuel energy /coal, oil, gas/
eis(i) energy-intensive industries /fernf, chempro, onrjint/
eise(i) energy and energy intensive /fernf, chempro, onrjint, coal, oil, gas, elect/




t /1995*2012/, tfirst(t), tlast(t) ;
tfirst(t)=yes$(ord(t) eq 1) ;
tlast(t)=yes$(ord(t) eq card(t)) ;
alias (iorig,jorig) , (i,j) , (f,ﬀ), (j,jj),(e,z) ;
parameters
xbar benchmark intermediate transaction matrix
vbar benchmark factor supply matrix
gbar benchmark final demand matrix
cbar benchmark aggregate consumption
* Taxes
zbar benchmark distortions matrix
tot_id Total id taxes
tot_su Total subsidies
tot_du Total duties
tot_tp Total value added tax
* Values in the SAM
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ybar0 benchmark output
endl labor used in production : found in the SAM
ibar benchmark aggregate investment positive values
xinv exogenous investment demand vector
tinv positive values of investment
impt benchmark imports
impts benchmark imports sum
expt benchmarkexports
bopdef0 balance of payments deficit in the benchmark
bopdef balance of payments deficit
em0 benchmark energy materials bundle
ma0 benchmark materials bundle
n0 benchmark energy supply
f0 benchmark fossil fuel supply
a0 benchmark armington supply
d0 benchmark demand
mu Share of government demand in total demand
carblim limit on endowment of carbon emission certificates per sector





esubl Elasticity of consumption for leisure versus consumption /0.3/
subsnrj Elasticity of substitution between electricity fossil fuels /0.7/
subs Elasticity of substitution between fossil fuels /1.5/
u0 benchmark unemployment rate for all workers in 1995 /0.125/
ra0 benchmark national income spent on consumption /0/
vk benchmark aggregate capital
endogsav flag to turn on endogenous saving /0/
ncalib flag to specify non-calibration run /0/
carblim90 carbon emissions in 1990 /103/
carblim0 benchmark 1995 endowment of carbon emission certificates
bmkscale scale benchmark by 1e-3 /1e-3/
ecuscale benchmark year ecu-usd conversion
gamma gdp growth rate (oecd economic outlook 1997) /0.01/
;
* We multiply everything by bmkscale because the values in the SAM are too
big.
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* There may be negative values, therefore, when extracting the values from the
SAM, we take the maximum between 0
* and the value in the SAM.
vbar(f,j) = bmkscale * sum(jorig$mapi(jorig,j), sam(f,jorig)) ;
xbar(i,j) = bmkscale * sum((iorig,jorig)$(mapi(iorig,i) and mapi(jorig,j))
, sam(iorig,jorig)) ;
gbar(i,d) = bmkscale * sum(iorig$mapi(iorig,i), sam(iorig,d)) ;
zbar(tou,j) = bmkscale * sum(jorig$mapi(jorig,j), sam(tou,jorig)) ;
gdp0 = sum((i,d),gbar(i,d)) ;
ecuscale = 6.55957/6.52 ;
* We multiply everything by ecuscale to convert ecu to euros as all our calcu-
lations are in euros.
vbar(f,j) = ecuscale * vbar(f,j) ;
xbar(i,j) = ecuscale * xbar(i,j) ;
gbar(i,d) = ecuscale * gbar(i,d) ;
zbar(tou,j) = ecuscale * zbar(tou,j) ;
wp =639.02*ecuscale ;
* Wage premium calculation A. Gubian (DARES) / Sophie Ponthieux :"Em-
plois non qualifies, emplois a bas salaires
* et mesures d’allegement du cout du travail"
* 0.6= NQ W / Q W —> Q W - 0.4* Q W = NQ W
* NQ W = 958.53 ecus
* The wage premium = 0.4*Q W = 639.02
* In euros WAGE PREMIUM = 639.02*ecuscale
display vbar, xbar, gbar, zbar ;
* Output gross of tax —> all taxes are included except those on imports
ybar0(j) = sum(i,xbar(i,j))+sum(f,vbar(f,j))+tot_id(j)+tot_su(j)+tot_tp(j) ;
* Energy supply, per sector
n0(i)=sum(e,xbar(e,i)) ;
* Fossil fuel energy supply per sector
f0(i)=sum(fe,xbar(fe,i)) ;
* Materials bundle
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ma0(j)=sum(i,xbar(i,j))-sum(fe,xbar(fe,j))-xbar("elect",j) ;




* Extracting negative investment values
xinv(i)=min(0,gbar(i,"Inv")+gbar(i,"Dstock")) ;
* Extracting positive investment values
tinv(i)=max(0,gbar(i,"Inv")+gbar(i,"Dstock")) ;
* Aggregate investment and capital returns
ibar=sum(i,tinv(i)) ;
* Physical capital services
vk=sum(j,vbar("k",j)) ;






* Balance of payments deficit : net demand
bopdef0 = sum(i,impt(i)-expt(i)) ;
bopdef = bopdef0 ;
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* Taxes on output are calculated on a gross revenue basis, while taxes on inputs




tﬀ Total factor taxes
tfe Tax rates on labor in fossil fuel sector




tl total benchmark tax on labor
tm Import tax
pf0 Reference user cost of factor inputs
py0 Reference production price
pm0 Reference import price
;
* Output tax is the sum of subsidies and factor taxes divided by the value of
output
ty0(i)$ybar0(i)=(tot_su(i)+tot_tp(i))/ybar0(i) ;








tm(i) = tm0(i) ;
* Total benchmark taxes on labor
tl=sum(j,tf("L",j)) ;
display ty0, tm0, tf0, tot_id ;
* Share of government demand
mu=tots/cbar ;
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display colsum, rowsum, ibar, endl, tots, n0, tl, nhle ;







emiss0(fe) benchmark carbon emissions in 1995 (EIA 1999) /coal 15, oil 65, gas 17/
ccoef(fe) carbon emissions coeﬃcient on each fossil fuel
tcl(t) total carbon limitations




tcl(t) = 0 ;
carblim(j) =0 ;
* We initially set the carbon tax to be nul in the benchmark
tau_c(j) = 0 ;
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*=========================================
* INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
*=========================================
scalars
deltak depreciation rate on physical capital /0.059/
deltah depreciation rate on knowledge /0.12/
;
* Patent data
* I added a 1 in the first column of CONS, TRANS and OSERV (lack of data
for these sectors)
table pp(*,*) table of patents per Industry of Manufacture and Sector of Use -
Johnson-Evenson Patent Set (JEPS)
Agric Coal Gas Elecg Telserv Elect Chempro Oil
Agric 551.664608 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 6.950082 0.000000
Coal 0.232087 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.270519 0.000000
Gas 0.326444 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.380501 0.000000
Elecg 36.481266 28.992244 40.779292 6832.943325 353.433769 47.656523 29.031657 2.040803
Telserv 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 5.154323 587.931568 0.170215 0.250840 0.000000
Elect 1.326011 1.443636 2.030558 267.145593 9.075789 295.084816 7.724558 0.073031
Chempro 462.553761 47.302362 66.533548 136.453332 5.270163 70.634006 4388.975881 133.953703
Oil 0.212839 1.108753 1.559526 2.354271 0.000000 0.228815 3.536854 47.775922
Transequ 5.964733 3.516940 4.946783 0.313858 0.193120 0.000000 0.959936 0.214872
fernf 61.899571 18.700199 26.302927 69.948569 0.657940 15.131187 37.487173 10.823446
Oequg 988.698877 127.604547 179.483282 403.778522 13.684824 83.869809 564.583488 113.812775
Cgoodsind 159.543848 5.696590 8.012588 173.744694 9.351039 12.439291 35.226287 3.807358
Onrjint 81.754273 0.863791 1.214973 33.781692 3.822390 18.726683 81.225280 3.048733
Cons 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Trans 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Servcred 2.168924 0.704584 0.991038 39.413092 10.547910 2.760989 0.473273 0.000000
Oserv 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
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Transequ fernf Oequg Cgoodsind Onrjint Cons Trans Servcred Oserv
Agric 0.071769 0.479172 0.240657 0.386925 0.467093 0.256756 0.000000 25.010787 10.608357
Coal 0.000000 0.522027 0.201072 0.192414 0.000000 0.319833 1.928202 0.870246 0.000000
Gas 0.000000 0.734262 0.282820 0.270642 0.000000 0.449864 2.712130 1.224052 0.000000
Elecg 392.964184 158.540180 638.339410 85.273040 5.359513 258.475870 91.295675 1107.729654 331.932361
Telserv 0.854348 0.000000 0.972760 2.732293 0.000000 0.306484 0.537793 17.215096 6.917320
Elect 38.109953 16.190560 43.271044 9.329331 2.294455 157.993163 1.938311 95.678207 49.495666
Chempro 83.993064 349.571161 154.762923 729.817859 628.006545 82.880242 13.159890 215.423810 2228.870943
Oil 23.871439 7.236546 11.923068 3.721368 0.369760 7.569507 17.997006 12.038886 0.200483
Transequ 3020.252728 1.790958 18.011727 3.322370 0.575040 14.361328 95.854128 40.940578 40.920216
fernf 165.766491 1049.147091 395.173317 184.758340 29.989052 1150.779880 60.213352 371.532284 175.501267
Oequg 478.621263 1072.362537 4518.484838 1871.497265 334.699681 631.340651 233.122161 1748.764443 1845.239806
Cgoodsind 97.258461 69.159540 154.402855 1726.795110 29.575594 498.829928 48.209910 446.883323 814.229723
Onrjint 112.096492 29.639883 60.231400 117.808788 570.239107 219.865498 38.182402 69.029800 96.126801
Cons 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Trans 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Servcred 20.140300 3.579513 69.352246 13.349778 0.620137 6.919554 5.147984 1192.561289 26.864706
Oserv 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
;
* We determine labor that is not human capital by multiplying the estimate of
the number of non qualified workers in 1995
* by the wage of non qualified workers in 1995 in euros
* http ://www.insee.fr/fr/indicateur/smic.htm


















* Re-scale nhle(servcred) as this value is larger than total value of labor in this
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sector.
nhle("servcred")= 0.75 * nhle("servcred") ;
;
* I multiply the average qualified wage in euros by the number of researchers
parameters


















* Values of research and development per industry from the Centre de l’Infor-
matique Statistique et de l’Aide à la Décision of the Ministère de l’éducation nationale,
de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche
* http ://cisad.adc.education.fr/reperes/
* For coal / oil/ gas/ elect I divided the total by the share of each sector in all
energy
parameters
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* Declaration of variables and equations for ITC
parameters
rd_sm total research and development so that BGP functions for human capital
rdd_tot total R&D in the model that does not satisfy the BGP
diﬀ diﬀerence between rdd_tot and rd_sum
rddf(i) research and development that should be for the BGP to function
;
positive variables
HR(i,j) benchmark R&D flows embodied in intermediate transactions table
HL(j) benchmark knowledge embodied in labor : proxied by researchers
HLE(j) benchmark skilled workers that are not researchers and not unskilled
H(j) benchmark total knowledge per sector
xtilde(i,j) intermediate transactions matrix net of R&D flows
vtilde(f,j) factor supply matrix net of human capital and embodied technology
rdd research and development column once itc method is in
hri benchmark positive R&D flows in the matrix
hs0 aggregate knowledge services
ks0 aggregate capital services
* Column and Row sum
colsumb column sum with introduction of the itc method
rowsumb row sum with the introduction of the itc method
;
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*=========================================
* HUMAN CAPITAL EXTRACTION FROM SAM
*=========================================
* Determination of the matrix
HR.l(i,j) = (RD(i) * pp(i,j)) / sum(jj,pp(i,jj)) ;
* We PROXY human capital as the number of researchers in the economy
HL.l(j) = chercheurs(j) ;
* Skilled workers in the model that are used in the production and not in the
research and development
HLE.l(j) = vbar("L",j) - NHLE(j) - HL.l(j) ;
* Definition of sectoral knowledge
* This is the sum of knowledge embodied in labor and knowledge embodied in the
interindustry transaction matrix
* We use this definition of xtilde, where only values that are positive are taken into
account
xtilde.l(i,j) = xbar(i,j) - HR.l(i,j)$(xbar(i,j) - HR.l(i,j)>0) ;
* Determination of vtilde which is the sum of skilled (not researchers) and
unskilled labor engaged in production
vtilde.l("L",j) = vbar("L",j)- HL.l(j) ;
vtilde.l("K",j) = vbar("K",j) ;
* Determination of just the positive values of the hr matrix
hri.l(i,j) = xbar(i,j)-xtilde.l(i,j) ;
* The human capital row is the sum of the positive values of hr and hl
H.l(j) = sum(i,hri.l(i,j))+hl.l(j) ;
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* Determination of the value of the r&d vector when the hr matrix is positive.
RDD.l(i) = sum(j,hri.l(i,j)) ;
*This value of RD is smaller than the total value of RetD that is given in the
statistics
rdd_tot = sum(i,sum(j,hri.l(i,j))) ;
* Check for the maintenance of overall row-column balance
* column sum should be equal to 0
colsumb.l(j)= ybar0(j) - H.l(j) - (tot_id(j)+tot_su(j)+tot_tp(j)) - sum(f,vtilde.l(f,j))
- sum(i,xtilde.l(i,j)) ;
* rowsum which should be equal to 0
rowsumb.l(i)= ybar0(i)-(sum(d,gbar(i,d)))+ tot_du(i)-sum(j,xtilde.l(i,j))-RDD.l(i) ;
* Physical capital did not change because we did not extract anything from the
k
ks0.l = sum(j,vtilde.l("k",j)) ;
* computing the sum of all human capital that has been extracted from the labor
and the
* interindustry transaction matrix
hs0.l = sum(j,h.l(j)) ;
*=========================================
* APPLICATION OF THE INTEREST RATE TO HK
*=========================================
* The interest rate of the economy is chosen to be the one that derives from the
physical capital in the SAM
ir = ks0.l * (gamma + deltak) / ibar - deltak ;
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* We apply this interest rate to the equations with human capital to derive
total R&D on the BGP
rd_sm = hs0.l * (gamma + deltah) / (ir + deltah) ;
* We then calculate the diﬀerence between rd_sm (value necessary for BGP)
and rdd_tot (value in the SAM)
diﬀ = rd_sm / rdd_tot ;
* We determine the value of the R&D column that is needed so that the BGP
should be satisfied
rddf(i) = rdd.l(i)* diﬀ ;
parameter totrddf ;
totrddf =sum(i,rddf(i)) ;
* After introducing this new column in the SAM, the whole SAM is unbalanced
*=========================================
* POSITIVITY OF RESIDUALS
*=========================================
* Once we have extracted the value of human capital from the interindustry
* transaction matrix, there must always be a minimum of 10% of the value of the
cells that
* are tangible assets.
xtilde.lo(i,j) = 0.1 * xbar(i,j) ;
vtilde.lo(f,j) = 0.1 * vbar(f,j) ;
* positivity of intangible inputs (lower bound of zero)
HR.lo(i,j) = 0 ;
HL.lo(j) = 0 ;
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display hr.l, h.l, hl.l, vtilde.l, xtilde.l, hs0.l, ks0.l, hri.l,colsumb.l, rowsumb.l, rd_sm,
rdd_tot, diﬀ, rddf, ir, totrddf ;
display ybar0 ;
*=========================================
* CREATION OF A NEW SAM
*=========================================
sets




subsidy, id_tax, duties, va_tax/
colnew new col names /agric,coal, oil, gas, elect, fernf, chempro, onrjint,
elecg,transequ,oequg,cgoodsind,cons,telserv,




SAMNEW Unbalanced SAM that is created when we changed the values in the
R&D column ;
SAMNEW(i,j) = xtilde.l(i,j) ;
SAMNEW(i,d) = gbar(i,d) ;
SAMNEW(i,"rdﬀ") = rddf(i) ;
SAMNEW(tou,j) = zbar(tou,j) ;
SAMNEW("K",j) = vtilde.l("K",j) ;
SAMNEW("SL",j) = HLE.l(j) ;
SAMNEW("UL",j) = NHLE(j) ;
SAMNEW("Hum",j) = H.l(j) ;
display samnew ;
*=========================================
* FIRST REBALANCING OF THE SAM
*=========================================
* I have calculated the amount of research and development that needs to be taken
out of the SAM and put in the RD column. Now both physical capital and human
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capital grow on the balanced growth path. SAMNEW is not balanced though because
of this change I rebalance the SAM according to the Model Library Method : SAM-
BAL.GMS. My new SAM, which is balanced is called SAMBAL.
Variables





rbal(rownew) new row balance
cbal(colnew) column balance
devsqr definition of square deviations
pos positive values of the SAMBAL except for subsidy
;
* Equations for the rebalancing of the SAM
devsqr.. dev =e= sum((rownew,colnew), (sqr(sambal(rownew,colnew)
-samnew(rownew,colnew))
/ samnew(rownew,colnew))$(samnew(rownew,colnew)))
+ sum(rownew, (sqr(ybar0(rownew)- totals(rownew))
/ybar0(rownew))$(ybar0(rownew)))
+ sum(colnew, (sqr(ybar0(colnew)- totals(colnew))
/ybar0(colnew))$(ybar0(colnew))) ;
rbal(rownew).. totals(rownew) =e= sum(colnew$samnew(rownew,colnew)
, sambal(rownew,colnew)) ;
cbal(colnew).. totals(colnew) =e= sum(rownew$samnew(rownew,colnew)
, sambal(rownew,colnew)) ;
model bal /rbal, cbal, devsqr/ ;
solve bal using nlp minimizing dev ;
display sambal.l ;
*=========================================
* SECOND REBALANCING OF THE SAM
*=========================================
equations










=e= ((ir + deltak) / (gamma + deltak)) ;
h_acc.. sum(j$samnew("hum",j),sambal("Hum",j))
/ (sum(i$samnew(i,"rdﬀ"),sambal(i,"rdﬀ")))
=e= ((ir + deltah) / (gamma + deltah)) ;
rbal2(rownew).. totals(rownew) =e= sum(colnew$samnew(rownew,colnew)
, sambal(rownew,colnew)) ;
cbal2(colnew).. totals(colnew) =e= sum(rownew$samnew(rownew,colnew)
, sambal(rownew,colnew)) ;
devsqr2.. dev =e= sum((rownew,colnew), (sqr(sambal(rownew,colnew)
-samnew(rownew,colnew))
/ samnew(rownew,colnew))$(samnew(rownew,colnew)))
+ sum(rownew, (sqr(ybar0(rownew)- totals(rownew))
/ybar0(rownew))$(ybar0(rownew)))
+ sum(colnew, (sqr(ybar0(colnew)- totals(colnew))
/ybar0(colnew))$(ybar0(colnew))) ;
model essai /k_acc,h_acc,rbal2,cbal2,devsqr2/ ;
solve essai using dnlp minimizing dev ;
display sambal.l ;
*=========================================
* PARAMETER DEFINING IN SAMBAL
*=========================================
parameters
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xbarbal values of the xbar matrix in the balanced SAM
vbarbal values of the vbar matrix in the balanced SAM
gbarbal values of the gbar matrix in the balanced SAM
cbarbal consumption in the balanced SAM
zbarbal values of the zbar matrix in the balanced SAM
ybar0bal benchmark output in the balanced SAM
labs0bal benchmark labor supply : unemployed and workers
i.e. total labor force in economy
labskibal supply of all skilled workers : total skilled labor force
skibal skilled workers in the economy
totskibal total skilled workers in the economy
totnskibal total non skilled workers in the economy
endlbal endowment of labor
ibarbal aggregate investments in the balanced SAM
rdbarbal aggregate investment in human capital the balanced SAM
xinvbal exogenous investments in the demand vector
tinvbal positive values of investment in the balanced SAM
imptbal benchmark imports in the balanced SAM
imptsbal benchmark imports sum in the balanced SAM
exptbal benchmark exports in the balanced SAM
bopdef0bal balance of payments deficit in the benchmark of the balanced SAM
bopdefbal balance of payments deficit in the balanced SAM
em0bal benchmark energy materials in the balanced SAM
ma0bal benchmark materials bundle in the balanced SAM
n0bal benchmark energy supply in the balanced SAM
f0bal benchmark fossil fuel supply in the balanced SAM
a0bal benchmark armington supply in the balanced SAM
d0bal benchmark demand in the balanced SAM
vkbal value of capital returns in the balanced SAM
vhbal value of human capital returns in the balanced SAM
totsbal total taxes in the balanced SAM
mubal share of government demand
;
* We create an additional line in the factors matrix, and create therefore an addi-
tional set of factors which includes
* human capital as another factor of prodcution
* In the same way we create an addtional set dh, including the usual demands as
well as investment in research
* and development
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sets
v factors of production including human capital /K,SL,UL,Hum/
fu skilled and unskilled labor and capital /K,SL,UL/
dh demand including R&D /Fcons, Inv, Dstock,
Exports, Import, rdﬀ/
;
alias (vv,v), (fufu,fu) ;
* Determination of the diﬀerent parts of SAMBAL
vbarbal(v,j) = sambal.l(v,j) ;
xbarbal(i,j) = sambal.l(i,j) ;
gbarbal(i,dh) = sambal.l(i,dh) ;
zbarbal(tou,j) = sambal.l(tou,j) ;
* Energy supply, per sector
n0bal(i)=sum(e,xbarbal(e,i)) ;




* Energy materials bundle
em0bal(j)=n0bal(j)+ma0bal(j) ;
* There is NO tax on consumption
cbarbal=sum(i,gbarbal(i,"Fcons")) ;
* Extracting negative investment values
xinvbal(i)=min(0,gbarbal(i,"Inv")+gbarbal(i,"Dstock")) ;
* Extracting positive investment values
tinvbal(i)=max(0,gbarbal(i,"Inv")+gbarbal(i,"Dstock")) ;
* Aggregate investment and capital returns
ibarbal=sum(j,tinvbal(j)) ;
* Aggregate investment and capital returns
rdbarbal=sum(i,gbarbal(i,"rdﬀ")) ;
* Flows of physical capital services
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vkbal=sum(j,vbarbal("k",j)) ;
* Flows of physical capital
vhbal=sum(j,vbarbal("hum",j)) ;
* Endowment of all labor
endlbal=(sum(j,vbarbal("Ul",j))+sum(j,vbarbal("Sl",j)))/(1-u0) ;
* skilled labor in the economy without counting the researchers
skibal(j)= vbarbal("SL",j) ;
* Total input of skilled laborers actually working in the economy
totskibal = (sum(j,skibal(j))) ;
* Total input of non skilled laborers actually working in the economy
totnskibal= (sum(j,vbarbal("UL",j))) ;
* labor supply, all those that are unemployed and all workers





* Balance of payments deficit : net demand
bopdef0bal = sum(i,imptbal(i)-exptbal(i)) ;
















tot_subal(j) = zbarbal("subsidy",j) ;
tot_idbal(j) = zbarbal("id_tax",j) ;
tot_dubal(j) = zbarbal("duties",j) ;
tot_tpbal(j) = zbarbal("va_tax",j) ;
* Tax definition in SAMBAL
ybar0bal(j) = sum(i,xbarbal(i,j))+sum(v,vbarbal(v,j))
+tot_idbal(j)+tot_subal(j)+tot_tpbal(j) ;
ty0bal(i)$ybar0bal(i) = (tot_subal(i)+tot_tpbal(i))/ybar0bal(i) ;
tf0bal(fu,i)$(sum(fufu,vbarbal(fufu,i))) = tot_idbal(i)/sum(fufu,vbarbal(fufu,i)) ;
tm0bal(i)$imptbal(i) = tot_dubal(i)/imptbal(i) ;
tybal(i) = ty0bal(i) ;
tfbal(fu,i) = tf0bal(fu,i) ;
tmbal(i) = tm0bal(i) ;
totsbal = sum(j,sum(tou,zbarbal(tou,j))) ;
tlbal = sum(j,tfbal("UL",j))+sum(j,tfbal("SL",j)) ;
* Armington good definition
* To the armington definition we now add the demand for research and development




* Share of government demand
mubal=totsbal/cbarbal ;













* A FORWARD LOOKING MODEL
*=========================================
*Declaration of the assumed parameters
scalar
r interest rate
k0 initial capital stock
hk0 initial human capital stock
rk0 initial return to capital
rh0 initial return to human capital
iv0 initial investment in physical capital
ivh0 initial investment in human capital ;
parameter qref(t) quantities
pref(t) prices ;




*Interest rate of the economy is infered by the growth theory
r = (gamma+deltak) * vkbal /ibarbal - deltak ;
*Rental rate of capital in the base period
rk0 = deltak + r ;
*Initial capital stock
k0 = vkbal / rk0 ;
*Initial investment




*Interest rate of the economy is infered by the growth theory
r = (gamma+deltah) * vhbal/rdbarbal - deltah ;
*Rental rate of human capital in the base period
rh0 = deltah + r ;
*Initial human capital stock
hk0 = vhbal / rh0 ;
*Initial investment in human capital
ivh0 = (deltah+gamma) * hk0 ;
* On the BGP, all quantities increase at the same growth rate gamma
* On the BGP, all prices decrease at the rate of the interest rate r
* We have ord(t)-1 as an exponent to represent the fact that in the base year
qref et pref are equal to one and grow thereafter.
qref(t)=(1+gamma)**(ord(t)-1) ;
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pref(t)=(1/(1+r))**(ord(t)-1) ;




diﬀerence = (gamma+deltak) * vkbal/ibarbal - deltak
-((gamma+deltah) * vhbal/rdbarbal - deltah) ;
option r :7 ;







p(i,t) ! Price index for commodities
pfb(j,t) ! Price of fossil bundle
pnb(j,t) ! Price of the energy bundle
pfx(t) ! Price for small open economy
px(j,t)$(expt(j)) ! Export price
pm(j,t)$(impt(j)) ! Import price
pva(j,t) ! Price index for value-added by sector
pa(j,t) ! Armington price
pinv(t) ! Price of investment
pinvt ! Price of investment the last period (market for a post term K)
rk(t) ! Rental rate for physical capital
rhk(t) ! Rental rate for human capital
pcons(t) ! Price of consumption
pg(t) ! Price of government good
pl(t) ! Wage rate for labor
pem(j,t) ! Price of energy materials bundle
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pma(j,t) ! Price of materials bundle
pklem(j,t) ! Price of capital labor enery bundle
pac(fe,t) ! Gross-of-carbon-tax price of coal oil and gas
ptcl(t)$tcl(t) ! Price of carbon emission rights
prd(t) ! Price of research and development
prdt ! Price of research and development at the last period
$sectors :
carbon(fe,t) ! Dummy sector for carbon emissions accounting
klem(j,t) ! capital labor energy bundle
nb(j,t) ! Production of energy bundle per sector j
fb(j,t) ! Production of fossil bundle
y(j,t) ! Production by sector
va(j,t) ! Value added by sector
em(j,t) ! Energy Materials bundle
m(j,t) ! Materials bundle sector




hka(t) ! Human capital
inv(t) ! Aggregate investment
G(t) ! Aggregate governmnent good
cons(t) ! Aggregate private consumption
rdi(t) ! Aggregate research and development
$consumers :
ra ! Representative agent
govt(t) ! Tax collector
$auxiliary :
tk ! Terminal capital stock
thk ! Terminal human capital stock
* report variables
$report :
v :taxt(t) i :pg(t) prod :cons(t) ! Total taxes
v :labsect(j,t) i :pl(t) prod :va(j,t) ! Skilled labor per sector
v :dpro(j,t) o :p(j,t) prod :y(j,t) ! Production for domestic use
v :epro(j,t) o :px(j,t) prod :y(j,t) ! Production for export use
v :con(t) o :pcons(t) prod :cons(t) ! Consumption
v :ex(j,t) o :pfx(t) prod :expo(j,t) ! Exports
v :im(j,t) i :pfx(t) prod :imp(j,t) ! Imports
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v :agginv(t) o :pinv(t) prod :inv(t) ! Q of aggregate inv.
v :aggrd(t) o :prd(t) prod :rdi(t) ! Q of aggregate R&D inv.
v :t_inv(i,t) i :pa(i,t) prod :inv(t) ! Inv. aﬀected by tax
v :tang(j,t) i :pklem(j,t) prod : y(j,t) ! Tanbible inputs in prod. function
v :materials(j,t) i :pma(j,t) prod :em(j,t) ! Materials in the production
v :cap_serv(j,t) i :rk(t) prod :va(j,t) ! Sectoral use of capital services
v :hum_serv(j,t) i :rhk(t) prod :y(j,t) ! Sectoral use of HK services
v :inv_fe(i,t)$fe(i) i :pa(i,t) prod :inv(t) ! Inv in PK in the FF sector
v :rd_fe(i,t)$fe(i) i :pa(i,t) prod :rdi(t) ! Inv. in RD in the FF sector
v :p_cons(i,t)$fe(i) i :pa(i,t) prod :cons(t) ! Emissions from private consumption
v :g_cons(i,t)$fe(i) i :pa(i,t) prod :G(t) ! Emissions from gov. consumption
v :sect_fe(fe,j,t)$eise(j) i :pac(fe,t) prod :fb(j,t) ! sectoral FF (covered sectors)
v :sect_fe(fe,j,t)$neise(j) i :pa(fe,t) prod :fb(j,t) ! sectoral FF (non-covered sectors)
* carbon accounting sector only for covered sectors by the PNAQ
$prod :carbon(fe,t) s :0
o :pac(fe,t) q :(sum(eise,xbarbal(fe,eise)))
i :pa(fe,t) q :(sum(eise,xbarbal(fe,eise)))
i :ptcl(t)$tcl(t) q :(ccoef(fe) * sum(eise,xbarbal(fe,eise)))
* CES production function (KL EM)H
$prod :y(j,t) elat :2
o :px(j,t)$(exptbal(j)) q :exptbal(j)$(exptbal(j)) p :py0(j) a :govt(t) t :tybal(j)
o :p(j,t) q :d0bal(j) p :py0(j) a :govt(t) t :tybal(j)
i :pklem(j,t) q :(em0bal(j)+(sum(fufu,vbarbal(fufu,j))+tot_idbal(j))) elat :
i :rhk(t) q :vbarbal("Hum",j) elat :
* production of the bundle (KL EM)
$prod :klem(j,t)
o :pklem(j,t) q :(em0bal(j)+(sum(fufu,vbarbal(fufu,j))+tot_idbal(j)))
i :pem(j,t) q :em0bal(j)
i :pva(j,t) q :(sum(fufu,vbarbal(fufu,j))+tot_idbal(j))
* creation of an EM bundle
$prod :em(j,t) s :0.75
o :pem(j,t) q :em0bal(j)
i :pnb(j,t) q :n0bal(j)
i :pma(j,t) q :ma0bal(j)
* creation of a materials bundle
$prod :m(j,t) s :0.6
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o :pma(j,t) q :ma0bal(j)
i :pa(i,t)$(not e(i)) q :xbarbal(i,j)
* creation of an energy bundle
$prod :nb(j,t) s :0.7
o :pnb(j,t) q :n0bal(j)
i :pfb(j,t) q :f0bal(j)
i :pa("elect",t) q :xbarbal("elect",j)
* creation of a fossil fuel bundle
$prod :fb(j,t) s :1
o :pfb(j,t) q :f0bal(j)
i :pac(fe,t)$eise(j) q :xbarbal(fe,j)
i :pa(fe,t)$neise(j) q :xbarbal(fe,j) a :govt(t) t :tau_c(fe,t)
* value added
$prod :va(j,t) s :1
o :pva(j,t) q :(sum(fufu,vbarbal(fufu,j))+tot_idbal(j))
i :rk(t) q :vbarbal("K",j) P :pf0("K",j) a :govt(t) t :tfbal("k",j)
i :pl(t) q :vbarbal("SL",j) P :pf0("SL",j) a :govt(t) t :tfbal("SL",j)
i :pl(t) q :vbarbal("UL",j) P :pf0("UL",j) a :govt(t) t :tfbal("UL",j)
* armington good
$prod :arm(j,t) s :3
o :pa(j,t) q :a0bal(j)
i :p(j,t) q :d0bal(j)
i :pm(j,t) q :(imptbal(j)$(imptbal(j))*(1+tmbal(j)))
* exports
$prod :expo(j,t)$(exptbal(j))
o :pfx(t) q :exptbal(j)
i :px(j,t) q :exptbal(j)
* imports
$prod :imp(j,t)$(imptbal(j))
o :pm(j,t) q :(imptbal(j)$(imptbal(j))*(1+tmbal(j)))
i :pfx(t) q :imptbal(j)$imptbal(j) P :pm0(j) a :govt(t) t :tmbal(j)
* human capital
$prod :hka(t)
o :prd(t+1) q :((1-deltah)*hk0)
o :prdt$tlast(t) q :((1-deltah)*hk0)
o :rhk(t) q :vhbal
i :prd(t) q :hk0
* physical capital
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$prod :ka(t)
o :pinv(t+1) q :((1-deltak)*k0)
o :pinvt$tlast(t) q :((1-deltak)*k0)
o :rk(t) q :vkbal
i :pinv(t) q :k0
* aggregate investment in human capital
$prod :rdi(t) s :1
o :prd(t+1) q :ivh0
o :prdt$tlast(t) q :ivh0
i :pa(i,t) q :gbarbal(i,"rdﬀ") a :govt(t) t :tau_c(i,t)$fe(i)
* aggregate investment : only positive values
$prod :inv(t) s :1
o :pinv(t+1) q :iv0
o :pinvt$tlast(t) q :iv0
i :pa(i,t) q :tinvbal(i) a :govt(t) t :tau_c(i,t)$fe(i)
* Aggregated private consumption
$prod :cons(t) s :1
o :pcons(t) q :((1-mubal)*cbarbal)
i :pa(i,t) q :((1-mubal)*gbarbal(i,"Fcons")) a :govt(t) t :tau_c(i,t)$fe(i)
* aggregate government consumption
$prod :G(t) s :1
o :pg(t) q :totsbal
i :pa(i,t) q :(mubal*gbarbal(i,"Fcons")) a :govt(t) t :tau_c(i,t)$fe(i)
* Final private demand of the representative agent
$demand :ra
d :pcons(t) q :(((1-mubal)*cbarbal) * qref(t)) p :pref(t)
e :pl(t) q :((sum(j,vbarbal("SL",j)))*qref(t))
e :pl(t) q :((sum(j,vbarbal("UL",j)))*qref(t))
e :pinv(tfirst) q :k0
e :pinvt q :(-1) r :tk
e :prd(tfirst) q :hk0
e :prdt q :(-1) r :thk
e :pfx(t) q :(bopdefbal*qref(t))
e :pa(j,t) q :(-xinvbal(j)*qref(t))
e :ptcl(t)$tcl(t) q :tcl(t)
* Government demand
$demand :govt(t)
d :pg(t) p :pref(t)
e :pg(t) q :totsbal
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* The last year (t$tlast(t)) the increase of investment in physical capital must equal
to the increase of production
$constraint : tk
sum(t$tlast(t),inv(t)/inv(t-1)-((sum(j,y(j,t)))/(sum(j,y(j,t-1))))) =e= 0 ;
* The last year (t$tlast(t)) the increase of investment in human capital must equal
the increase of production
$constraint : thk
sum(t$tlast(t),rdi(t)/rdi(t-1)-((sum(j,y(j,t)))/(sum(j,y(j,t-1))))) =e= 0 ;
$oﬀtext
*=========================================
* BENCHMARK REPLICATION AND FREE SOLVE
*=========================================
$sysinclude mpsgeset modelf
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* set carbon price to zero in benchmark
ptcl.l(t) = 0 ;








* SOLVING OF THE MODEL
*option nlp pathnlp ;
option mcp=path ;
* benchmark replication
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modelf.iterlim=0 ;
$include modelf.gen
solve modelf using mcp ;
* No calibration
abort$(ABS(modelf.OBJVAL) GT 1.E-4)
"*** benchmark does not calibrate." ;
* benchmark national income





solve modelf using mcp ;
$ontext
*=========================================































sector_emiss_bau(j,t) = sum(fe, ccoef(fe) * sect_fe.l(fe,j,t)) ;
emiss_bau(t) = sum(fe,emiss0(fe) * carbon.l(fe,t)) ;
eis_emiss_bau(t) = sum(eis, sector_emiss_bau(eis,t)) ;
ener_emiss_bau(t) = sum(e, sector_emiss_bau(e,t)) ;
neise_emiss_bau(t) = sum(neise, sector_emiss_bau(neise,t)) ;
eise_emiss_bau(t) = ener_emiss_bau(t) + eis_emiss_bau(t) ;
* Emissions that come from non covered sectors and derive from Investment and
consumption
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bau_emiss_a0(t) = tot_neisfi(t) + eis_emiss_bau(t)+ener_emiss_bau(t) ;
inc_bau(t) = ra.l ;
tangi(j,t) = tang.l(j,t) ;
material(j,t) =materials.l(j,t) ;
productneise(t) = sum(neise, epro.l(neise,t) + dpro.l(neise,t)) ;




product(j,t) = epro.l(j,t) + dpro.l(j,t) ;
* Human capital and physical capital services
tot_hum_serv(t) = sum(j,hum_serv.l(j,t)) ;
hum_serv_sect_eise(t) = sum(eise,hum_serv.l(eise,t)) ;
hum_serv_sect_neise(t) = sum(neise,hum_serv.l(neise,t)) ;
tot_cap_serv(t) = sum(j,cap_serv.l(j,t)) ;
hum_serv_sect(j,t) = hum_serv.l(j,t) ;
cap_serv_sect(j,t) = cap_serv.l(j,t) ;
* Production
pro(t,j) = dpro.l(j,t)*p.l(j,t)+epro.l(j,t)*px.l(j,t) ;
* Labor
tot_lab_bau(j,t) = labsect.l(j,t) ;
* Price of human capital services and physical capital
impact(t,"prhkser") = rhk.l(t) ;
impact(t,"prpkser") = rk.l(t) ;
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option sector_emiss_bau :5 ;
option eis_emiss_bau :5 ;
option ener_emiss_bau :5 ;
option neise_emiss_bau :5 ;
option eise_emiss_bau :5 ;
option inc_bau :5 ;
option emiss_bau :5 ;
option tot_neisfi :5 ;
option bau_emiss_a0 :5 ;
option gdp_bau :5 ;
option tot_hum_serv :5 ;
option hum_serv_sect :5 ;
option hum_serv_sect_eise :5 ;
option hum_serv_sect_neise :5 ;
option bau_invk :5 ;
option bau_invr :5 ;
option tot_cap_serv :5 ;
option cap_serv_sect :5 ;
option tot_lab_bau :5 ;
option impact :5 ;
option product :5 ;
option tangi :5 ;
option producteise :5 ;
option productneise :5 ;
option material :5 ;
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option gdp_bau_rep :5 ;
option eis_bau_rep :5 ;
option neise_bau_rep :5 ;
option eise_bau_rep :5 ;
option tot_bau_emiss_a0_rep :5 ;
option tot_hum_bau :5 ;
option tot_cap_bau :5 ;
option bau_invk_rep :5 ;
option bau_invr_rep :5 ;
option producteise_bau :5 ;
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*=========================================
* We constrain only the sectors that are constrained by the NAP
parameter
impact Vector of impact of policy shock
;
parameter
ener_emiss_con NAP constraint on the energy producing sectors
eis_emiss_con NAP constraint on the energy intensive sectors
;
ener_emiss_con(t) = 17.72 ;
eis_emiss_con(t) = 15.88 ;
* PNAQ data for France for 2005 - 2007 + BANKING
tcl(t)$(ord(t)=11) = 37.40414 - 0.25209 ;
tcl(t)$(ord(t)=12) = 38.15223 - 0.26389 ;
tcl(t)$(ord(t)=13) = 38.91527 - 0.27299 ;
* PNAQ data for France for 2008 - 2012 + BANKING, with NAP not constrained
no Kyoto
tcl(t)$(ord(t)=14) = 39.69358 - 1.30449 ;
tcl(t)$(ord(t)=15) = 40.48745 - 1.37549 ;
tcl(t)$(ord(t)=16) = 41.29720 - 1.49549 ;
tcl(t)$(ord(t)=17) = 42.12314 - 1.59849 ;
tcl(t)$(ord(t)=18) = 42.96560 - 1.72849 ;
* PNAQ data for France for 2008 - 2012 + BANKING, with NAP not constrained
with Kyoto
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=14) = - ;
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=15) = - ;
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=16) = - ;
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=17) = - ;
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=18) = - ;
* PNAQ data for France for 2008 - 2012 + BANKING, with NAP constrained to
32 with Kyoto
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* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=14) = - ;
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=15) = - ;
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=16) = - ;
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=17) = - ;
* tcl(t)$(ord(t)=18) = - ;
* PNAQ data for France NO BANKING
* tcl(t)$(ord(t) >= 11) = ener_emiss_con(t) + eis_emiss_con(t) ;
* PNAQ data for France in the case where the NAP is constrained, NO BANKING
* tcl(t)$(ord(t) >= 14) = 32 ;
* PNAQ data + Kyoto 2008 - 2012
* carbtax(t)$(ord(t) >= 14) = 8.5 ;
* tau_c(fe,t) = carbtax(t) * 1e-3 * ccoef(fe) ;
$include modelf.gen

































tot_emiss_pol(t) = eise_emiss_pol(t)+tot_neisfi_pol(t) ;
inc_pol(t) = ra.l ;
tangi(j,t) = tang.l(j,t) ;
material(j,t) =materials.l(j,t) ;
productneise(t) = sum(neise, epro.l(neise,t) + dpro.l(neise,t)) ;




product(j,t) = epro.l(j,t) + dpro.l(j,t) ;
pro(t,j) = dpro.l(j,t)*p.l(j,t)+epro.l(j,t)*px.l(j,t) ;
tot_lab_pol(j,t) = labsect.l(j,t) ;
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sector_emiss_pol(j,t) = sum(fe, ccoef(fe) * sect_fe.l(fe,j,t)) ;
emiss_pol(t) = sum(fe,emiss0(fe) * carbon.l(fe,t)) ;
eis_emiss_pol(t) = sum(eis, sector_emiss_pol(eis,t)) ;
ener_emiss_pol(t) = sum(e, sector_emiss_pol(e,t)) ;
neise_emiss_pol(t) = sum(neise, sector_emiss_pol(neise,t)) ;
eise_emiss_pol(t) = ener_emiss_pol(t) + eis_emiss_pol(t) ;
tot_hum_serv_pol(t) = sum(j,hum_serv.l(j,t)) ;
hum_serv_sect_pol(j,t) = hum_serv.l(j,t) ;
hum_serv_sect_eise_pol(t) = sum(eise,hum_serv.l(eise,t)) ;
hum_serv_sect_neise_pol(t) = sum(neise,hum_serv.l(neise,t)) ;
tot_cap_serv_pol(t) = sum(j,cap_serv.l(j,t)) ;
cap_serv_sect_pol(j,t) = cap_serv.l(j,t) ;
impact(t,"pc $/ton") = 1000 * ptcl.l(t) ;
impact(t,"welf level") = ra.l ;
impact(t,"pr. HK serv") = rhk.l(t) ;
impact(t,"pr. PK serv") = rk.l(t) ;
option sector_emiss_pol :5 ;
option eis_emiss_pol :5 ;
option ener_emiss_pol :5 ;
option neise_emiss_pol :5 ;
option eise_emiss_pol :5 ;
option tot_emiss_pol :5 ;
option tot_neisfi_pol :5 ;
option inc_pol :5 ;
option emiss_pol :5 ;
option gdp_pol :5 ;
option impact :5 ;
option tot_hum_serv_pol :5 ;
option product :5 ;
option hum_serv_sect_pol :5 ;
option hum_serv_sect_neise_pol :5 ;
option hum_serv_sect_eise_pol :5 ;
option tot_cap_serv_pol :5 ;
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option cap_serv_sect_pol :5 ;
option tot_lab_pol :5 ;
option pol_invr :5 ;
option pol_invk :5 ;
option tangi :5 ;
option producteise :5 ;
option productneise :5 ;
option material :5 ;
display emiss_pol, inc_pol, sector_emiss_pol, gdp_pol, eis_emiss_pol, ener_emiss_pol,
eise_emiss_pol, neise_emiss_pol,
tot_emiss_pol, impact, tot_lab_pol, hum_serv_sect_pol, cap_serv_sect_pol,
tot_hum_serv_pol,tot_cap_serv_pol, pro,
hum_serv_sect_neise_pol, hum_serv_sect_eise_pol, pol_invr, pol_invk, prod-



































option gdp_pol_rep :5 ;
option eis_pol_rep :5 ;
option neise_pol_rep :5 ;
option eise_pol_rep :5 ;
option tot_pol_emiss_a0_rep :5 ;
option tot_hum_pol :5 ;
option tot_cap_pol :5 ;
option pol_invr_rep :5 ;
option pol_invk_rep :5 ;
option productneise_pol :5 ;
option producteise_pol :5 ;
display gdp_pol_rep,emiss_pol_rep,eis_pol_rep, eise_pol_rep,ener_pol_rep,
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neise_pol_rep,tot_pol_emiss_a0_rep, tot_hum_pol, tot_cap_pol, pol_invr_rep,
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In this thesis, we sought to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
the process of induced technological change. After having made an overview in the
first chapter of this thesis of the diﬀerent techniques to model technological change in
energy-economy models, we build a CGE model for the French economy in the second
chapter where we model technological change as an exogenous process. We determine in
detail the impact on the economy of a policy similar to the French National Allocation
Plan and address the diﬀerent model reactions to such a policy in the case where firms
cannot have access to technological change. We address the shortcomings of modeling
technological change as an exogenous process in such a specification, specifically in
that it is impossible with such a model to define the eﬀect of an emission constraint on
technological change, nor its impact on the rest of the economy. In the third chapter
we model in a partial theoretical model introduced by Nordhaus in 1968, an energy
constraint, and show that the optimal direction of technological change can indeed be
expected to be influenced by such a policy. However, in such a partial framework we
do not assess the impacts on the whole economy of such an emission constraint. For
this reason, in the fourth chapter of this thesis, we determine a method for modeling
technological change through the stock of knowledge approach in a forward looking
version of the general equilibrium model for France described in the second chapter of
this thesis. By so doing we manage to determine the eﬀect of the National Allocation




We show that, in a general equilibrium framework the negative impact of the revenue
eﬀect, limits the positive eﬀect of technological change on the covered sectors. Moreover,
while the process of technological change indeed slightly limits the negative impacts of
the environmental policy on the economy, the eﬀect on production and emissions are
very small and are a short lived process. Technological change appears the first years
of the constraints and disappears rapidly in the following years leaving the economy
on a path where substitutions are the only reaction possibility of the model. Indeed,
with our specification of induced technological change, the conventional substitutions
between tangible inputs detailed in the second chapter of this thesis, are the firms’ only
solution to facing the emission constraints. With such model behavior, we support
the proposition that technological change has less eﬀect on the economy than the
conventional substitution between tangible inputs. In our frame of work, in order for
technological change to play a major role in the model’s reactions, it is necessary for
the emission constraint to increase each year and not be stable over a period of time.
Finally, we also show that an eviction eﬀect may lead to the fall in the investment in
physical capital when the investment in human capital increases.
Such small results the first years of the introduction of the constraints may be due to
the type of emission constraint that we introduced in the model, whereby the National
Allocation Plan is indeed a very loose constraint. It would be interesting to study, for
instance, the eﬀect on the model of introducing the Kyoto constraint on the non covered
sectors in the second simulation period, or simply a stronger emission constraint than
the NAP on covered sectors. Another cause for these small reactions could be linked
to the value of the elasticities of substitution between the tangible inputs. Indeed,
minimizing the substitution possibilities may also be a means to enhancing the impact
on human capital services of an environmental policy. For this reason a sensitivity
analysis would be interesting to undertake.
In our specification of the production function, technological change is Hicks-neutral
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in the sense that it increases the productivity of all inputs to production in a similar
fashion. Therefore, by modifiying the production function, it would be particularly
interesting to study how technological change may increase the productivity of energy
alone or reduce the emission / output relationship.
In terms of the data extraction, in the process of extracting human capital from
the SAM we chose to concentrate on human capital embodied in the interindustry
transaction matrix as well as in the value of labor found in the SAM. We recognize here
that human capital may also be extracted from physical capital services and extracting
human capital services from this factor would refine the analysis. Such refinement would
be useful if this technique for modeling technological change is further studied.
Finally, one of our main constraints in this thesis being the lack of precise data for
our date of calibration, namely 1995, it is almost needless to add that such analysis
would gain in accuracy with more up-to-date and accurate values for the diﬀerent




Dans cette thèse, nous avons cherché à déterminer l’eﬀet de la prise en compte du
progrès technique endogène sur l’étude des répercussions économiques d’une contrainte
environnementale.
En eﬀet, aujourd’hui les dégâts environnementaux, conséquences de nos comporte-
ments ne peuvent plus être ignorés. Nos comportements enracinés dans une forte
préférence pour le présent, et notre capacité à ignorer les conséquences futures de
nos actions, plus ces conséquences sont lointaines dans le temps, se traduisent par des
choix de consommation de plus en plus égoïstes. Il y a encore une centaine d’années,
nul ne prenait conscience du fait que l’industrialisation grandissante de notre économie
pouvait avoir des répercussions néfastes sur l’environnement. Aujourd’hui, alors que
nos consciences commencent à être rodées, il est particulièrement frappant que ce qui
motive l’homme dans sa volonté de protéger l’environnement est non pas cette prise
de conscience mais simplement le fait que l’on commence déjà à voir et à ressentir
les conséquences de nos choix de vie. Ainsi, l’on peut bien chercher à démontrer que
nos actions auront de graves répercussions sur le bien-être de nos enfants ou petits
enfants, mais ceci ne nous incitera pas réellement à changer de comportement. C’est
bien l’imminence et la palpabilité de ces répercussions qui pourra nous faire remet-
tre nos comportements en question. Mais il faut aussi bien avouer que l’homme, face
aux conséquences de ses choix de vie, ne désire pas réellement modifier ses choix de
consommation profondément enracinés dans ses habitudes, et réduire son bien-être
aujourd’hui, même s’il sait que cela augmentera son bien-être demain.
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Cette réticence se traduit par le comportement frileux de certains gouvernements
qui, soumis au culte de la croissance quantitative craignent de la contraindre en soumet-
tant leur économie à des politiques environnementales. En eﬀet, peu acceptent de met-
tre en péril la croissance de leur économie pour le bien-être environnemental du monde
demain. D’ailleurs, le comportement de nos gouvernements reflète ceux des hommes qui
la composent. Si se limiter aujourd’hui dans ses choix de consommation est pénible,
risquer de corrompre la croissance, inconcevable. D’autant plus que se mêlent à ces
choix gouvernementaux les considérations personnelles des personnages politiques, qui
voient en une croissance soutenue aujourd’hui la condition sine qua non à leur réélection
demain.
C’est peut-être d’ailleurs au fond, devant ce constant d’échec que l’on a du chercher
en autre chose que dans le modification de nos comportements, la solution au problème
du changement climatique. En eﬀet, même si le concept et l’existence même du progrès
technique est loin d’être nouveau, il a trouvé au coeur de cette problématique une
nouvelle raison essentielle à son existence. Tout compte fait, n’est il pas le moyen
idéal pour empêcher qu’une contrainte environnementale ait un impact négatif sur la
croissance ? Ainsi, pour ne pas risquer qu’agir pour la protection de l’environnement
nous force à modifier nos choix de consommation, nous cherchons dans l’existence du
progrès technique la solution à l’apparente dichotomie qui existe entre croissance et
contrainte environnementale.
Et pourquoi pas d’ailleurs. Après tout, il est bien évident que le progrès technique
est au coeur du fonctionnement de notre société et qu’il est d’ailleurs l’élément essentiel
de la croissance. Ainsi, ne pas le prendre en compte dans les projections de nos modèles
serait ne pas prendre en compte l’élément central à leur croissance. Mais la question
qui est posée ici, est celle de l’endogénéité du progrès technique, à savoir, si et comment
le progrès technique est influencé par les diﬀérentes contraintes d’une société, et si et
comment il permet de lever les contraintes pour faire croître toujours plus.
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C’est dans un contexte de modélisation que s’inscrit cette thèse et au coeur de ce
débat entre politique environnementale, progrès technique et croissance.
Nous allons ainsi chercher à montrer comment la prise en compte d’une contrainte
environnementale dans un modèle d’équilibre général calculable où le progrès technique
est modélisé comme un processus exogène, aﬀecte une économie. Nous adresserons ainsi
les limitations qui sous-tendent la modélisation du changement technologique comme
un processus exogène et chercherons à mettre en évidence les impactes du Plan National
d’Allocation des Quotas, sur les diﬀérents secteurs de l’économie française. Ensuite,
nous montrerons comment la direction du progrès technique est en fait aﬀectée par une
contrainte environnementale. Ceci nous permettra de soutenir l’idée qu’il est nécessaire
de modéliser le progrès technique comme un processus endogène qui peut être influencé
par une politique environnementale et qui canalise les eﬀets de cette politique sur une
économie. Enfin, nous reprenons le modèle d’équilibre général modélisé avec le progrès
technique exogène et nous présentons une méthode pour modéliser le progrès technique
de manière endogène à travers le l’approche par le "Stock de Connaissances". Nous
étudions ensuite comment la prise en compte du progrès technique induit influence les
résultats du modèle. Nous montrons, que finalement, le progrès technique induit a peu
d’impacts sur le comportement de l’économie.
Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, nous donnons un état de l’art de la modéli-
sation du progrès technique. Nous étudions comment le progrès technique est générale-
ment modélisé dans les modèles économie - énergie, c’est à dire les modèles qui prennent
en compte la dimension énergie de l’économie. Nous montrons qu’il existe deux méth-
odes fondamentalement diﬀérentes dans la modélisation du progrès technique ; il est
soit possible de le modéliser de façon exogène, soit de façon endogène. Modéliser le pro-
grès technique de façon exogène sousentend que l’on suppose que le progrès technique
dans sa direction ou dans son taux ne peut pas être aﬀecté par une contrainte. En eﬀet,
il suit une tendance prédéterminée par le modélisateur. En revanche, modéliser le pro-
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grès technique de façon endogène signifie que le modélisateur suppose que sa direction
et son taux sont malléables et sont la conséquence de la situation économique.
Nous présentons dans ce chapitre deux méthodes pour modéliser le progrès tech-
nique exogène et deux méthodes pour modéliser le progrès technique endogène. Il est en
eﬀet possible de modéliser le progrès technique exogène par le paramètre "Autonomous
Energy Eﬃciency Improvement", ou par les Technologies Backstop. Par ailleurs il est
possible de modéliser le progrès technique endogène par le "Learning by Doing" et
par l’approche par le "Stock de Connaissances". Nous détaillons mathématiquement la
modélisation de ces quatre approches et présentons les avantages et les inconvénients
liés à ces méthodes de modélisation.
Dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse nous construisons un modèle d’équilibre
général calibré sur une matrice de comptabilité sociale, compilée par les chercheurs de
GEM-E3 et EUROSTAT, représentant la France en 1995. Nous construisons une ver-
sion dynamique récursive de ce modèle, et modélisons le progrès technique de manière
exogène. L’objectif de ce chapitre est d’étudier comment une économie réagit dans le cas
d’une contrainte environnementale libellée sous la forme du Plan National d’Allocation
des Quotas (PNAQ), et dans le cas où le progrès technique n’est pas malléable. Pour ce
faire, nous étudions trois politiques. La première est l’introduction du PNAQ en 2005
et jusqu’en 2012, sans contrainte supplémentaire. La deuxième est l’introduction du
PNAQ en 2005 et jusqu’en 2012 couplée avec l’introduction des contraintes de Kyoto
en 2008 et jusqu’en 2012. La troisième est l’introduction du PNAQ en 2005 et jusqu’en
2007, rendue plus contraignante entre 2008 et 2012, et couplée avec l’introduction des
contraintes de Kyoto en 2008.
Nous montrons à travers la modélisation du PNAQ jusqu’en 2012, que cette poli-
tique est peu contraignante, et que le prix des permis est proche de 1.2$ MtC la première
période et 8.5$ MtC la deuxième période. Nous montrons que la production des secteurs
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couverts (secteurs visés par le PNAQ) chute pendant le temps où la contrainte est ac-
tive par rapport au BAU (Business as Usual) alors que la production des secteurs non
couverts (secters non visés par le PNAQ) croît relativement au BAU. Nous mettons
simplement ici en évidence le phénomène principal qui sous-tend ce modèle, à savoir
les possibilités de substitutions. En eﬀet, alors que les secteurs couverts sont contraints
dans leurs émissions, la production des secteurs non couverts est tout simplement plus
demandée dans le processus de production des deux types de secteurs. Nous montrons
de plus, que ce sont les secteurs dont la production est la plus intensive en pétrole
et en gaz, qui achètent les permis sur le marché des permis d’émission négociables au
prix de 1.2$ MtC la première période et 8.5$ MtC la deuxième période. En eﬀet, ces
secteurs peuvent diﬃcilement substituer assez de leurs inputs pour satisfaire les con-
traintes d’émission. Les secteurs dont la production est la moins intensive en pétrole
et en gaz sont vendeurs de permis sur le marché, car leurs simples substitutions leur
permettent de polluer moins.
Nous montrons à travers la deuxième politique environnementale, que l’introduction
du PNAQ jusqu’en 2012, couplé en 2008 avec les contraintes de Kyoto (approximées par
une taxe sur les secteurs non couverts de 26$ MtC) modifient ces premiers résultats.
Dans la première période, le prix des permis des secteurs couverts est de 1.2$ MtC
tandis que ce prix n’atteint que 3.4$ MtC la deuxième période (contrairement à 8.5
$ MtC dans la première politique). Ceci vient du fait que les contraintes reposant
sur les secteurs non couverts les forcent cette fois à réduire leurs émissions. Ainsi les
secteurs non couverts utilisent dans leur production encore moins de charbon, pétrole
et gaz (énergies fossiles polluantes), ce qui leur permet de réduire leurs émissions.
La production totale des secteurs couverts chute ainsi mécaniquement comme leur
demande chute. Le prix des permis d’émissions négociables que s’échangent les secteurs
couverts, tombe forcément. Il apparaît ici que les secteurs qui se portent vendeurs de
permis d’émissions négociables dans la deuxième période sont maintenant les secteurs
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du charbon, du pétrole et du gaz. En eﬀet, leur demande chute tellement qu’ils se
trouvent en état d’excédent de permis alors que les autres secteurs se portent acheteurs
de permis en raison du léger accroissement de leur production.
Nous montrons à travers la troisième politique environnementale, que l’introduction
du PNAQ jusqu’en 2007, rendu plus contraignant (1.45 MtC en moins que la contrainte
initiale) en 2008 et couplé avec les contraintes de Kyoto (approximées cette fois par
une taxe de 8$ MtC sur les secteurs non couverts) modifient encore ces résultats. Nous
montrons que le prix des permis la première période est de 1.2$ MtC tandis que ce
prix atteint à la deuxième période 25$ MtC. Cette croissance des prix provient du
fait que la contrainte est accrue sur les secteurs couverts. La production total des
secteurs couverts chute encore plus fortement que dans les deux premières politiques
et ce en raison du fait que le PNAQ est plus contraignant. La production des secteurs
non couverts croit encore plus que dans les deux politiques précédentes en raison des
phénomènes de substitution d’inputs en leur faveur. Cette fois, les secteurs couverts qui
achètent leurs permis sur le marché des permis d’émissions négociables sont à nouveau
les même secteurs que dans la première politique, à savoir les secteurs qui sont les
plus intensifs en pétrole et gaz. Les autres se portent vendeurs sur le marché, car ils
ont réussi à substituer leurs inputs suﬃsamment pour réduire leurs émissions. Ce qui
apparaît ici est le fait que contraindre encore plus le PNAQ dans la deuxième période
fait chuter la taxe sur les secteurs non couverts. Elle est tout simplement moins forte
car les contraintes de Kyoto sont presque atteints grâce au PNAQ.
Dans le troisième chapitre de cette thèse nous étudions à l’aide d’unmodèle théorique
introduit par Nordhaus en 1968, la direction du progrès technique dans le cas où il ex-
iste une contrainte sur l’utilisation d’énergie. Ainsi, l’objectif de ce chapitre est de
montrer que la direction du progrès technique repose sur les facteurs de production qui
sont contraints et n’est donc pas indépendant de l’introduction de politiques environ-
nementales.
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Pour ce faire nous reprenons le cadre de travail de Nordhaus et introduisons dans la
fonction de production simple du producteur comprenant le capital (facteur accumu-
lable dans le temps) et le travail (facteur non reproductible), un facteur de production
supplémentaire, l’énergie (facteur reproductible). Dans ce cas, nous montrons que le
résultat canonique de Nordhaus est à nouveau vérifié, à savoir que sur le sentier de
croissance de long terme le progrès technique est neutre au sens de Harrod ; il repose
sur le facteur de production non reproductible. Nous montrons de plus que les con-
ditions nécessaires qui sous-tendent ce résultat sont suﬃsantes quand l’élasticité de
substitution entre l’agrégat capital-énergie et le travail est inférieur à 1. Dans le cas où
il est supérieur à 1, nous montrons que sur le sentier de croissance de long terme, le
progrès technique neutre au sens de Harrod n’est plus optimal. Enfin, nous montrons
que sur ce sentier, tous les facteurs intensifs croissent au taux de croissance du pro-
grès technique, ce qui signifie que les émissions provenant de l’utilisation de l’énergie
croîtront sans contrainte.
Nous introduisons ensuite une contrainte sur l’utilisation d’énergie, et nous sup-
posons qu’à long terme l’utilisation d’énergie ne peut pas dépasser un certain seuil.
Nous montrons dans ce cas que sur le sentier de croissance de long terme il est impossi-
ble que le progrès technique soit neutre au sens de Harrod. Il faut en eﬀet que le progrès
technique repose en partie sur l’agrégat capital-énergie. En eﬀet, nous montrons que
dans le cas où la part du capital dans l’agrégat capital-énergie tend vers l’unité (c’est
à dire est grande), le progrès technique tendra vers la neutralité au sens de Harrod. En
eﬀet, nous tendons à retrouver le cas de Nordhaus à deux facteurs de production. En
revanche, si la part du capital dans l’agrégat capital-énergie tend vers 0 (c’est à dire
est faible), le progrès technique tendra vers la neutralité au sens de Hicks. Enfin, nous
notons que la force de la contrainte ne joue aucun rôle sur la direction du progrès tech-
nique et que le progrès technique sera toujours plus fort sur le travail que sur l’agrégat,
et ce quelle que soit la contrainte sur l’énergie.
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Dans le quatrième chapitre de cette thèse, nous prenons acte des conclusions des
trois premiers chapitres, à savoir que de ne pas prendre en compte le progrès technique
comme un processus endogène limite la puissance explicative du modèle. Le modèle
ne peut pas expliquer comment le progrès technique est aﬀecté par une contrainte en-
vironnementale. De plus, il ne permet pas de rendre compte de toutes les diﬀérentes
réactions qu’une économie peut avoir face à une contrainte environnementale. Enfin,
nous prenons acte des conclusions du premier chapitre relatives aux avantages et limi-
tations dans la modélisation du progrès technique dans les modèles économie-énergie.
Nous présentons ainsi une nouvelle méthode pour modéliser le progrès technique en-
dogène à travers l’approche par le Stock de Connaissances.
Nous reprenons ainsi le modèle d’équilibre général détaillé dans le deuxième chapitre
de cette thèse. Nous modifions tout d’abord la matrice de comptabilité sociale (MCS)
sur laquelle est calibré le modèle de façon à y extraire une estimation du capital humain
compris dans les valeurs de la matrice.
Pour ce faire nous utilisons des données relatives aux investissements en recherche
et développement en 1995 pour chaque secteur donné dans la MCS. Nous multiplions
ces données avec une matrice représentant les flux de brevets en France autour de cette
période. Nous obtenons ainsi une méthode pour estimer comment les investissements
en R&D d’une entreprise i ont été "distribués" ou "spill-over" en 1995 vers les autres
secteurs de l’économie. Nous appelons cette matrice, la matrice de flux technologiques.
Nous extrayons cette matrice de la matrice d’échanges inter-industriels de la MCS
et la sommons sur i et sur j. Nous créons ainsi une nouvelle colonne dans la MCS
représentant les investissements en R&D par secteur et une nouvelle ligne représentant
la valeur des services de capital humain utilisés comme facteur de production.
Or, nous savons que le capital humain est aussi compris dans la valeur du travail que
l’on trouve dans la MCS. Pour en extraire une estimation, nous multiplions le nombre
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de chercheurs employés dans chaque secteur par le salaire d’un travailleur qualifié. Nous
retirons ces valeurs obtenues de la valeur du travail dans la MCS et les ajoutons à la
nouvelle ligne représentant les services de capital humain. Nous obtenons donc une
nouvelle matrice de comptabilité sociale entièrement équilibrée.
Or le problème qui se pose à nous est celle de la méthode à utiliser pour calibrer un
modèle dynamique sur cette matrice. En eﬀet, pour que le stock de capital physique
et le stock de capital humain croissent tous deux au taux de croissance de l’économie,
il faut qu’il y ait un seul taux d’intérêt qui satisfasse les conditions de croissance des
deux stocks. Or, il apparaît que le taux d’intérêt nécessaire pour que le stock de cap-
ital physique croisse sur le sentier de croissance de long terme est diﬀérent de celui
nécessaire pour que le stock de capital humain croisse aussi sur le sentier de croissance
de long terme. Pour résoudre cette diﬃculté, nous choisissons comme taux d’intérêt de
référence, celui du capital physique et déterminons les valeurs de l’investissement en
R&D nécessaires pour que le stock de capital humain croisse sur le sentier de crois-
sance de long terme avec ce taux d’intérêt. Nous modifions les valeurs de la colonne
investissement en R&D, pour que l’équilibre soit satisfait. Cette manipulation sur la
matrice de comptabilité sociale la déséquilibre. Pour la rééquilibrer nous utilisons un
algorithme permettant de recalculer les valeurs de toute la matrice de comptabilité so-
ciale, en minisant le carré de la diﬀérence entre l’ancienne et la nouvelle matrice et en
rajoutant comme contrainte que les valeurs du capital humain et du capital physique
de la nouvelle matrice permette de définir cette croissance de long terme. La matrice
est à nouveau équilibrée.
Nous calibrons ensuite notre modèle sur cette nouvelle matrice ainsi que sur l’anci-
enne matrice. Nous construisons ainsi deux versions du même modèle dyanmique, un
avec le capital physique comme seul stock qui croît sur le sentier de croissance de long
terme, et l’autre avec le capital physique et le capital humain qui croissent tous deux
sur le sentier de croissance de long terme. Ainsi, nous pouvons étudier l’introduction
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du PNAQ dans une version du modèle avec progrès technique endogène et dans une
version du modèle sans progrès technique.
Face à une contrainte environnementale, une entreprise peut substituer entre ses
diﬀérents facteurs de production tangibles tels le travail, la capital physique, l’énergie,
les matériaux, mais peut aussi substituer ces facteurs de production tangibles pour un
facteur de production intangible, le capital humain. Cette dernière substitution est le
processus de progrès technique endogène.
Dans cette specification nous montrons que comme Nordhaus (2002), dans le cas
où on introduit le Plan National d’Allocation des Quotas dans la version du modèle
avec changement technologique induit, l’eﬀet du progrès technique induit est moins
important que les eﬀets de substitution entre les inputs de production tangibles qui
ont lieu les années qui suivent l’introduction de la contrainte. Le détail de ses eﬀets de
substitutions sont donnés dans le chapitre deux de cette thèse.
Par ailleurs, nous montrons comme le fait Sue Wing (2001), que dans le cas où
on a modélisé le progrès technique comme un processus endogène, les secteurs qui ne
sont pas soumis au PNAQ vont accroître leur demande de services de capital humain
par rapport au BAU plus que ne le feront les secteurs qui sont visés par la contrainte
énergétique. Ceci est dû aux eﬀets de substitution qui fait que la production des secteurs
non contraints croît suite à l’introduction de la contrainte énergétique sur les secteurs
couverts, car les deux types de secteurs demandent leur production comme facteur
de production. Cette croissance de leur production leur permet de mécaniquement
accroître leur demande de facteurs de production et donc de services de capital humain.
Nous montrons aussi l’existence d’un eﬀet d’éviction ou eﬀet de "crowding out",
qui relie la demande de services de capital humain à la demande de services de capital
physique. En eﬀect, nous montrons que dans le cas où l’investissement en R&D aug-
mente ceci entraîne une chute de l’investissement en capital physique. C’est pourquoi les
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demandes de services de capital physique et de capital humain suivent des graphiques
inversés.
Enfin, nous montrons dans la lignée de Popp (2002), qu’il existe des pics de demande
de services de capital humain les premières années de l’introduction du PNAQ, et ce
pour les deux types de secteurs. Ceux ci disparaissent les années qui suivent alors même
que la contrainte est encore active.
Le progrès technique est donc un processus à courte espérance de vie, moins eﬃcace
que les eﬀets de substitution fâce à une contrainte environnementale qui ne peut être
induit qu’à force de politiques de plus en plus contraignantes.
Résumé
La réalité du réchauﬀement climatique ne fait plus aucun doute aujourd’hui. Les hommes ont
pris conscience de l’imminence des conséquences de leurs comportements sur l’environnement
ainsi que de la nécessité de prendre des mesures eﬃcaces pour réduire les gaz à eﬀet de serre
provenant de la production industrielle. Ainsi il est important d’étudier les eﬀets d’une poli-
tique environnementale sur le fonctionnement de l’économie. Dans ce contexte, la question
des moyens à mettre en oeuvre pour éviter qu’une politique de protection environnementale
ne déclenche une réduction de la croissance économique, se pose naturellement. Dans cette
thèse nous cherchons étudier si le progrès technique peut remédier à la dichotomie qui existe
entre croissance économique et contrainte environnementale. Nous montrons à travers un
modèle d’équilibre général calculable représentant l’économie française, comment une con-
trainte d’émissions similaire au Plan National d’Allocation des Quotas aﬀecte l’économie de
la France si celle ci ne peut y répondre que par des substitutions entre facteurs de production.
Nous montrons de plus comment la direction du progrès technique peut vraisemblablement
être influencée par une contrainte d’émissions. Ne pas prendre en compte cet eﬀet sur le pro-
grès technique mènerait à la sous-estimation des capacités de réaction d’une économie. Nous
proposons enfin une réflexion sur les eﬀets du progrès technique induit par une contrainte en-
vironnementale dans un cadre d’équilibre général. Le progrès technique est ici définit comme
une demande croissante du facteur de production intangible en réaction à une contrainte
d’émissions, ce qui permet l’augmentation de l’eﬃcacité des facteurs de production tangibles.
Today few people doubt the reality of global warming. We have understood that our
economic choices and behavior influence our environment visibly and rapidly, and see the
necessity for eﬃcient measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions stemming from industrial
production. For this reason, it is important to study the likely eﬀects that an environmental
policy may have on the economy. In this context it is important to investigate how an economy
may counter the negative impacts of an environmental constraint on economic growth. In this
thesis, we seek to determine whether technological progress may be a remedy to the expected
dichotomy between economic growth and environmental protection. We show, through a
general equilibrium model representing the French economy, how a constraint similar to the
French National Allocation Plan aﬀects the French economy when the latter’s only possible
reactions are substitutions between production factors. We then show how the direction of
technological change can be expected to be influenced by an environmental constraint. To
oversee this eﬀect would lead to underestimating the capacity of an economy to react. Finally,
we describe the eﬀects of technological change induced by an environmental constraint in a
general equilibrium framework. Technological change is here modeled as an increased demand
for the intangible production factor following an environmental constraint, which leads to an
increase in the eﬃciency of tangible production factors.
